Opinion
19-CV-4759 (VB)
11-04-2019
CARLOS WARD, Plaintiff, v. N.Y.S.D.O.C.C.S.; THOMAS GRIFFIN, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER; ALBERT ACRISH, NURSE PRACTITIONER; FREDERICK N. BERNSTEIN, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, Defendants.
ORDER OF SERVICE :
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in Green Haven Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting conditions-of-confinement and inadequate medical care claims. By order dated July 30, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner's in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the "special solicitude" in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief "that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action," which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
DISCUSSION
A. N.Y.S.D.O.C.C.S.
Plaintiff's claims against N.Y.S.D.O.C.C.S. must be dismissed. "[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . ." Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). "The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state." Id. New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states' immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against N.Y.S.D.O.C.C.S. are therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). B. Service on Thomas Griffin, Assistant Commissioner; Albert Acrish, Nurse Practitioner; and Frederick N. Bernstein, Medical Director.
Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, Plaintiff is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) ("The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP)). Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that the summons and complaint be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served the summons and complaint until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that a summons be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date the summons is issued. If the complaint is not served within that time, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff's responsibility to request an extension of time for service); see also Murray v. Pataki, 378 F. App'x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) ("As long as the [plaintiff proceeding IFP] provides the information necessary to identify the defendant, the Marshals' failure to effect service automatically constitutes 'good cause' for an extension of time within the meaning of Rule 4(m).").
To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants Thomas Griffin, Assistant Commissioner; Albert Acrish, Nurse Practitioner; and Frederick N. Bernstein, Medical Director, through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form ("USM-285 form") for each of these Defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses and deliver to the Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon these Defendants.
Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if Plaintiff's address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Plaintiff fails to do so.
CONCLUSION
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff, together with an information package.
The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against N.Y.S.D.O.C.C.S. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses, complete the USM-285 forms with the addresses for Thomas Griffin, Assistant Commissioner; Albert Acrish, Nurse Practitioner; and Frederick N. Bernstein, Medical Director, and deliver all documents necessary to effect service to the U.S. Marshals Service.
The Clerk of Court is directed to docket this as a "written opinion" within the meaning of Section 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue). SO ORDERED. Dated: November 4, 2019
White Plains, New York
/s/_________
VINCENT L. BRICCETTI
United States District Judge
DEFENDANTS AND SERVICE ADDRESSES
1. Thomas Griffin
Assistant Commissioner
1220 Washington Avenue, Bldg. 9
Albany, New York 12226
2. Albert Acrish
Nurse Practitioner
Green Haven Correctional Facility
594 Rte. 216
Stormville, New York 12582
3. Frederick N. Bernstein
Medical Doctor
Green Haven Correctional Facility
594 Rte. 216
Stormville, New York 12582