Id. (citing Tims v. Carter, 241 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Tenn. 1951); Ward v. Nat'l Healthcare Corp., No. M2007-00231-COA-R9-CV, 2007 WL 3446340, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2007); Winters, 836 S.W.2d at 585). Here, the complaint states that Plaintiff Darryl Suggs, the Administrator of the Decedent's estate, is a resident of Shelby County. Dr. Jain, who is a material defendant, is also a resident of Shelby County. Because "the plaintiff and defendant both reside in the same county in this state, . . . the action shall be brought either in the county where the cause of action arose or in the county of their residence."
Therefore, the rule does apply in cases involving multiple defendants if the plaintiff and at least one material defendant reside in the same county and that county is where the cause of action accrued. Tims, 241 S.W.2d at 503; Ward v. National Healthcare Corporation, No. M2007-00231-COA-R9-CV, 2007 WL 3446340, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2007); Winters, 836 S.W.2d at 585. A thorough and historical review of the common county rule is stated in Tims v. Carter. 241 S.W. 502-03.
The concept of a "material" defendant for purposes of venue does not appear to be fully developed by our courts. The Tennessee Court of Appeals in Ward v. Nat'l Healthcare Corp., 2007 LEXIS 695 (TennApp. 2007), 2007 WL 3446340 concluded that a material defendant need not be a "principal" or "significant" defendant. In Deaton v. Evans, 241 S.W.2d 423 (Tenn. 1951), the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed a circumstance where plaintiff had filed suit in Shelby County against a state highway patrolman whose residence was in Shelby County and the Tennessee Commissioner of Finance and Taxation who maintained a residence in Davidson County. The relief sought included an order restraining the Department from cancelling plaintiff's vehicle registration.