Opinion
07-06-1934
WARD v. McLELLAN.
John I. O'Neill, of Jersey City, for complainant. Frank G. Turner, of Newark, for defendant.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. This court has jurisdiction of an action based upon a contract made by the husband, decedent, with his wife.
2. Contracts between persons holding this relation to each other (husband and wife) still stand on their ancient footing—void at law but good in equity, if fair, and fairly obtained. * * * Courts of equity alone can give a remedy on a contract made between a husband and his wife, whether redress is sought by one of the original parties against the other, or by or against the legal representatives of one or both of the original parties.
3. The statute of limitations does not operate as a bar to a recovery for moneys loaned by a wife to her husband; where there is a valuable consideration for an assignment of a claim from the widow to another, the assignor is not disqualified from testifying under section 4 of the Evidence Act, as amended by P. L. 1931, p. 305 (Comp. St. Supp. § 70-4).
4. Where the evidence does not show that there was an agreement between decedent and his widow to allow interest upon a loan made to him in his lifetime by his wife, interest will not be allowed.
Suit by Emilie M. Ward, assignee of Anna H. Ringle, against Emma Pauline McLellan, executrix of the estate of Valentine Ringle, deceased.
Order for complainant.
John I. O'Neill, of Jersey City, for complainant.
Frank G. Turner, of Newark, for defendant.
EGAN, Vice Chancellor.
This is a suit by Emilie M. Ward, assignee of Anna H. Ringle, widow of the decedent, Valentine Ringle, for moneys loaned by the widow to the decedent. The assignment of the widow's claim is dated April 2, 1934. The Ringles were married December 15, 1926. The defendant contends that this court is without jurisdiction and that the complainant had an adequate remedy at law. This contention is without force. This court has unquestionable exclusive original jurisdiction over the subject-matter. The action is based upon a contract made by the husband, decedent, with his wife; and, in order to recover, the complainant is required to show that a contract, either express or implied, existed between the said husband and his wife. Wood v. Chetwood, 44 N. J. Eq. 64, 14 A. 21, 22.
In the case cited, the court said: "Contracts between persons holding this relation to each other (husband and wife) still stand on their ancient footing,—void at law, but good in equity, if fair and fairly obtained. * * * Courts of equity alone can give a remedy on a contract made between a husband and his wife, whether redress is sought by one of the original parties against the other, or by or against the legal representative of one or both of the original parties."
The defendant challenges the right of complainant to recover and offers the statute of limitations as a bar. It may be said the statute of limitations does bar the recovery of moneys loaned by the widow to the decedent six years prior to the date of the marriage; but it does not operate as a bar to a recovery for moneys loaned within the said period where the transactions are between husband and wife. There is ample authority in this state for such conclusion; and in support thereof may be cited the case of Bennett v. Finnegan, 72 N. J. Eq. 155, 65 A. 239, in which the court said: "As to the statute of limitations, I must hold it not applicable. This is on the authority of Yeomans v. Petty, 40 N. J. Eq. (13 Stew.) 495, 4 A. 631, decided by Vice Chancellor Bird in 1885, and of Alpaugh v. Wilson, 52 N. J. Eq. (7 Dick.) 424, 28 A. 722, decided by the same Vice Chancellor in 1894, and affirmed on appeal for the reasons given by him. Id., 52 N. J. Eq. (7 Dick.) 589, 33 A. 50. These cases hold distinctly that, so far as relates to claims by the wife against the husband, the statute is not applicable, and they control this case." The same principle is enunciated in Collins v. Babbitt, 67 N. J. Eq. 165, 58 A. 481.
In Reeves v. Weber et al., 111 N. J. Eq. 454, 162 A. 566, 567, the Court of Errors and Appeals said: "We do not repudiate the doctrine enunciated in a long line of decisions of this court which hold that, based upon the public policy of preventing litigation between husband and wife, mere delay on the part of one spouse in bringing an action against the other during the continuance of the marital state does not constitute such 'laches' as will deprive the injured spouse of his or her remedy against the other."
Both the assignor and assignee testified that the assignment was based upon a good and valuable consideration and was founded upon the promise of the assignee to maintain and support the assignor for and during the period of her life. Moosbrugger v. Swick, 86 N. J. Law, 419, 92 A. 269. The assignment in the instant case, I find, is for a valuable consideration, and the assignor, consequently, was not disqualified from testifying under section 4 of the Evidence Act, as amended by P. L 1931, p. 305 (Comp. St. Supp. § 70—4). Howells v. Martin, 101 N. J. Eq. 275, 137 A. 565.
In my opinion the complainant is entitled to recover for all loans made within the six-year period prior to the date of the marriage; and, also, to such loans as were made subsequent to the marriage. The loans approximate the sum of $1,394.10. The complainant demands interest on the loans; but since there is no evidence in the case to indicate that there was an understanding or agreement as to it between the widow and the decedent, interest will not be allowed. Riker v. Riker, 83 N. J. Eq. 198, 92 A. 586.
I shall advise an order to conform with the conclusions herein expressed.