Opinion
C. A. 1:24-562-DCC-SVH
04-25-2024
Anthony Ward, Plaintiff, v. J. Reuben Long Medical Staff and Director Rose, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges, United States Magistrate Judge.
Anthony Ward (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § i983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights by J. Reuben Long Detention Center (“JRLDC”) Medical Staff and Director Rose (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(i)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends this case be summarily dismissed.
Out of an abundance of caution, the undersigned has construed this matter as continuing to include Director Rose, although Plaintiff did not include him in his “amended complaint.” As explained below, Plaintiff's “amended complaint” was an unsigned habeas petition.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges he has informed medical staff that he has “sleep apnea, a hernia, heart flutters and skipped beats, spitting up blood, [and] a major plaque build up inside [his] mouth which is painful and makes it hard to eat.” [ECF No. 1 at 5-6]. He also claims he needs a CPAP machine, but that the JRLDC will not provide one. Id. at 6. He seeks $50,000 in monetary damages and injunctive relief.
On February 13, 2024, the undersigned issued orders (1) directing Plaintiff to submit documents necessary to bring this case into proper form and (2) advising Plaintiff of the deficiencies of his complaint and permitting him until March 5, 2024, to file an amended complaint. [ECF Nos. 7, 8]. The Clerk of Court mailed Plaintiff a blank standard complaint form and other documents to complete. [ECF No. 10]. On February 28, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a completed, but unsigned, petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which the Clerk of Court liberally construed as an amended complaint.
Plaintiff placed the civil action for this case on the petition, so it appears he intended to file it in this case. However, because the petition states the same allegations and seeks the same relief as Plaintiff's original complaint, the Clerk did not convert this case to one sounding in habeas. As discussed more below, the relief Plaintiff seeks is not available in a habeas action.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
B. Analysis
1. JRLDC Medical Staff is not a Person
To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege he was injured by “the deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by a “person” acting “under color of state law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1230 (3d ed. 2014). Only “persons” may act under color of state law; therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” Groups of individuals in a building do not qualify as a “person” who can act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. See Kane v. Beaufort Cty Sheriffs Dep't, C/A No. 9:14-508-RMG, 2015 WL 404570, at *6 n.2 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2015) (noting that “[a] department is not a person subject to suit under § 1983”). Here, JRLDC Medical Staff is not considered a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, and is therefore subject to summary dismissal.
Plaintiff's complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.
2. Supervisory Liability
Plaintiff's complaint contains no factual allegations specific to Rose. To the extent Rose is sued only in his official capacity, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983. The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in illegal action. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (4th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court explains that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-74 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding officials may be held liable for the acts of their subordinates, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source and fails to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization). Accordingly, Rose is subject to summary dismissal.
3. Insufficient Allegations
Plaintiff's claims regarding his medical care are vague in that he generally alleges ailments and that he has not provided adequate care, but he does not allege whether he has been examined by any individual medical professional and on how many occasions. A claim of deliberate medical indifference requires more than a showing of mere negligence, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976), and “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1994) (providing greater explanation of the level of culpability required for deliberate indifference). The Fourth Circuit has noted that treatment “must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff provides insufficient factual information to state a medical indifference claim against Defendants. See Thomas v. Anderson City Jail, No. 6:10-3270-RMG-KFM, 2011 WL 442053, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 19, 2011) (finding the Constitution requires prisoners be provided with a certain minimum level of medical treatment, but it does not guarantee to a prisoner the treatment of his choice); Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir. 1988). Although Plaintiff argues he should have received additional or different treatment, a disagreement as to the proper treatment for an injury does not in and of itself state a constitutional violation. See Brown v. Thompson, 868 F.Supp. 326, 331 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (finding that although the provision of medical care by prison officials is not discretionary, the type and amount of medical care is discretionary).
4. Monetary Relief Is Not Available in Habeas
To the extent Plaintiff intended to convert this case to a habeas petition, it is nevertheless subject to summary dismissal. He states he is seeking a refund from the money paid to see medical and $50,000. [ECF No. 10 at 8]. However, monetary damages are not an available remedy in a habeas corpus action. McKinney-Bey v. Hawk-Sawyer, 69 Fed.Appx. 113, 113 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[t]he purpose of habeas corpus is to test the legality of detention”) (quoting Arias v. Rogers, 676 F.2d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir. 1982)).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be summarily dismissed without leave for further amendment.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).