That argument has been considered but it is entitled to receive little weight and it is of little relevance. We turn now to the chief cases cited by the parties, namely, Dwight A. Ward, 20 T.C. 332, affd. 224 F.2d 547 (C.A. 9, 1955); and Munson v. McGinnes, 283 F.2d 333 (C.A. 3, 1960), certiorari denied 364 U.S. 880. Petitioner has cited additional authorities. All have been considered.

This concept also embraces fees paid to lawyers for negotiating sales. Dwight A. Ward, 1953, 20 T.C. 332. Similar treatment has been accorded expenses of a seller for revenue stamps and title abstracts. Mrs. E.A. Giffin, 1930, 19 B.T.A. 1243.

YANKWICH, District Judge. Before us are the petitions of Dwight A. Ward and Hanna P. Ward to review decisions of the Tax Court entered on August 13, 1953, 20 T.C. 332 decreeing that there were deficiencies in the petitioners' income taxes for the year 1946 in the respective amounts of $8051.46 and $2444.45. The determination of the Tax Court was made on petitions from a determination of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue finding deficiencies in the respective amounts of $11,221.46 and $1,965.95.

As appears from the brief of the plaintiffs herein there are several other decisions to the same effect. See Flood v. United States, 1 Cir., 133 F.2d 173, 178; Kaufman v. Commissioner, 12 T.C., 1114; Ward v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 332, 343; Miller v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. 495; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. People's-Pittsburgh Trust Company, 3 Cir., 60 F.2d 187; Butler v. Commissioner, 17 T.C., 675; Hurt v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A., 653; Folker v. Johnson, 2 Cir., 230 F.2d 906.          In the instant case not only was the litigation in question based upon a contract in which a taxpayer participated when made, but the litigation in question attacked the contract as being invalid at the time, though it also alleged acts of conspiracy upon the part of the defendants, most of these acts occurring after the taxpayer had resigned as Chairman of the Board, but was continuing his activities with the company as aforesaid.

A taxpayer may of course reduce his amount realized by costs and expenses of the property's disposition. See, e.g., sec. 1.263(a)-2(c), Income Tax Regs.; Ward v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 547, 554-55 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'g 20 T.C. 332 (1953); see also sec. 1.1034-1(b)(4)(i), Income Tax Regs. Gaggero doesn't argue, however, that any such costs should lower his amount realized.

A general partner may be deemed to be conducting the trade or business activity of the partnership of which she is a member. Flood v. United States, 133 F.2d 173, 179 (1st Cir.1943); Cokes v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 222, 228, 1988 WL 83530 (1988); Drobny v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1326, 1986 WL 22150 (1986); Brannen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 471, 1982 WL 11168 (1982), affd. 722 F.2d 695 (11th Cir.1984); Hagar v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 759, 1981 WL 11253 (1981); Ward v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 332, 1953 WL 294 (1953), affd. 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir.1955); Cluet v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1178, 1180, 1947 WL 255 (1947); see sec. 1.702–1(b), Income Tax Regs. See generally Rev. Rul. 92–17, 1992–1 C.B. 142.

However, in the Hager case, we proceeded with a partnership analysis. This analysis was in part based on Estate of Lanier v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1980-295, affd. on this issue without published opinion 659 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1981), which reasoned that the partnership level determination was the correct approach because: (1) Of the historical view that for purposes of section 162(a) a partner is really engaged in the business of his partnership (see Ward v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 332, 343 (1953), affd. 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1955); and (2) the language of section 702(b). See section 1.702-1(b), Income Tax Regs., which provides in part that a partner's distributive share of partnership section 270 “hobby losses” (a provision replaced by section 183) retains that character in the hands of the partner.

It has long been established that, in a capital gains context, selling expenses are to be offset against the selling price (i.e., are a reduction of “amount realized”) rather than applied as an addition to the basis of the property sold. See, e.g., Thompson v Commissioner 9 B.T.A. 1342, 1345-1346 (1928); Giffin v Commissioner 19 B.T.A. 1243 (1930); Hunt v Commissioner 47 B.T.A. 829, 839 (1942); Davis v Commissioner 4 T.C. 329 (1944), affd. 151 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied 327 U.S. 783 (1946); South Texas Properties Co v Commissioner 16 T.C. 1003, 1010 (1951); and Ward v Commissioner 20 T.C. 332, 340-343 (1953), affd. 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1955). See also Lanrao Inc v United States 422 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1970); Estate of Machris v Commissioner 34 T.C. 827, 829 (1960); General Spring Corp v Commissioner a Memorandum Opinion of this Court dated July 27, 1953.

It has long been established that, in a capital gains context, selling expenses are to be offset against the selling price (i.e., are a reduction of "amount realized") rather than applied as an addition to the basis of the property sold. See, e.g., Thompson v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 1342, 1345-1346 (1928); Giffin v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 1243 (1930); Hunt v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 829, 839 (1942); Davis v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 329 (1944), affd. 151 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied 327 U.S. 783 (1946); South Texas Properties Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1003, 1010 (1951); and Ward v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 332, 340-343 (1953), affd. 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1955). See also Lanrao, Inc. v. United States, 422 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1970); Estate of Machris v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 827, 829 (1960); General Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, a Memorandum Opinion of this Court dated July 27, 1953.

As in York, the court was not faced with the question of whether the trade or business of a partner was an appropriate consideration in characterizing the activities of the partnership for purposes of section 162. Also distinguishable are Butler v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 1097 (1961); Ward v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 332 (1953), affd. 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1955); Flood v. United States, 133 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1943). Each of these cases stands for the proposition that a taxpayer may be individually engaged in a trade or business by reason of his participation in a partnership.