Opinion
23-CV-6410 (LTS)
11-28-2023
ANTOINETTE WARD, Plaintiff, v. DR. CHEMERINSKI; DR. NADIA NORD; LISAHIA HORTON; DR. LEE, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that Defendants violated her constitutional rights. By order dated August 13, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff leave to replead her claims in an amended complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Antoinette Ward, a resident of Bronx County, filed this complaint against four employees of the Veteran's Administration Medical Center (“VA”) on Kingsbridge Road in the Bronx: (1) Dr. Chemerinski, “OPD Mental Health”; (2) Dr. Nadia Nord, “Primary”' (3) Lisahia Horton, “Practice Manager”; and (4) Dr. Lee, a thoracic surgeon. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to “notify the medical proxy holders,” presumably her and other family members, “prior to major surgery on [her] mother as prescribed by law.” (ECF 1 ¶ II.) Plaintiff's mother underwent surgery on May 1, 2021, and passed away on July 26, 2021. (Id. at III.) Plaintiff claims that Defendants' “fail[ure] to practice due diligence” caused her “undue stress” and pain, and she seeks money damages and declaratory relief. (Id. ¶¶ IV, V.) Attached to the complaint are 8 pages of documents relating to Plaintiff's mother's medical care. (Id. at 8-16.)
DISCUSSION
A. Constitutional claim
Plaintiff brings this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). To state a claim for relief under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege facts that plausibly show that: (1) the challenged action was attributable to an officer acting under color of federal law, and (2) such conduct deprived her of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution. See Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 496 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389). Bivens provides only for money damages; injunctive or declaratory relief is not available under Bivens. See Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The only remedy available in a Bivens action is an award for monetary damages from defendants in their individual capacities.”).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that VA employees failed to notify her, in her capacity as her mother's health care proxy, about her mother's surgery before it was done. These allegations cannot be considered viable claims under Bivens. The Supreme Court has recognized implied causes of action under Bivens in only three contexts: (1) unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); (2) employment discrimination under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); and (3) inadequate medical treatment of a convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has “made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored' judicial activity.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017); see also Egbert v. Boule, 142 S.Ct. 1793, 1805 (2022) (holding in the context of a Fourth Amendment claim under Bivens that “superficial similarities are not enough to support the judicial creation of a cause of action”). Plaintiff's claims do not fall into one of these categories and would constitute an expansion of the Bivens doctrine.
The Court need not reach the issue of whether a Bivens claim for money damages may lie against federal officials based on Plaintiff's allegations at this stage, however, because Plaintiff has not pleaded facts that would state such a claim.
Though, typically, “the Bivens question . . . is ‘antecedent' to the other questions presented,” Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S.Ct. 2003, 2006 (2017) (citing Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757 (2014)), the Supreme Court has endorsed “disposing of a Bivens claim by resolving the constitutional question, while assuming the existence of a Bivens remedy,” Id. at 2007.
B. Tort claim
Plaintiff's allegations may be construed as asserting a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), which waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for claims for damages arising from the tortious conduct of federal officers or employees acting within the scope of their office or employment. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2680. “The proper defendant in an FTCA claim is the United States, not individual federal employees or agencies.” Holliday v. Augustine, No. 3:14-CV-0855, 2015 WL 136545, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 9, 2015).
Before bringing FTCA claims in federal court, a plaintiff must comply with the FTCA's procedural requirements. See Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015). In order to exhaust the FTCA's administrative remedies, a claimant must file a written claim for damages with the appropriate federal entity and receive a final written determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Such an administrative claim must be in writing, specify the damages sought, and be filed within two years of the date the claim accrues. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a). A claimant may file suit in federal district court seeking review of the agency's final decision within six months of the date the notice of final agency decision is mailed. See § 2401(b). Or, if the agency does not make a final decision within six months of the claimant's filing of an administrative claim, the claimant may bring an FTCA action in a federal district court. See § 2675(a). While this exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, see Celestine v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood Health Ctr., 403 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2005), “the FTCA's time bars are nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling,” Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 420.
Here, Plaintiff seeks damages for the allegedly tortious conduct of federal employees of the VA, but she does not allege that she complied with the FTCA's procedural requirements by filing a written claim with the federal agency. “The FTCA requires that a claimant exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a complaint in federal court,” Celestine, 403 F.3d at 82, and “[u]nless a plaintiff complies with that requirement, a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff's FTCA claim.” Johnson, 189 F.3d at 189.
Moreover, “a failure to exhaust one's administrative remedies cannot be cured after the fact.” Giddings v. United States, No. 21-CV-5251 (VSB), 2023 WL 4492411, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2023) (citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“Because this requirement is jurisdictional, the subsequent denial of an administrative claim cannot cure a prematurely filed action.”)); Liriano v. ICE/DHS, 827 F.Supp.2d 264, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The requirement that prematurely filed FTCA claims be dismissed holds even when . . . the FTCA claims would be ripe if re-filed at the date of the court's decision.”).
Plaintiff's complaint gives no indication that she exhausted her FTCA claim by filing an administrative claim with the VA. Unless Plaintiff has exhausted her FTCA claim, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of Plaintiff's complaint. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to name the United States as the sole defendant, and to allege facts showing that she has complied with the FTCA's exhaustion requirement.
C. Claims on behalf of estate
It is unclear whether Plaintiff seeks to assert claims on behalf of her mother's estate, and, if so whether, she may do so pro se. The provision governing appearances in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, allows two types of representation: “that by an attorney admitted to the practice of law by a governmental regulatory body, and that by a person representing [her]self.” Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And “because pro se means to appear for one's self, a person may not appear on another person's behalf in the other's cause. A person must be litigating an interest personal to [her].” Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998). But “when the administrat[rix] and sole beneficiary of an estate with no creditors seeks to appear pro se on behalf of the estate, she is in fact appearing solely on her own behalf, because she is the only party affected by the disposition of the suit.” Pappas v. Philip Morris, Inc., 915 F.3d 889, 893 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 2010)).This is because, “[u]nder those circumstances, the assignment of the sole beneficiary's claims to a paper entity - the estate - rather than to the beneficiary herself, is only a legal fiction.” Id. (citing Guest, 603 F.3d at 21).
D. Leave to amend
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)).
In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court grants her leave to file an amended complaint to provide facts showing that (1) she has exhausted any FTCA claims, whether they are asserted on her own behalf, on behalf of her mother's estate, or both; and (2) she has standing to assert an FTCA claim on behalf of her mother's estate, should she seek to do so.
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated her federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
Plaintiff may consider contacting the New York Legal Assistance Group's (“NYLAG”) Clinic for Pro Se Litigants in the Southern District of New York, which is a free legal clinic staffed by attorneys and paralegals to assist those who are representing themselves in civil lawsuits in this court. The clinic is run by a private organization; it is not part of, or run by, the court. It cannot accept filings on behalf of the court, which must still be made by any pro se party through the Pro Se Intake Unit. A copy of the flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order.
CONCLUSION
The complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff is granted leave to replead her claims in an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-6410 (LTS). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.