Opinion
CV186038410S
07-20-2018
Pamela WARANOWICZ v. Michael ARSENEAULT
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RORABACK, J.
I
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Pamela Waranowicz, brings this action against the defendant, Michael Arseneault, in the wake of an automobile collision which is alleged to have occurred on February 18, 2016 on West Street in Bristol. As a result of the collision, the plaintiff alleges that she suffered injuries and damages.
On February 19, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to strike counts two and three of the plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that the allegations are legally insufficient to sustain a cause of action under either General Statutes § 14-295 or common-law recklessness. On March 26, 2018, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant’s motion to strike. This matter was heard at short calendar on April 16, 2018.
II
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to challenge the legal sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted." Bennett v. Connecticut Hospice, Inc., 56 Conn.App. 134, 136, 741 A.2d 349 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 938, 747 A.2d 2 (2000). "The motion admits all facts well pleaded ... but does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions." (Citation omitted.) Id. "[T]he trial court’s inquiry is to ascertain whether the allegations in each count, if proven, would state a claim on which relief could be granted." Id. In doing so the court must "construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McCoy v. New Haven, 92 Conn.App. 558, 561, 886 A.2d 489 (2005). "A determination regarding the legal sufficiency of a claim is, therefore, a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact." Emerick v. Kuhn, 52 Conn.App. 724, 728-29, 737 A.2d 456, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 929, 738 A.2d 653 (1999). "A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Donar v. King Associates, Inc., 67 Conn.App. 346, 349, 786 A.2d 1256 (2001). "If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
COUNT TWO: STATUTORY RECKLESSNESS
The defendant argues that count two should be stricken because it does not allege a violation of General Statutes § 14-295 with sufficient specificity. Specifically, the defendant claims that the plaintiff has failed to plead any specific particularized allegations of recklessness beyond the recitation of alleged statutory violations.
There exists a split of authority in the Superior Court over the meaning of the term "specifically pleaded." Pyka v. Popielase, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-05-50000166-S (May 30, 2006, Hartmere, J.). The minority view is that a claim under § 14-295, should be similar to the standard for a claim under common-law recklessness, and thus "should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kostiuk v. Queally, 159 Conn. 91, 94, 267 A.2d 452 (1970). Therefore, "under the minority view, a plaintiff must plead the specific facts constituting recklessness above and beyond the facts constituting mere negligence." Termini v. Taylor, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV-05-5000171-S (November 28, 2005, Taylor, J.) (40 Conn.L.Rptr. 424, 425).
In contrast, the majority approach is that § 14-295 does not mandate the same level of specificity as necessary for a claim under common-law recklessness. The majority view requires "that a plaintiff, in addition to pleading facts constituting negligence, need only make the general allegations mentioned in § 14-295: that the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the enumerated statutes, and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Colon v. SNET, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-01-0385673-S (May 22, 2002, Gallagher, J.). "The majority view is based both on an analysis of the legislative history as well as a review of the statutory language of § 14-295 itself. These cases conclude that as long as the general requirements of the statute are met, such pleading is enough to survive a motion to strike and to state a cause of action under § 14-295." (Footnote omitted.) Ferens v. Brown, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-00-0509116-S (October 11, 2001, Quinn, J.).
This court agrees with the majority view that "a claim under [§ ] 14-295 may be asserted without the pleading of subordinate, supporting facts as long as the assertion otherwise satisfies the provisions of [§ ] 14-295, and as necessary, the provisions of any of the statutes enumerated in [§ ] 14-295 that are claimed to be violated." Lombard v. Booth, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-01-0383637-S (July 12, 2001, Stevens, J.) (30 Conn.L.Rptr. 78, 78-79); See Pyka v. Popielase, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-05-50000166-S.
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant operated his vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-218a and/or 14-222. The plaintiff further alleges that the violations were engaged in by the defendant deliberately or with reckless disregard for the safety of others and were a substantial factor in causing injury to the plaintiff. Because this court has adopted the majority view which requires only that the plaintiff make general allegations of recklessness stated in the statute, the court finds count two to be legally sufficient. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to strike count two is denied.
COUNT THREE: COMMON-LAW RECKLESSNESS
"[R]eckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent. [S]uch aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pecan v. Madigan, 97 Conn.App. 617, 622 n.5, 905 A.2d 710 (2006), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 919, 918 A.2d 271 (2007). "To establish recklessness by the defendant, the plaintiff must prove, on the part of the defendants, the existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts ... [Such conduct] is more than negligence, more than gross negligence. [I]n order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them ... [I]t is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action. [In sum, such] conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bolmer v. McKulsky, 74 Conn.App. 499, 503-04, 812 A.2d 869, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 954, 818 A.2d 780 (2003).
"There is a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Angiolillo v. Buckmiller, 102 Conn.App. 697, 705, 927 A.2d 312, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 927, 934 A.2d 243 (2007). "A cause of action in recklessness may be sufficiently alleged upon the same facts that would support a cause of action in negligence provided the allegations are independently sufficient to support a cause of action in recklessness." Walsh v. Abbott Terrace Health Center, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-99-0137269-S (September 18, 2000, Wiese, J.) (28 Conn.L.Rptr. 183, 184). However, "merely using the term ‘recklessness’ to describe conduct previously alleged as negligence is insufficient as a matter of law." Angiolillo v. Buckmiller, supra, 705.
In the present case, the plaintiff has in paragraphs 8 and 9 of her complaint alleged facts that would support an independent claim for common-law recklessness. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant "was driving at excessive speed, distracted and/or not paying attention to traffic, traffic signals and/or other vehicles on the road, specifically the plaintiff who was stopped in front of him at the intersection, instead directing his attention to distractions and while not being aware of the traffic or traffic signals, and accelerating forward when there was a red traffic signal, and he failed to attempt to apply his brakes and was unable to stop ..." The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant "was aware and/or knew that such conduct was reckless and placed those around him at substantial risk of serious injury, yet he continued to disregard that fact ..." These alleged facts, when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, support her claim that the defendant acted with a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others. For these reasons, the court finds count three to be legally sufficient, and the motion to strike is denied as to count three.
III
CONCLUSION
The defendant’s motion to strike count two and three is therefore denied.