This is because Mr. Wiggins' conduct simply gave rise to the occasion which made Mr. Kay's injuries possible. See Wanless v. Winner's Corp., 341 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. App. 1986) (finding as a matter of law that the defendant's alleged negligence of ordering employee to come in to work despite employee's reservations about driving in inclement weather did not proximately cause the decedent's death because "the conduct of defendant could have done nothing more than give rise to the occasion which made plaintiff's injuries possible"). Mr. Wiggins' actions did not play a substantial part in bringing about Mr. Kay's injuries.

Therefore, I do not believe that, even assuming a provider-patient relationship, the Poes were entitled to recover because the alleged breach of the duty owed, i.e., the misclassification of the baby's condition, while perhaps a "cause in fact," cannot be said to have been the proximate cause of the baby's tragic death. E.g., Wright v. Ashe, 220 Ga. App. 91, 94 ( 469 S.E.2d 268) (1996); Wanless v. Winner's Corp., 177 Ga. App. 783, 785 (3) ( 341 S.E.2d 250) (1986). I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong, Judge Smith and Judge Ruffin join in this dissent.

In order to recover in this case plaintiff must show that not only were the defendants negligent in their supervision of the students, but that such negligence was the proximate cause of Wright's injuries. See Wanless v. Winner's Corp., 177 Ga. App. 783, 785 ( 341 S.E.2d 250) (1986). "If the injuries complained of did not flow naturally and directly from the wrongful act or omission attributed to the defendant, or could not reasonably have been expected to result therefrom, or would not have resulted therefrom, but from the interposition of some independent unforeseen cause, the defendant's antecedent wrongful act or omission, if any, would not be the proximate cause of the injury complained of."

" (Cit.)'" (Cit.)' Wanless v. Winner's Corp., 177 Ga. App. 783, 785 (3) ( 341 S.E.2d 250) (1986)." Beamon v. Ga. Power Co., 199 Ga. App. 309, 312 ( 404 S.E.2d 463).

"' Whitaker v. Jones, McDougald, Smith, Pew Co., 69 Ga. App. 711, 715 ( 26 S.E.2d 545)." Wanless v. Winner's Corp., 177 Ga. App. 783, 785 (3) ( 341 S.E.2d 250). In the case sub judice, it is our view that defendant's alleged negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.

In these circumstances, the negligence of the railway did no more than furnish conditions or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, and under which Wynne took actions which intervened as the preponderating cause of the accident. Wanless v. Winner's Corp., 177 Ga. App. 783, 785 ( 341 S.E.2d 250) (1986). Nevertheless, any intervening act which is a normal reaction to the conditions created by the prior negligence is deemed foreseeable by the defendant and does not break the chain of proximate causation.

See OCGA §§ 51-12-8; 51-12-9." Wanless v. Winner's Corp., 177 Ga. App. 783, 785 (3) ( 341 S.E.2d 250) (1986). See also, Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co. v. Goodroe, 98 Ga. App. 394 (3, 4) ( 106 S.E.2d 45) (1958).

"`"`A prior and remote cause can not be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition, or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, efficient cause of the injury. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.' [Cit.]"' [Cit.]" Wanless v. Winner's Corp., 177 Ga. App. 783, 785 (3) ( 341 S.E.2d 250) (1986). We find, therefore, that the alleged improper mounting of the transformer was not the proximate cause of appellant's injury. "The conduct of [Georgia Power] could have done nothing more than give rise to the occasion which made [appellant's] injuries possible.

(Emphasis supplied.) Wanless v. Winner's Corp., 177 Ga. App. 783, 785 ( 341 S.E.2d 250) (1986). Accord Cain v. Ga. Power Co., 53 Ga. App. 483 ( 186 S.E. 229) (1936).

See Martin v. Bank South, 175 Ga. App. 422, 423-24 ( 333 S.E.2d 616) (1985). Accord Wanless v. Winner's Corp., 177 Ga. App. 783, 785 (2) ( 341 S.E.2d 250); Fort v. Boone, 166 Ga. App. 290 ( 304 S.E.2d 465) (1983). 2.