Opinion
2018 CA 1510
05-31-2019
Elizabeth WALTON and Jason Cline Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Children Bailey Cline, Emma Cline, and Michael Cline v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Kathleen Barnett and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Luke J. Thibodeaux, II J., Chandler Loupe, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants, Elizabeth Walton and Jason Cline, Individually and on behalf of his minor children Bailey Cline, Emma Cline, and Michael Cline Andrew W. Eversberg, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees, Kathleen Barnett and State Farm Mutual, Automobile Insurance Company Richard S. Thomas, Kimberly R. Calais, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile, Insurance Company
Luke J. Thibodeaux, II J., Chandler Loupe, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants, Elizabeth Walton and Jason Cline, Individually and on behalf of his minor children Bailey Cline, Emma Cline, and Michael Cline
Andrew W. Eversberg, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees, Kathleen Barnett and State Farm Mutual, Automobile Insurance Company
Richard S. Thomas, Kimberly R. Calais, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile, Insurance Company
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., McCLENDON, AND HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.
MCCLENDON, J.
In this personal injury case, the plaintiffs appeal the judgment of the trial court that dismissed their claims with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action arises out a two-vehicle accident that occurred on January 20, 2014, in Zachary, Louisiana in East Baton Rouge Parish. Elizabeth Walton was driving northbound on Blackwater Road, in a rural and wooded area, with her three stepchildren in a dark-colored Kia Soul. At the same time, Kathleen Barnett was driving on the same road in the opposite direction in a GMC pickup truck. After putting on her turning signal, Ms. Barnett attempted to make a left-hand turn into a private driveway when she collided with the vehicle being driven by Ms. Walton. The investigating officer, Louisiana State Trooper Tommy Lee, reported that the accident occurred at 5:50 p.m. Ms. Walton was given a citation for failing to have her headlights on.
Ms. Barnett's five-year-old grandson was also in the back seat of the truck.
Thereafter, on January 20, 2015, Ms. Walton and her husband, Jason Cline, filed a petition for damages, individually and on behalf of his minor children, Bailey Cline, Emma Cline, and Kade Cline, against Ms. Barnett; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), as the liability insurer for Ms. Barnett; and State Farm, as the underinsured motorist carrier for Ms. Walton, alleging that they suffered injuries and damages resulting from the fault and negligence of Ms. Barnett. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Ms. Barnett was not liable for the accident. The trial court signed a judgment on August 1, 2018, and the plaintiffs appealed. They assign the following as error:
The petition identified Kade Michael Cline as "Michael."
1. The trial court erred when it substituted its own unfamiliar personal experience and recollection for the testimony of the witnesses regarding road visibility and used this personal recollection in weighing witness credibility; and
2. The trial court erred when it took judicial notice of facts in violation of LSA-C.E. art. 201B and used these facts to weigh credibility.
Although not specifically assigned as error, the plaintiffs also assert that the trial court failed to place the burden on Ms. Barnett to prove that she was free from fault as a left-turning motorist.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's finding of fact in the absence of "manifest error" or unless it is "clearly wrong." Stobart v. State through Dept, of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993). Under the manifest error-clearly wrong standard, this court employs a two-part test for the review of a factfinder's determinations. Id. Under the manifest error standard of review, a reviewing court may not merely decide if it would have found the facts of the case differently. Hayes Fund for First United Methodist Church of Welsh, LLC v. Kerr-McGee Rocky Mountain, LLC, 14-2592 (La. 12/8/15), 193 So.3d 1110, 1115. Rather, to reverse a trial court's factual conclusions, the appellate court must satisfy a two-step process based on the record as a whole: there must be no reasonable factual basis for the trial court's conclusion, and the finding must be clearly wrong. Hayes, 193 So.3d at 1115-16 ; Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882.
This test requires a reviewing court to review the record in its entirety to determine manifest error. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. This court's determination is not whether the factfinder was correct, but whether the factfinder's conclusion was a reasonable one. Id. Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the factfinder's, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989). Thus, where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Hayes, 193 So.3d at 1116 ; Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844.
DISCUSSION
Several witnesses testified at the trial in this matter, including two of Ms. Walton's stepchildren. Bailey Cline, who was thirteen years old on the date of the accident, testified that the accident occurred in the evening, but that "it was still light outside." She agreed that 5:50 was the correct time of the accident. She also testified that the sun was not down, although it was setting.
At the beginning of trial, the parties entered into several stipulations, including the stipulation that State Farm insured Ms. Barnett at the time of the accident with liability limits of $ 25,000.00 per person and $ 50,000.00 per accident.
Kade Cline, who was fourteen years old on the date of the accident, testified that he did not remember the time of the accident, but that there was "pretty sufficient lighting." On cross-examination, Kade was reminded of his deposition testimony where he stated that Ms. Walton did not have her headlights on at the time of the accident. Thereafter, counsel for the plaintiffs stipulated that Ms. Walton had not turned on her headlights.
Angela Starns, a resident who lives two driveways away from where the accident occurred, testified that she was outside when the accident happened around 4 p.m. She stated that the security light outside her house, which atomatically turns on when it becomes dark, had not yet come on. Ms. Starns' daughter, Shelby Starns, testified that the sun was still out when the accident occurred. She stated that she stayed outside for about an hour after the accident and missed part of her grandmother's birthday party. When asked what time the party started, Shelby Starns responded 6:30 or 7:00. On cross examination, Shelby Starns stated that she had no reason to disagree with the investigating officer's report that the accident occurred at 5:50.
Mr. Cline testified that he received a telephone call from Ms. Walton at 5:45 or 5:50 on the day of the collision informing him that she and the children had been in an accident. On cross-examination, he was reminded of his deposition testimony wherein he stated he got the call at around 6:00.
Ms. Walton testified that she did not have her vehicle's headlights on, but that the sun was out and she did not think that she needed her lights on. She testified that the accident occurred at about 5:30 or 5:40.
Trooper Lee testified that by the time he arrived at the accident scene, the plaintiffs had already been transported to the hospital. He stated that he noted in his report that the accident occurred at 5:50 p.m., based on his conversations with witnesses, when emergency medical services were called (at 6:02), and when he was called to respond (at 5:58). Trooper Lee testified that Ms. Barnett told him that she did not see the other vehicle until the accident occurred. When Trooper Lee went to the hospital to talk to Ms. Walton, she informed him that at the time of the accident, she could still see without her headlights. Trooper Lee explained to Ms. Walton that not only does the law require a driver to have headlights on after sunset, but that headlights also allow other drivers to see her vehicle. Trooper Lee testified that sunset on January 20, 2014, was at 5:30 p.m. and that he issued Ms. Walton a citation for the failure to activate her vehicle's headlights. He also stated that he determined that sunset on the day of the accident was at 5:30 p.m., based on a U.S. Naval Observatory Astronomical Applications document.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:301 provides, in pertinent part:
A. Every vehicle upon a highway within this state shall display lighted lamps and illuminating devices as hereinafter respectively required for different classes of vehicles subject to exception with respect to parked vehicles at any of the following times:
(1) At any time between sunset and sunrise.
(2) When, due to insufficient light or unfavorable atmospheric conditions, persons and vehicles on the highway are not clearly discernable at a distance of five hundred feet ahead.
(3) When moisture in the air or precipitation necessitates the continuous use of windshield wipers.
(4) While driving in a tunnel.
During Trooper Lee's testimony, the trial court questioned him about the orientation of headlights. The following exchange took place:
The Court: All right. Sir, in your experience, how are the headlights of automobiles oriented?
The Witness: Straight ahead.
The Court: Or to the right. They don't shine to the left because you don't want to blind the oncoming traffic, right?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
Charles Holcombe also testified at trial. He stated that he lives about three quarters of a mile south of where the accident occurred on Blackwater Road and was heading home from work. He testified that he was travelling about fifty feet, or about two car lengths, behind Ms. Barnett and witnessed the accident. Mr. Holcombe testified that the accident occurred at about 5:50 in the evening and that it was dusk. He stated that he did not see the other vehicle until Ms. Barnett began her left turn and her headlights shone on the other car. He stated that Ms. Walton's vehicle did not have its headlights on.
In his statement to Trooper Lee on the day of the accident, Mr. Holcombe placed the time of the accident at about 5:55 p.m.
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Ms. Barnett testified that she did not believe that she contributed to the accident. She stated that it was getting dark outside, she had her headlights activated, and she was traveling slowly looking for a house. Ms. Barnett stated that when she found the house, she put on her left-turn signal, looked ahead, saw headlights in the distance, and began her turn. She stated that she did not see the other car until impact.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court determined that, based on the totality of the evidence, the accident occurred at approximately 5:50 p.m. While recognizing the high duty of care required of a left-turning motorist, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish fault on the part of Ms. Barnett.
In their appeal, the plaintiffs contend that there are major factual issues as to what time the accident occurred, how dark it was at that time, and whether Ms. Barnett's lack of headlights was a cause of the subject accident. Initially, the plaintiffs challenge the trial court's observation in its oral reasons for judgment that it was "pretty dark" at the time the accident occurred. The plaintiffs argue that the majority of the witnesses testified at the trial that it was still light outside. They maintain that the trial court could have found the defendants' witnesses more credible, but when the trial court interjected its own personal observations, the factfinder went beyond its duty and offered its own testimony from admittedly unfamiliar recollections and used the court's unreliable personal experience in weighing the credibility of the witnesses.
The trial court stated in its oral reasons for judgment:
As I've pointed out, I've lived in Louisiana for all of my 68 years. In January at 5:30, 5:40, 6:00 in the afternoon, my recollection is that it's pretty dark at that time.
Secondly, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the direction headlights are oriented on an automobile. In its oral reasons, the trial court stated:
I think I can take judicial notice that headlights are calibrated to shine more to the right side of the road than to the left. They're either straight ahead or to the right. Headlights don't want to shine into the face of oncoming drivers, so the lights are not calibrated to shine to the left. So I find it completely believable that, as testified to by Ms. Barnett and by Mr. Holcombe, the oncoming Walton vehicle was not visible until Ms. Barnett began her turn, and her headlights went slightly to the left.
The plaintiffs assert that the notice taken by the trial court goes to the heart of the factual determination regarding whether Ms. Barnett should have seen Ms. Walton's vehicle before turning.
Initially, we note that as an appellate court we review judgments and not reasons for judgment. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-0571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507, 572. Judgments are often upheld on appeal for reasons different than those assigned by a trial court. The written reasons for judgment are merely an explication of the trial court's determinations. They do not alter, amend, or affect the final judgment being appealed. Id.
Moreover, upon our review of the record, we can find no manifest error by the trial court in its factual determinations. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, the record supports the findings that Ms. Walton did not have her vehicle's headlights on at the time of the accident, that the accident occurred after sunset at approximately 5:50 p.m. on January 20, 2014, and that Ms. Walton's vehicle was not visible until Ms. Barnett began her left turn immediately before impact. Several of the plaintiffs' own witnesses corroborated the time of the accident and that it was getting dark. Trooper Lee not only testified that sunset was at 5:30 p.m. on the day in question, but he also acknowledged that headlights are either oriented straight ahead or to the right. Mr. Holcombe, who was two car lengths behind Ms. Barnett, and Ms. Barnett both testified that they did not see Ms. Walton's vehicle until Ms. Barnett began her left turn and the vehicle was illuminated by Ms. Barnett's headlights.
Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court failed to apply the proper burden of proof on Ms. Barnett as the left-turning motorist. The plaintiffs base this argument on the trial court's statement, "I just can't see that there has been proof by a preponderance of evidence of any fault on the part of Ms. Barnett." However, based on the evidence presented, we do not find that the trial court's determination of fault was clearly wrong, nor do we find that the trial court applied an improper burden of proof.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the August 1, 2018 judgment of the trial court, in favor of the defendants, Kathleen Barnett, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, as the liability insurer for Ms. Barnett, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, as the underinsured motorist carrier for Ms. Walton, and dismissing the plaintiffs' claims. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiffs, Elizabeth Walton and Jason Cline, individually and on behalf of his minor children, Bailey Cline, Emma Cline, and Kade Cline.
AFFIRMED.
Whipple, C.J. concurs.
Higginbotham, J. dissents.