Opinion
No. 05-02-01368-CR No. 05-02-01369-CR
Opinion Filed June 27, 2003 Do Not Publish
On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F01-59874-S and F01-59879-QS. Affirmed
OPINION
In a consolidated trial, a jury convicted appellant of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (cause number 05-02-01368-CR) and evading arrest (cause number 05-02-01369-CR). Appellant pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs alleged in each of the indictments. In both cases, the trial court assessed punishment at five years' confinement and a $100 fine. In two issues, appellant alleges the evidence is factually insufficient to support his convictions for the offenses of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and evading arrest. We affirm the trial court's judgments. From the record, it appears that on December 8, 2001, at around 1:30 a.m., wrecker driver William Stanley ("Stanley") brought a vehicle into the Dallas police impound lot. While off-loading the vehicle, Stanley saw a person in the impound lot who looked as though he was trying to break into one of the impounded cars. By cell phone, Stanley reported what he had seen to the impound lot office. Sergeant Barbara Hobbs ("Hobbs"), who was on duty at the pound, drove to the location to investigate. A person jumped from between two cars and began to run. Both Stanley and Hobbs gave chase on foot. However, the suspect jumped into an impounded vehicle, a Honda Accord, and drove it out of the pound at a high rate of speed. Hobbs got back into her patrol vehicle, began to chase the Honda, and called police dispatch for backup. Dallas police officer Amos Gantt ("Gantt"), who was on patrol in the area with a partner, heard Hobbs' call for assistance and joined the chase. After running several red lights, the driver of the Honda jumped out of the vehicle and began to run on foot. The driverless Honda continued down the street and crashed into a parked vehicle. Gantt exited his patrol vehicle, drew his weapon, ordered the suspect to stop, and eventually took the suspect into custody. State witnesses identified appellant as the person who drove the Honda from the auto impound lot and who evaded arrest by using the vehicle. Angela Prince ("Prince") testified she was the owner of the Honda and that appellant did not have consent to use her vehicle. Appellant chose to testify at trial. He testified he was not the person who committed any of the acts alleged. He denied being in the impound lot on the night in question, taking the Honda and driving it off of the lot, or driving the Honda in the chase described by the officers. Appellant testified he had been at a relative's house that night. Afterwards, he was walking down a street to catch a bus or the train when an Accord came around the corner, went past him, then crashed into something. He stated that almost simultaneously, a police squad car came around the corner, and an officer jumped from the squad car and arrested him. Appellant alleges on appeal that the evidence was factually insufficient in each case to support his conviction. In conducting a factual sufficiency review, we neutrally analyze all of the evidence without the prism of "in the light most favorable to the prosecution." See Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). We will reverse only if we determine the proof of guilt is so weak or the contrary proof so overwhelming that it renders the guilty verdict clearly wrong and unjust. Id. In conducting this review, we must be appropriately deferential to the fact finder's role. Thompson v. State, 93 S.W.3d 16, 21 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3708 (U.S. Apr. 8, 2003) (No. 02-1579); Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 198 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Absent exceptional circumstances, issues of witness credibility are for the jury. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 9. In making our review, we are to consider what the appellant asserts is the most important evidence supporting his claim. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). In his brief, appellant narrows his assertions and arguments by claiming the State failed to prove that he was the individual who operated the motor vehicle and who evaded arrest. Appellant does not claim the State failed to prove the elements of the two offenses. He simply claims the State arrested and prosecuted the wrong man. We will analyze all the evidence bearing on the narrow issue of identity. Stanley testified that during the foot chase at the impound lot, he got within four feet of the suspect before he jumped into the Honda. The Honda was under a light pole. Before backing out and driving away, the suspect looked at Stanley for three or four seconds. Stanley stated the suspect was wearing a gray windbreaker or sweatshirt and blue jeans. At trial, Stanley identified appellant as the person he saw get into the Honda and drive away. However, appellant attacks Stanley's credibility, pointing to Stanley's testimony that when he saw appellant at the impound lot, appellant only had a mustache. At trial, appellant testified that, at the time he was arrested, his hair was braided and he wore a full beard. Stanley also admitted he was a convicted felon. Hobbs testified that, although she did not get a good look at the suspect's face while pursuing him on foot at the impound lot, the suspect was wearing a gray sweatshirt and blue jeans. She also saw the suspect get into the Honda and drive away at a high rate of speed. Hobbs then got into her patrol vehicle and began to chase the suspect. During the chase, Hobbs lost sight of the Honda briefly as it went around a curve, but she caught up with it at the next red light. In response to Hobbs's assist call, Gantt joined the chase. Gantt drove in directly behind the fleeing Honda while Hobbs took a side street to try to contain the Honda. When Hobbs regained sight of the Honda, she saw it had crashed into a parked vehicle and that Gantt and his partner had a suspect in custody. Hobbs verified through her records and the license plates that the crashed Honda was the same Honda that had been taken from the impound lot. Hobbs stated that, by the person's clothing, height and build, the person arrested by Gantt was the same person who had run from her at the impound lot and had driven away in the Honda. However, at trial, Hobbs could not identify appellant as the person who fled in the Honda. Gantt testified that once he joined the chase, the Honda was constantly in his vision. He saw the driver jump out of the Honda while it was still moving and start running on foot. After a chase of about one hundred feet, Gantt apprehended the person and placed him under arrest. Gantt testified at trial that appellant was the same person who jumped out of the moving Honda and was eventually arrested. Gantt also stated that, at the time of his arrest, appellant had Prince's credit card on his person. Prince testified that her gas credit card was inside the Honda when it was stolen. In his brief, appellant urges us to consider what is not in evidence. Gantt did not testify that he did not lose sight of the suspect while he was chasing him on foot. Gantt's partner, Officer Brown, did not testify at the trial. There was confusion at the arrest scene, as Brown attempted to stop the Honda before it crashed into the parked vehicle. Because of this confusion, appellant argues that Gantt misidentified appellant as the person who jumped out of the Honda. Appellant did not attempt to use a false name when first questioned by the officer at the scene of the arrest. No fingerprint evidence was presented linking him to the Honda. No oral or written statements by appellant were offered by the State implicating him in the commission of the offenses. As mentioned above, appellant testified that he was not at the impound lot, did not take the Honda, and was not the person driving the Honda in the police chase. He stated he was in the area and was mistaken by the police as the person who jumped from the Honda. He also testified that Prince's credit card was not on his person, but was among items taken from the Honda by the police. Having analyzed all the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude the proof of guilt in each case is not so obviously weak nor the contrary proof so overwhelming that it renders the guilty verdicts clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Therefore, the evidence is factually sufficient to support the convictions. We resolve appellant's two issues against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.