Opinion
Case No. 2:02-CV-214-PS.
January 18, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Elizabeth Walton's son died when he was in custody of the Lake County Work Release Center and she brought this § 1983 action claiming principally that his death was the result of the Sheriff's poor training of the Center's correctional staff. Ms. Walton contends that had the correctional staff been given better training in emergency medical care, her son's death could have been avoided. Because Ms. Walton has failed to establish that the lack of training was the result of deliberate indifference, the Motions for Summary Judgment on the § 1983 claim are granted.
BACKGROUND
On June 12, 2001, the decedent, Albert Walton Sr., age 55, was arrested by the Gary Police Department for leaving the scene of an accident. When he was brought to Court he was ordered to post a $500 cash/$5000 surety bond. If he was unable to post the bond, the Gary City Court Judge ordered him committed to the Lake County Sheriff's Work Release Program until the case could be brought to trial on July 23, 2001. Evidently, Mr. Walton was unable to come up with the bond and he was therefore committed to the Sheriff's Work Release Center. Walton was first taken to the Lake County Jail for one night and the following day — June 14, 2001 — he was booked into the Work Release Center.
Upon his entry into the Lake County Jail, Walton was given a medical assessment by an EMT. Walton advised the EMT that he was an insulin dependent diabetic but that he had no other medical risk factors. The following day, after being transferred to the Work Release Center, Walton was again medically screened. He again told the intake officer at the Work Release Center that he was diabetic but that otherwise he had no medical risk factors.
Medication for inmates at the Work Release Center was normally distributed in the morning between 6:30 a.m. and 6:45 a.m. (Sanders Dep at 23). In order to get their medication, inmates have to go to the control desk at the Center and make the request. (Sander Dep at 24). It is the inmate's responsibility to actually administer the medication. (King Dep at 20). From the day he was admitted into the Center until the day of his death, Walton regularly requested his insulin in the morning. (Sanders Dep at 23-24). Medication logs for each inmate are kept at the control center desk so that when an inmate requests medication, the officer on duty can check to verify that the inmate is allowed to have the medication. The medication chart for Walton shows the dispensing of medication to him on a daily basis during the time that he was incarcerated at the Work Release Center. Further, Walton admitted in response to a request to admit that he routinely gave himself insulin shots, usually in the stomach.
On July 13, 2001 at around 6:45 a.m. (no one knows the exact time), Walton went to the control desk at the Work Release Center and requested his insulin. (King Dep at 19). Working the desk that morning was Corporal Louis King. Corporal King was in charge of the midnight shift supervising three or four custody officers. (King Dep at 7). The midnight shift runs from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. Although King knew Walton, he was unaware until that morning that Walton was diabetic and insulin dependent. (King Dep at 19). Walton approached the control desk and asked King for his medication. King instructed Officer Sanders, another custody officer who was working at the time, to get Walton a syringe and his insulin. Sanders knew that Walton was diabetic because Sanders had previously dispensed insulin to Walton. As Walton was waiting at the control desk, Sanders went and got the insulin and a syringe. Sanders brought the items back to the control desk area and gave them to Cpl. King, who set the items on the counter in front of Walton. But Walton did not take them. Instead, Walton told King that first he had to go to the bathroom. Because Walton was not feeling well, two inmates accompanied Walton to the bathroom. So as Walton walked down the hall to the bathroom, his insulin and the syringe were left on the counter at the control desk.
A short time after Walton left for the bathroom, the shift change occurred. Sgt. William Johnson took over for Corporal King and Officer Chmielik replaced Officer Sanders. At the shift change, Sgt. Johnson noticed the insulin bottle and the needle laying on top of the counter and asked King why the items were there. This conversation occurred a little before 7:00 a.m. (Johnson Dep at 24). Cpl. King told Sgt. Johnson that the items belonged to Walton who decided to go to the bathroom before taking the medicine. King told Johnson that Walton was not feeling well. (King Dep at 26). Officer Sanders had a similar conversation with his replacement, Officer Chmielik. (Sanders Dep at 28).
King proceeded to "punch-out" and shortly after 7:00 a.m. he started to leave the facility. (King Dep 24). Before he left, however, he decided to check on Walton. King went to the bathroom where Walton was and spoke with him over the stall doors. Walton had been in the bathroom for about five minutes by that time. (King Dep at 31). There was at least one other inmate with Walton inside the bathroom stall. King asked Walton if he was alright and Walton said "I'll be okay in a few minutes." (King Dep at 26). King followed up with the other inmate who told King to "Go ahead on. I'll see to him. . . . [H]e'll be alright." (Id.) King also asked Walton if he needed to go to the hospital, and Walton replied that he would be "okay. I just need to use the bathroom." (King Dep at 32). Cpl. King left the bathroom thinking Walton would be alright but for precaution he went back to the control desk and reminded Sgt. Johnson that Walton was in the bathroom and that the medication on the counter was for Walton. (Id.)
Within five minutes of Cpl. King leaving the facility, Sgt. Johnson got a call over the radio from Officer Chmielik who told Johnson that Walton was unconscious in the bathroom. (The record — at least the portion of it that was presented to the Court — does not disclose how Chmielik was notified that Walton was unconscious in the bathroom). Sgt. Johnson immediately called 911 and an ambulance was dispatched. This was pursuant to official Sheriff's Department policy which stated that "in the event a resident requires medical treatment, the following procedure will be instituted: In cases of medical emergencies where transport by staff is either impossible or inadvisable, the ambulance service should be summoned." According to the ambulance reports, the 911 call was received at 7:15 am and the ambulance arrived at the Work Release Center at 7:23 am. Walton was transported to the nearest hospital and was immediately admitted. He died the following day — July 15, 2001 — at around 1:20 p.m.
An autopsy was performed and the manner of death was found to be "natural." The cause of death was listed as "Extensive Cerebral Hemorrhages." Neither party has presented evidence explaining what precisely an "Extensive Cerebral Hemorrhage" is and whether it can be caused by a diabetic failing to get insulin.
When Cpl. King and other officers are hired as custody officers at the Work Release Center, they receive training in self defense, handcuffing techniques, CPR, and the policy and procedures for handling sick inmates, including the calling of an ambulance in the case of a medical emergency. They do not receive any specialized medical training beyond the CPR training. After a review of what occurred the day in question, Sheriff Buncich demoted King for his poor handling of the situation relating to Walton.
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment initially carries the burden of demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the position of the non-moving party. Doe v. R.R. Donnelley Sons, Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). The non-moving party must then set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is not entitled to judgement as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). To establish a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A genuine dispute about a material fact exists only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw every reasonable inference from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The non-moving party must support its contentions with admissible evidence and may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings or conclusory statements in the affidavits. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
Miscellaneous Section 1983 Claims
Elizabeth Walton, Albert Walton's mother, brought this lawsuit against a number of parties pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that her son's Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. Many of these claims either have no merit or Plaintiff has withdrawn them in her Response to Summary Judgment. First, Walton has sued "Lake County," but in response to the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by the County, she admits that her claim against "Lake County" is really just a claim against the Sheriff's Department. (Plaintiff's Response at 9). But "Lake County" and the "Lake County Sheriff's Department" are distinct entities; the former is not responsible for the actions of the latter. Donahue v. St. Joseph County by the Bd. of Commissioners, 720 N.E.2d 1236, 1241 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). It is County Sheriffs, not the County Commissioners, who are responsible for providing appropriate medical care to pretrial detainees. St. Mary's Medical Center v. Warrick County, 671 N.E.2d 929 (Ind.App. 1996). Because Walton has presented no evidence against Lake County, and essentially concedes as much in her response, the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Lake County is granted in its entirety.
Walton has also brought an action against Sheriff John Buncich and Warden Robert Piskoty in both their official and individual capacities. However, in response to summary judgment, Walton concedes that she has no evidence against either of them in their individual capacities. ( See Plaintiff's Response at 9). Thus, summary judgment is granted with respect to the § 1983 individual claims against Defendants Piskoty and Buncich.
Robert Piskoty was also sued in his official capacity as Warden of the Lake County Jail, but that suit is baseless. Piskoty has provided the Court with an uncontradicted affidavit in which he avers that he is only the Warden of the Lake County Jail and that he has nothing to do with the Work Release Center. The Work Release Center and the Lake County Jail are two different facilities and Piskoty avers that he has no responsibility for the former. Sheriff Buncich corroborates this with an affidavit of his own. Since there is no evidence that anything untoward happened to Walton while he was in the Lake County Jail, summary judgment on the § 1983 claim is therefore granted to Robert Piskoty in his official capacity.
Finally, Walton has also sued "Officer Unknown" but such a lawsuit is not tenable in federal court. Naming unknown defendants serves no real purpose in federal courts. Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997) ("We note in passing that it is pointless to include lists of anonymous defendants in federal court; this type of placeholder does not open the door to relation back under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15"). Summary judgment on the § 1983 claim is therefore granted to "Officer Unknown."
With this underbrush cleared away, what is left for analysis is the official capacity claims against the Sheriff and Sgt. Johnson (i.e., the claim against the Sheriff's Department); the individual capacity claims against Sgt. Johnson; and the various state law claims. We turn to those now.
Fourteenth Amendment Claim of Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
Ms. Walton's first claim is that the Officials at the Lake County Work Release Center were deliberately indifferent to her son's serious medical needs. To state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must show that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Walton was a pretrial detainee and thus not protected by the Eighth Amendment. However, the due process rights of detainees are at least as great as those of convicted prisoners, Higgins v. Correctional Medical services of Illinois, Inc., 178 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1999), and Fourteenth Amendment claims of pretrial detainees are analyzed in the same way as Eighth Amendment claims of prisoners. Id.; Zentmyer v. Kendall County, 220 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2000).
It is interesting that most of plaintiff's criticism is directed at the actions (or inactions) of Cpl. King. The Plaintiff takes King to task for not more closely monitoring Walton when he went to the bathroom and for his cavalier approach to telling Sgt. Johnson — his replacement — about what was going on with Walton. Yet, Plaintiff has not sued King. Of all the people actually involved in the event in question, only Sgt. Johnson was sued in his individual capacity.
To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, the detainee must satisfy a two prong test: (1) the deprivation alleged must be objectively serious; and (2) the prison official must have exhibited deliberate indifference to the inmate's heath and safety. Zentmyer, 220 F.3d at 810 ( citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).
There can be no question that Mr. Walton's diabetic needs were objectively serious, and no one seems to contend otherwise. The question therefore is whether the actions of Sgt. Johnson and the others involved exhibited a deliberate indifference to Mr. Walton's safety. As the Supreme Court has stated: "[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. For example, in Zentmyer, a prisoner sued after he was not consistently given his medication for an ear infection. The evidence established that the guards on duty failed on a number of days to dispense to him his medication. The Seventh Circuit held that "failing to dispense medication exactly as prescribed may constitute negligence . . . but `the presence of multiple acts of negligence is merely evidentiary; it is not an alternative theory of liability.'" Zentmyer, 220 F.3d at 811 ( quoting Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 1103 (7th Cir. 1994)).
In this case, the undisputed facts show that none of the officials directly involved in the incident — certainly not Johnson, the only one present who was sued in his individual capacity — were deliberately indifferent to Walton's medical needs. Indeed, the evidence is quite to the contrary. On the day in question, Walton went to the control desk at the Work Release Center and requested his insulin. Cpl. King was manning the desk. King immediately dispatched Officer Sanders to get Walton his insulin and a syringe. Sanders knew that Walton was diabetic because Sanders had previously dispensed insulin to Walton. Without delay, Officer Sanders went and got the insulin and syringe and brought the items back to the control desk. The items were then laid on the counter for Walton. But instead of immediately administering the insulin to himself, as he had done countless times before while in the jail, Walton said that he first needed to go to the bathroom, leaving the insulin on the counter.
Plaintiff alleges that the fact that the Work Release Center controlled the insulin and the syringes proves that the Sheriff's Department was deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of diabetics. Plaintiff does not cite to a single case, and our research has also failed to find one, which stands for the proposition that deliberate indifference can be established where a prison chooses to keep medication under prison control rather than entrusting the medication to the inmates. It seems obvious that prison officials would retain control of drugs and only dispense them upon request of the inmate. Security of the institution surely compels this.
Thus, the undisputed facts show that none of the Work Release Center officials who were involved in the incident refused to dispense medication to Walton. On the contrary, they promptly gave it to him upon request. Moreover, the medication dispensing logs kept at the Center show that Walton was being given his medication regularly and on a daily basis. On the day in question he was given the insulin and syringe but he simply chose not to administer it. Instead, Walton decided to go to the bathroom prior to giving himself the insulin shot. Tragically, he collapsed in the bathroom a few minutes later.
The record is unclear as to whether Mr. Walton's failure to take his insulin is what caused his death. While the defendants have attached the autopsy report to their Motion for Summary Judgment and it states that the cause of death is "Extensive Intracerebral Hemorrhages," neither side bothers to explain to the Court what exactly that is and whether that cause of death is consistent with diabetic shock. So even had the Work Release Center denied Walton his medication altogether — which it plainly did not — the Plaintiff has failed to establish that this is what caused his death.
In addition to properly and timely dispensing the medication to him, King also checked on Walton while he was in the bathroom. King went to the bathroom and spoke with him over the stall doors. Walton had been in the bathroom for about five minutes by that time. King asked Walton if he was alright and Walton said "I'll be okay in a few minutes." King followed up with the other inmate present in the bathroom who told King to "Go ahead on. I'll see to him. . . . [H]e'll be alright." King then asked Walton if he needed to go to the hospital and Walton replied that he would be "okay. I just need to use the bathroom." Therefore, Cpl. King left the bathroom thinking Walton would be alright, but for precaution he went back to the control desk and reminded Sgt. Johnson that Walton was in the bathroom and that the medication on the counter was for Walton. Within five minutes, Sgt. Johnson got a call over the radio from Officer Chmielik who told Sgt. Johnson that Walton was unconscious in the bathroom. Sgt. Johnson immediately called 911 and an ambulance was promptly dispatched to the Center. Thus, within approximately 20 minutes of when he first went to the bathroom declaring that he was not feeling well, an ambulance was called for Walton, and during that time, Walton specifically told Cpl. King that he did not need to go to the hospital.
Plaintiff attached a one page letter (Exhibit 4) signed by various inmates dated July 15, 2001, that states that Walton was in the bathroom for "about an hour" before the ambulance was called. This statement is not under oath and therefore cannot be considered by the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 859 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Affidavits are admissible in summary judgment proceedings if they are made under penalties of perjury"). In any event, it is uncontradicted that Walton went to the bathroom just prior to the shift change at 7:00 a.m. and the documentary evidence establishes beyond question that the ambulance was dispatched at 7:15 a.m. The inmate witnesses estimate that Walton was in the bathroom for "about an hour" on the one hand, and the documentary evidence that establishes that he was in there for no more than 25 minutes, on the other, does not present a "genuine issue of material fact." Stewart v. RCA Corp., 790 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1986).
In sum, Walton was timely dispensed his medication and was checked on in the bathroom. Although Walton declared that he was not feeling well when he went to the bathroom, there was certainly no manifestation that would have led the guards to immediately call for an ambulance. This was confirmed when Walton specifically told Cpl. King that he did not need to go to the hospital. Under these facts, we cannot say that any of the officials were deliberately indifferent to Walton's serious medical needs.
Finally, Plaintiff makes much of the fact that Cpl. King was reprimanded and demoted for his handling of Walton that day. Indeed, Cpl. King perhaps should have been more careful in monitoring Walton. However, setting aside the question of whether the evidence of his demotion is a subsequent remedial measure and thus not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 407, this evidence is not probative of the § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Rather, this would "at most constitute (evidence) of simple negligence on the part of the Sheriff's personnel, which . . . will not suffice to attach liability under § 1983." Hirsch v. Burke, 40 F.3d 900, 905 (7th Cir. 1994). Deliberate indifference is more than mere negligence. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836.
The § 1983 Claim for Failure to Train
Plaintiff also claims that the Sheriff's Department is liable for its failure to train the guards in responding appropriately to medical emergencies. In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983. Id. at 694-95. Thus, under Monell, a city is liable only if an "official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution." Id. at 690. In other words, in order for Walton to recover from the Sheriff's Department, she must establish a direct causal connection between a custom or policy of the Department and the unconstitutional conduct that is alleged.
Plaintiff's only theory of liability against the Sheriff's Department is that it failed to properly train the staff at the Lake County Work Release Center to deal with the medical needs of the inmates. (Plaintiff's Response at 10-13). In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Supreme Court held that inadequate police training may serve as the basis for liability but only where the failure to train amounts to a deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. Id. at 388. As the Court noted:
The issue . . . is whether the training program is adequate; and if it is not, the question becomes whether such inadequate training can justifiably be said to represent `city policy.' It may seem contrary to common sense to assert that a municipality will actually have a policy of not taking reasonable steps to train its employees. But it may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. In that event, the failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent the policy for which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if it actually causes injury.Id. at 390.
The Seventh Circuit has recognized that the standard described in City of Canton for holding a municipality liable for its "failure to train" can be a bit "elusive." Cornfield v. Consolidated High School Dist. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1327 (7th Cir. 1993). In any event, "An allegation of a `failure to train' is available only in limited circumstances." Id. To prevail, Walton must show that (1) the Sheriff's employees violated his constitutional rights; (2) that the Sheriff had a policy or custom of failing to train its employees; and (3) that the failure to train caused the constitutional violation. Roach v. City of Evansville, 111 F.3d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 1997).
In this case, we have already found that the Sheriff's employees did not violate Walton's constitutional rights because he has failed to prove that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Therefore, in the absence of a constitutional violation by one of its officials, the Sheriff's Department cannot be liable. Reichenberger v. Pritchard, 660 F.2d 280, 284-85 (7th Cir. 1981) ("The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States."). In any event, even if we were to presume that Walton's constitutional rights were violated, he could still not recover against the Sheriff's Department on a failure to train theory.
In the wake of City of Canton, what has emerged is that "failure to train" cases may be brought against municipalities in two different circumstances. First is the situation where "the need for more or different training is obvious and the existing inadequacy is likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights." Robles v. City of Fort Wayne, 113 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted); see also Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1327. In these situations, the municipality would "evince a deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its citizens by failing to train its employees `with respect to a clear constitutional duty implicated in recurrent situations that a particular employee is certain to face." Robles, 113 F.3d at 735 ( quoting Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1327). Second, a municipality could also be "deliberately indifferent if it failed to provide further training after it learned of a pattern of constitutional violations involving the exercise of police discretion." Robles, 113 F.3d at 735.
We will address the second theory first. To prevail on this second theory, the plaintiff must produce evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations such that would put the Sheriff on notice of a problem that training could help eradicate. In Hirsch v. Burke, 40 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit addressed the proof that would be necessary to prevail on this type of a failure to train violation. In Hirsch, as in this case, the plaintiff was an insulin dependent diabetic who was wrongly arrested and jailed for public intoxication. In fact, he was not drunk; his blood sugar levels were off and he was in a diabetic shock which made him appear intoxicated. The plaintiff in Hirsch claimed that better training of the arresting officers would have allowed the officers to discern the difference between insulin shock on the one hand and drunkenness on the other. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that "Hirsch had to show that the defendants were on notice of a pattern of constitutional violations resulting from the inadequate training of police and jail personnel in recognizing diabetic shock. This notice of violations would have to show that the failure to provide further training was tantamount to a deliberate or conscious decision on the part of the defendants to allow the violations." Hirsch, 40 F.3d at 904. In Hirsch, as in this case, there was simply a lack of evidence of a series of constitutional violations committed by the inadequately trained employees. As the Court stated: "there was no evidence, for example, indicating past incidents of the City's police mistakenly arresting apparently intoxicated people who, it later turns out, were merely suffering from diabetic shock. . . . In short, there is absolutely nothing in this record to show that the defendants were on notice of any constitutional violations, much less than they were deliberately indifferent to them." Id., at 404-05.
Likewise, in this case, the plaintiff has presented no evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations at the Work Release Center relating to the medical needs of inmates, let alone violations relating to diabetic inmates in particular. As a result, there is a complete lack of evidence that the Sheriff was on notice of repeated constitutional violations that additional training could have helped prevent.
Walton also argues that this is one of those cases where the need to train correctional guards to evaluate medical emergencies is "so obvious" that the failure to do so amounts to deliberate indifference. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. Yet Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to suggest that this case — one involving an insulin dependent diabetic inmate — is one of those "recurrent situations that a particular employee is certain to face." Robles, 113 F.3d at 7335.
Moreover, the Sheriff's Department does provide training to its officers who work at the Work Release Center. Guards are trained in CPR; they are trained in dispensing medication including insulin; and they are instructed via official policy to immediately call an ambulance if a prisoner's medical condition presents a medical emergency. That is precisely what occurred in this case. In sum, Plaintiff has failed to prove that the failure to specifically train its staff in handling diabetics — beyond giving them the needed insulin — "amounted to deliberate indifference" to the rights of the inmates. Collins v. City Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123-24 (1992).
Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Lake County Sheriff's Department was deliberately indifferent to Walton's constitutional rights by its failure to train its officers. As a result, summary judgment is granted to the Lake County Sheriff's Department and to Sheriff Buncich in his Official Capacity.
State Law Claims
Plaintiff has also brought a series of state law claims invoking the supplemental jurisdiction of the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). These state law claims are brought against Sheriff Buncich, Warden Piskoty, Sgt. Johnson and "Officer Unknown" and include claims for wrongful death under Indiana Code Section 34-23-1-1, negligence, and violations of the Indiana Constitution.
The general rule is that when, as here, a federal claim drops out before trial, the federal court should relinquish jurisdiction over any supplemental state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1354 (7th Cir. 1997); Larsen v. City of Beloit, 130 F.3d 1278, 1286 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that a district court's decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims — after dismissing claims upon which federal jurisdiction was premised — is completely discretionary, even where state claims are ripe for decision, applicable state law is straightforward, and discovery has been completed); Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994) ("the general rule is that, when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims rather than resolving them on the merits"). Moreover, it is proper for a federal district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction at the summary judgment stage of a case. See e.g., NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 236-37 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court's decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims having granted summary judgment on federal copyright claim).
Taking this general rule into consideration, we find it is proper to relinquish jurisdiction over Plaintiff's various state law claims. These claims involve issues of state law that are most properly resolved by the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment [Doc. Nos. 44 and 45] are hereby GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims. Plaintiff's supplemental state law claims against all defendants except Lake County are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to all of Plaintiff's claims against Lake County. The clerk shall ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of the Defendants with respect to all of Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims and all claims against Lake County stating that the Plaintiff is entitled to no relief. The clerk shall treat this civil action as TERMINATED. All further settings in this action are hereby VACATED.
SO ORDERED.