Opinion
Case No. 4:08CV596SNL.
May 23, 2008
ORDER
In accordance with the memorandum filed herein this date,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction, declaratory judgment, writ of mandamus, writ of prohibition, per their Second Amended Complaint, and as incorporated in their motion for a temporary restraining order, as modified at the oral hearing on May 9, 2008, be and is DENIED on the basis of their federal claims.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that all remaining state-law claims, as contained in the plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, be and are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. All parties shall bear their respective fees and costs. No further action is to be taken in this case.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiffs have brought this action challenging the application of Missouri statute § 115.342 to plaintiff Juanita Head Walton (hereinafter referred to as Walton) in so far as prohibiting her name from appearing on the August 5, 2008 democratic primary election ballot as a candidate for Missouri state senator. This action was originally filed on April 28, 2008 seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a preliminary injunction. On May 2, 2008 this Court held an initial hearing on the TRO at which time the Court and counsel determined that the case be set for further hearing on May 9, 2008. Between May 2, 2008 and May 9, 2008 responsive pleadings were filed and the original complaint was amended twice. On May 9, 2008 the Court heard argument in support of and responsive to the plaintiffs' second amended complaint (#21) and the motion(s) for a TRO and/or preliminary injunction. During oral argument in this matter, the parties and the Court agreed to combine the hearing on the TRO/motion for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits; i.e. a request for a permanent injunction, as permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)2).
The remaining plaintiffs are allegedly registered voters who would vote for Ms. Walton if her name were to be certified and placed on the subject ballot.
Although the original complaint was filed on April 28, 2008, a motion for a TRO and for a preliminary injunction was not filed until May 2, 2008 (#6).
In seeking a permanent injunction,
"[a] plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction."eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006);Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of the University of Missouri, et. al., 2007 WL 4287865 (W.D.Mo. Dec. 6, 2007) ( quoting e-Bay v. MercExchange, supra.); see also, Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, Inc., 403 F.3d. 958, 967 (8th Cir. 2005) (sets forth a 3-factor test for a permanent injunction which is later incorporated into the 4-factor test of eBay v. MercExchange, supra.).
Having considered all the evidence before the Court, and arguments (both oral and written) of counsel, the Court has determined that a permanent injunction shall not be issued based upon the plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims; and that the remaining state-law claims/challenges to the application of § 115.342 R.S.Mo. are better addressed by the state court and therefore, shall be dismissed without prejudice.
Before addressing the legal issues present in this case, the Court will set forth its findings of fact relevant to the issues at hand.
On or about September 13, 1993 plaintiff Walton, along with others, formed a general business corporation by the name of El-Juan Group, Inc. for the purposes of operating a license fee office under contract with the State of Missouri. The Missouri Department of Revenue contracted with El-Juan Group for El-Juan Group to act as a fee agent pursuant to § 136.055 R.S.Mo. As a fee agent; i.e. fee office, El-Juan Group collected fees and taxes from members of the public on behalf of the State of Missouri (hereinafter referred to as the State) and was responsible to the State and the public for accounting for these collected fees and taxes. Plaintiff Walton was a corporate officer of El-Juan Group during the entire time that the corporation was acting as a fee agent for the State. El-Juan Group listed Walton as an officer in 1993 and 1994 annual reports, and filed multiple documents with the Secretary of State between September 13, 1993 and May 20, 1996 signed by Walton as a corporate officer. Defendants' Exhibits A, D1-D10.
All exhibits offered into evidence by the parties have been received without objection, and all factual findings are derived from these exhibits. When necessary, the Court will refer to a specific exhibit.
Plaintiff Juanita Head Walton is the wife of plaintiffs' counsel Elbert A. Walton. Unless otherwise noted, reference in this memorandum to "Walton" is to plaintiff Juanita Head Walton.
On February 21, 1996 the Department of Revenue sued El-Juan Group for failing to remit to the State the fees and taxes it had collected while acting as a fee agent for the State. On July 15, 1996 the Department of Revenue filed an amended petition entitled Director of Revenue, Dept. of Revenue, State of Missouri v. El-Juan Group, Inc. , Cause No. 685933 (Circuit Court of the County of St. Louis, Missouri). Defendants' Exhibit A-3. This amended petition alleged that pursuant to a contract entered into between the State and El-Juan Group,
"[D]efendant El-Juan Group, Inc. collected fees and taxes which are due and payable to Plaintiff and which remain outstanding and unpaid in the following amounts:Motor Vehicle/Marine $33,029.44 Local Tax 5,715.19 Drivers License 386.00 Total $39,130.63
That demand for payment of said fees and taxes has been made, but no payment has been forthcoming."
Defendants' Exhibit A-3.
El-Juan Group, Inc., through its corporate officers, including but not limited to plaintiff Walton, failed to answer the State's Amended Petition. On or about November 17, 1997, the Circuit Court for the County of St. Louis entered judgment against El-Juan Group. That judgment reads in pertinent part: "Given Defendant's failure to appear personally and contest the facts as plead and proven by Plaintiff, this Court ORDER [sic] and ADJUDGES in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $39,558.20." Defendants' Exhibit A-4. Upon the Court's best information, to-date, this default judgment has not been satisfied by El-Juan Group, Inc. or anyone on its behalf.
This amount evidently includes the additional costs associated with the litigation as sought in the prayer of the amended petition.
Meanwhile, on or about August 18, 1997 El-Juan Group, Inc. was administratively dissolved for failing to file an adequate annual report. Under Missouri law, an administratively dissolved corporation does not cease to exist; instead, it continues its corporate existence solely to carry on business "necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs under section 351.476 . . .", including "discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities". § 351.846.3 R.S.Mo. 2000; § 351.476.1(3) R.S.Mo. 2000. Dissolution of a corporation does not "[A]bate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against the corporation on the effective date of dissolution". § 351.476.2(6) R.S.Mo. 2000.
Plaintiff Walton was first elected to the Missouri House of Representatives in 2000 for a two-year term. Subsequently, she was re-elected to two-year terms in 2002, 2004, and 2006. Due to the term limits under the Missouri Constitution, plaintiff Walton could not seek a fifth term in the Missouri House of Representatives. Apparently, it became widely known that plaintiff Walton would run for the Missouri State Senate in 2008 in the 13th state senate district now represented by State Senator Timothy Green.
In 2006, the Missouri General Assembly passed certain amendments to Missouri's campaign finance reform bill. One of these amendments is § 115.342 R.S.Mo. which requires any potential candidate for public office to file an affidavit with the Department of Revenue, substantially in accordance with the form dictated by the statute, affirming that the candidate is not delinquent in the payment of state income taxes, personal property taxes, real property taxes on the place of residence (as stated on the candidate's declaration of candidacy), and furthermore, is not a "past or present corporate officer of any fee office that owes any taxes to the state." As referenced in § 115.342, the Department of Revenue developed an affidavit for potential candidates to complete and file with the Department in order to meet the requirements of § 115.342. Defendants' Exhibit A-5.
The Court takes judicial notice of counsel for the State defendants' statement to the Court that § 115.342 was passed with approval by 24 state senators and 88 state representatives.
On or about February 26, 2007 plaintiff Walton filed an affidavit with the Department of Revenue purportedly complying with the requirements of § 115.342. This affidavit was an alteration of the form of affidavit provided by § 115.342.2 R.S.Mo. In the opening declaration under penalty of perjury, plaintiff Walton stated the following:
". . . that I am not delinquent in the filing or payment of any state income taxes, personal property taxes, real property taxes on my place of residence, as stated on my declaration of candidacy, and that I am not a past or present corporate officer of any fee office that owes any taxes to the state, other than those taxes which may be in dispute, barred, expired, extinguished or deemed satisfied under applicable statutes of limitations or court rules." (plaintiff Walton's alteration is in bold print).
On or about February 28, 2008 the Department of Revenue received a complaint from Senator Green relating to plaintiff Walton's filing of her adulterated § 115.342 affidavit and contending that as a past officer of El-Juan Group, she owed back taxes pertaining to the aforementioned default judgment. On March 13, 2008 the Department sent Walton a letter informing her of the complaint, the Department's investigation into the matter, and its determination that pursuant to § 115.342 R.S.Mo. Walton would be disqualified from participating in the 2008 election unless said taxes were paid within thirty (30) days. Defendants' Exhibit A-7; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3.
On or about April 28, 2008 the Office of the Secretary of State verified with the Department of Revenue that the outstanding judgment for fees and taxes due had not been paid. Defendants' Exhibit C. On or about April 30, 2008 the Office of the Secretary of State informed plaintiff Walton that she was disqualified as a candidate for public office in the 2008 election(s). Defendants' Exhibit C-2; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12.
Meanwhile, plaintiff Walton pursued judicial remedies in the state courts. On March 12, 2008 Anthony Weaver filed suit against the State of Missouri and other state entities alleging that § 115.342 R.S.Mo. violated the state and federal constitutions. This petition was filed in the Circuit Court for Cole County, Missouri by Elbert A. Walton. On March 20, 2008 Mr. Walton amended this petition to add plaintiff Walton as a co-plaintiff with Mr. Weaver. Defendants' Exhibit A-9. That same day, the Cole County Circuit Court held a hearing on Weaver's and Walton's request for declaratory judgment, writ of mandamus, and injunctive relief. The Cole County Circuit Court denied these requests on March 25, 2008. Defendants' Exhibit A.
On April 7, 2008 the Cole County Circuit Court heard argument on the merits of Weaver's and Walton's amended petition. Due to the complexity and expansive nature of the arguments, the Cole County Circuit Court set an evidentiary hearing for April 16, 2008, and restrained any action on Walton's candidacy until April 16, 2008. Defendants' Exhibit A. On April 16, 2008 the Cole County Circuit Court judge permitted Walton to file a second amended petition adding claims regarding the applicability of § 115.342 R.S.Mo. to her, in addition to the constitutional claims. Defendants' Exhibit A-10.
On April 23, 2008 before the Cole County Circuit Court had ruled, Walton dismissed all of her claims as filed with the state court, and essentially, re-filed them in this Court.
While Walton's claims were pending before the Cole County Circuit Court, on or about March 26, 2008, El-Juan Group filed a motion with the St. Louis County Circuit Court requesting that the Court enter a "satisfaction of judgment" in the Department of Revenue's original lawsuit regarding the unpaid fees and taxes. Defendants' Exhibit A-2. On or about April 10, 2008 the Department of Revenue filed a responsive pleading to said motion arguing that the judgment was still collectable, and could be revived for another 10 years prior to October 28, 2009. On or about April 15, 2008 when the motion and response were called for hearing, El-Juan Group withdrew the motion prior to the St. Louis County Circuit Court ruling on it. Defendants' Exhibit A-2.
While both the Cole County Circuit Court and St. Louis County Circuit Court matters were pending, Elbert Walton, as counsel for and president of El-Juan Group, sent a "Request for Tax Clearance", Form 943 to the Department of Revenue. Defendants' Exhibit B-1. In the request, Mr. Walton represented himself as President of El-Juan Group, Inc. and indicated on the application that he was requesting the tax clearance solely for the purpose of reinstatement of the corporation with the Secretary of State. Furthermore, on the application, Mr. Walton stated that El-Juan Group, Inc. "has been dormant and has done no expenses, and held no assets since December 31, 1994 . . . That during the years 1993 and 1994, it sustained losses and earned no taxable income." Defendants' Exhibit B-1. Nowhere on the form did Mr. Walton indicate any past litigation with the Department of Revenue concerning taxes and fees owed while El-Juan Group was acting as a fee agent for the State.
Based upon the representations in the tax clearance request, Ms. Rhonda Wood of the Missouri Department of Revenue, researched only the three (3) most recent years of corporate income taxes, franchise taxes, and payroll taxes for El-Juan Group, Inc. itself. Defendants' Exhibit B — Affidavit of Rhonda Wood. Since the application did not indicate that El-Juan Group, Inc. had operated a fee office, she did not research whether El-Juan Group had paid all the taxes and fees it had collected on behalf of the State.
Although the Certificate of Tax Clearance states that "[A]ll taxes owed, including all liabilities owed as determined by the Division of Employment Security, pursuant to Chapter 288, RSMO, have been paid.", the Certificate further states:
"This statement is not to be construed as limiting the authority of the Director of Revenue to pursue collection of liabilities resulting from final litigation, default in payment of any installment agreement entered into with the Director of Revenue, any successor liability that may become due in the future, or audits or reviews of the taxpayer's records as provided by law."
Defendants' Exhibit B-2; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 and 1-B.
On or about April 28, 2008 plaintiff Walton filed this action challenging the applicability of § 115.342 R.S.Mo. to her candidacy on federal and state constitutional grounds. On or about May 6, 2008 the current second amended complaint was filed to add party plaintiffs' and their claim that application of § 115.342 to plaintiff Walton would interfere with their voting rights.
Plaintiff Walton — Candidate's Rights
Plaintiff Walton's arguments are basically of two (2) types: 1) a factual dispute as to whether she owes the taxes pursuant to the St. Louis County Circuit Court default judgment and/or whether that judgment is still enforceable; and 2) constitutional challenges, both federal and state, to § 115.342 R.S.Mo.
For purposes of this memorandum, the Court, after careful review of the evidentiary record and relevant caselaw, finds that § 115.342 R.S.Mo., in its plain language, is being asserted against plaintiff' Walton in her capacity as a corporate officer of El-Juan Group during the years it was acting as a fee agent for the State. It is clear to this Court that § 115.342 is not being used to assert a tax lien against plaintiff Walton personally. Furthermore, under Missouri law, the administrative dissolution of El-Juan Group prior to the default judgment being entered against it does not absolve it from its liability giving rise to the default judgment. Finally, it is equally clear to this Court, that the judgment entered by the St. Louis County Circuit Court was for taxes and fees owed by El-Juan Group to the State. A difference in semantics does not alter the substance of the judgment.
However, the Court voices no opinion as to any factual dispute or otherwise regarding the issues of the lapse of the judgment pursuant to § 516.350 R.S.Mo. or the tolling of § 516.350 due to the alleged bankruptcy of one of the corporate officers of El-Juan Group, Inc.; the effect of the alteration of the § 115.342 affidavit by plaintiff Walton; and the significance, if any, of the Certificate of Tax Clearance. These are matters better left for the appropriate state court to decide.
The Court notes that on two (2) occasions, state courts were in a position to address these matters; however, the plaintiffs chose to withdraw these matters from the state courts' consideration.
The Court will address only plaintiff Walton's federal constitutional claim(s). Plaintiff Walton challenges § 115.342 R.S.Mo. on federal equal protection grounds. With respect to candidate qualification statutes, the United States Supreme Court has noted:
The matter of all state constitutional claims will be addressed later in this memorandum.
"The Equal Protection Clause allows the States considerable leeway to enact legislation that may appear to effect similarly situated people differently. Legislatures are ordinarily assumed to have acted constitutionally. Under traditional equal protection principles, distinctions need only be drawn in such a manner as to bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state end. Classifications are set aside only if they are based solely on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of the State's goals and only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them. We have departed from traditional equal protection principles only when the challenged statute places burdens upon `suspect classes' of persons or on a constitutional right that is deemed to be `fundamental'."Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 962-63 (1982).
The exact nature of plaintiff Walton's equal protection claim is unclear because she 1) appears to be suing on behalf of fee offices in general while simultaneously denying that she was ever a past or present corporate officer of a fee office that owes taxes; and 2) appears to be suing on behalf of herself regarding ballot access.
Although the Court has some misgivings about plaintiff Walton's standing to sue on behalf of a fee office which she denies any involvement in as regards application of § 115.342, the Court will assume for purposes of this memorandum that she is suing, properly or not, on behalf of El-Juan Group in contending that it is being singled out, as a fee office, for discriminatory treatment.
A corporation, such as El-Juan Group, is a "person" under the Equal Protection Clause. MSM Farms, Inc. v. Spire, et. al., 927 F.2d. 330, 332 (8th Cir. 1991). The Equal Protection Clause requires that the government treat all similarly situated people alike. Barstad v. Murray County, 420 F.2d. 880, 884 (8th Cir. 2005) citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). The Supreme Court recognizes an equal protection claim for discrimination against a "class of one". Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Barstad, at 884; see also, Discovery House, Inc. v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, et. al., 319 F.3d. 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2003). Wherein a claim such as this one does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right, the proper level of scrutiny is a rational relationship test. Barstad, at 884; see also, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564; Nolan v. Thompson, 521 F.3d. 983, 990 (8th Cir. 2008); RJB Properties v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 468 F.3d. 1005, 1009-1010 (7th Cir. 2006); Discovery House, at 282. The purpose of a class-of-one claim is "to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents." Barstad, at 884 quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. A class-of-one claimant must prove that the State, "intentionally treated [it] differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment."Nolan, at 989-90 quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564; Barstad, at 884.
Despite generalizations and accusations, plaintiff Walton has not pointed to any other similarly situated company that has been treated more favorably. She has not identified any other fee office with an outstanding judgment for taxes owed whose past or present corporate officer has not been precluded from having their name certified for an election ballot. For that matter, she has not identified any other corporate entity with an outstanding judgment for taxes owed whose past or present corporate officer has not been precluded from having their name certified for an election ballot.
Under the rational basis review, "the plaintiff has the burden of proving the government's action irrational, and [t]he government may defend the rationality of its action on any ground it can muster, not just the one articulated at the time of decision." RJB Properties, at 1010 (citation omitted). The State, on the other hand, has offered legitimate and rational reasons why fee offices are included in § 115.342 R.S.Mo. It asserts that fee offices are included 1) to assist the state and local governments implementation and enforcement of their tax laws and tax collection; 2) to ensure that law-abiding people hold state and local offices; and 3) to ensure that the officeholders who impose taxes on others and determine how the revenue is spent are individuals who are diligent about tax compliance with tax laws themselves.
The Court has carefully reviewed the State's pleadings and cited caselaw and concurs that the State has an undisputed duty to protect the integrity of its tax system and to have those in positions to create and enforce the tax laws be diligent themselves about tax law compliance. Fee offices, unlike most other corporate entities, are a direct link to the State for taxpayers. Taxpayers trust fee offices to facilitate the payment of taxes to the State. This trust is sacrosanct and should not be treated lightly. Those who own fee offices owe a duty to the tax-paying public to be law-abiding when it comes to their own tax obligations, and § 115.342 fosters this trust and respect for government. Whether or not § 115.342 meets these goals or whether or not plaintiff Walton believes that El-Juan Group is liable for the said taxes is not the issue. All that is required for equal protection purposes is that the Missouri Legislature rationally decided that fee offices should be subject to § 115.342 in order to protect the integrity of the tax system in Missouri. Plaintiff Walton has not shown that Missouri's inclusion of fee offices in § 115.342 R.S.Mo. is arbitrary and irrational.
Plaintiff Walton's "other" equal protection claim appears to be that she, herself, is being singled out, as an alleged past officer of a fee office allegedly owing taxes, for discriminatory treatment. Despite counsel's accusations at oral argument of a racial animus as a catalyst for § 115.342 R.S.Mo., her pleadings do not promote this consideration. Instead, her sole argument is that § 115.342 R.S.Mo. was drafted and "pushed through" the Missouri Legislature by her political rival in the 13th District in order to keep her off the ballot. Once again, plaintiff Walton appears to be making a "class of one" equal protection claim regarding ballot access.
Counsel, at oral argument, also asserted political party animosity, as well as union affiliation, as being the motivation for passage of § 115.342 R.S.Mo.
Although states have the power to regulate their elections and access to their ballots, this power cannot be exercised in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 141 (1972); American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., et. al. v. Meyer, et. al., 120 F.3d. 1092, 1097 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing numerous United States Supreme Court cases addressing the states' power to regulate elections and ballot access). A state legislature is presumed to have acted constitutionally when enacting statutes that appear to affect similarly situated persons differently; and "[u]nder traditional equal protection principles, distinctions need only be drawn in such a manner as to bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state end." Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982) (plurality opinion). As stated before, a court must apply traditional principles of equal protection analysis; i.e. a rational relationship test, unless the legislation at issue burdens a suspect class, or a fundamental right. See, Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 963.
A candidate does not have a fundamental right to appear on an election ballot. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. at 143; Corrigan v. City of Newaygo, 55 F.3d. 1211, 1214 (6th Cir. 1995) ( citing Bullock v. Carter, supra.); Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d. 260, 265 (8th Cir. 1990) (". . . the right to run for public office, unlike the right to vote, is not a fundamental right."); Worthy, et. al. v. State of Michigan, et. al., 142 F.Supp.2d. 806, 810 (E.D.Mich. 2000). "Far from recognizing candidacy as a `fundamental right,' we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate's access to the ballot `does not of itself compel close scrutiny.'" Worthy, at 810 ( quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 963 quoting Bullock v. Carter, supra.). "However, the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. Of course, not every limitation or incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of review."Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. at 855-56 citing McDonald v. Board of Education, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
Based upon Supreme Court ballot cases, the issue of whether or not a strict scrutiny test or a rational basis test should be used appears to be almost a case-by-case analysis. See,Republican Party of Arkansas, et. al. v. Faulkner County, Arkansas, et. al., 49 F.3d. 1289, 1296 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The Supreme Court has not spoken with unmistakable clarity on the proper standard of review for challenges to provisions of election codes. In some cases, the Court has articulated and employed a flexible test, calibrating the level of scrutiny to the seriousness of the burden imposed by the challenged law; yet on other occasions it has suggested that all election and voting regulations must be subjected to strict scrutiny."); see also, Manifold, et.al. v. Blunt, et. al., 863 F.2d. 1368, 1372 n. 9 (1988) (reviewing Supreme Court cases involving equal protection challenges to ballot access statutes for the prior twenty years). "Decision in this area of constitutional adjudication is a matter of degree, and involves a consideration of the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests the State seeks to protect by placing restrictions on candidacy, and the nature of the interests of those who may be burdened by the restrictions." Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 963 ( citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). When the "availability of political opportunity" is targeted, the Supreme Court has departed from the traditional rational basis review. Worthy, at 810 citing Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974). These types of cases generally involve classifications based on wealth, Bullock v. Carter, supra., Lubin v. Panish, supra.; classifications based upon property ownership, Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989), Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); and classification schemes that impose burdens on new or small political parties or independent candidates, Clements v. Fashing, supra., Storer v. Brown, supra.
The statute at issue here does not make classifications based upon wealth, property ownership, nor does it place a heavy burden on minority or independent potential political candidates. Accordingly, the Court determines that plaintiff Walton's equal protection claim, as it pertains to herself, does not require a heightened standard of review.
As with the asserted El-Juan Group equal protection claim, plaintiff Walton does have a right not to be excluded arbitrarily from the ballot. Under the rational basis test, if the State's restriction, as set forth in § 115.342 R.S.Mo. is wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a valid state objective, then it must be struck down. This case presents an equal protection claim similar to the one asserted in Corrigan v. City of Newaygo, supra. There voters and potential candidates asserted a constitutional challenge to the City's ballot access provision which provided that residents of the City who were delinquent on their local taxes or water and sewer fees could not appear on the ballot for elections for local offices. Upon considering the City's justifications for the restriction; i.e. delinquent taxpayers are not committed to the well-being of the community, delinquent taxpayers as candidates would harm public respect for government, and protects the integrity of the decision-making process with respect to tax laws, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that such reasons, especially as to the integrity of the tax system, survived the rational basis review. Corrigan v. City of Newaygo, at 1216-17. The Court found that the ordinance did "serve the economic purpose of enforcing the City's tax regime. It provides incentives to those citizens who wish to run for office to pay their taxes. Furthermore, it punishes those who do not fulfill their obligations to the City by not allowing them to run for public office in Newaygo." Id.
The justifications set forth by the State here are similar: 1) the implementation and enforcement of the tax laws and tax collection; 2) that law-abiding people hold state and local offices; and 3) to ensure that the oficeholders who impose taxes on others and determine how the revenue is spent are individuals who are diligent about tax compliance with tax laws themselves. As before, the Court finds § 115.342 R.S.Mo. to be rationally related to these objectives. Whether or not this ballot access restriction is well-tailored to meet these objectives is not for the Court to consider for "it is not the province of this Court to challenge its [the State] wisdom or to second-guess the state's policy judgment." Worthy, at 815 citing Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 973. "Under traditional equal protection principles, a classification is not deficient simply because the State could have selected another means of achieving the desired ends." Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 969 citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316 (1976), Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83 (1976), San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973).
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the Missouri Supreme Court has found that § 115.342 R.S.Mo. did not invalidate H.B. 1900 (campaign finance reform bill) because it is related to the original purpose of ethics giving rise to H.B. 1900. Trout v. State of Missouri, 231 S.W.3d. 140, 145-46 (Mo. 2007) ("Furthermore, the section 115.342 and 115.350 candidate disqualification amendments that gave rise to the original purpose challenge are germane to the original purpose of ethics. Certainly the disqualification of persons from running for office who are delinquent on certain taxes, sec. 115.342, or who are felons, sec. 115.350, goes to the very essence of ethics regulation.").
Plaintiff Walton's right to equal protection under the laws is not violated by § 115.342 R.S.Mo.
Voter Plaintiffs' Rights
Next, the Court must consider whether § 115.342 R.S.Mo. unconstitutionally burdens the Voter Plaintiffs' equal protection rights and First Amendment associational rights. There is no dispute that the right to vote "is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure."Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979). However, this fundamental right is not absolute and not every law that imposes a burden upon it must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
The Court means no disrespect to electing not to name each of these plaintiffs individually. It is just a matter of judicial efficiency and economy to group these plaintiffs together as the "Voter Plaintiffs".
The second amended complaint makes repeated references to the "U.S. Voting Rights Act but fails to set forth the statute, the specific claim under the Act under which plaintiffs are challenging § 115.342, or under which provision of the Act the plaintiffs are challenging § 115.342. Consequently, the Court finds that any such claim is non-existent.
Recently, the Supreme Court has addressed the "flexibility" of review standards when addressing a challenge to an election law, or as in this case, a ballot access statute, which has some impact on voters' rights. In evaluating a claim that a state law burdens the right to vote, those regulations which impose a severe burden on associational rights are subject to strict scrutiny and are upheld only if they are "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest".Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008) quoting Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005). "If a state imposes only modest burdens, however, then `the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions' on election procedures".Washington State Grange, 128 S.Ct. at 1192 quoting Anderson v. Celebreezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983). "Accordingly, we have repeatedly upheld reasonable, politically neutral regulations that have the effect of channeling expressive activity at the polls." Washington State Grange, 128 S.Ct. at 1192 quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. at 438; see also, Crawford, et. al. v. Marion County Election Board, et. al., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 1615-16 (2008). This "balancing approach" has been recognized by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in cases involving a multitude of voters' claims challenging election laws. Republican Party of Arkansas v. Faulkner County, Arkansas, supra. (applies a modified version of strict scrutiny under both the Burdick, and Anderson approaches); Stiles v. Blunt, at 266, n. 10 ("Assuming that appellant has standing to raise the voters' claims, the author believes that it is more appropriate to analyze the minimum age requirement under the Anderson balancing test. I believe the Supreme Court intended the Anderson test to be applied whenever election regulations allegedly affect a citizen's `right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends.'"); Iowa Socialist Party v. Nelson, et. al., 909 F.2d. 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 1990) (adopting the 10th Circuit's balancing approach predicated upon Anderson); Manifold, et. al. v. Blunt, 863 F.2d. 1368, 1373, n. 9 (8th Cir. 1988) (ballot access requirement survives challenge under various standards, including the balancing test of Anderson).
The burden that application of § 115.342 imposes upon the Voter Plaintiffs is that they are unable to presumably vote for a candidate of their choice; i.e. plaintiff Walton. A secondary burden appears to be that the Voter Plaintiffs presumably cannot vote for an African-American candidate; i.e. plaintiff Walton. However, a voter does not have an absolute right to vote for a specific candidate or a specific class of candidates. Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller, 144 F.3d. 916, 921 (6th Cir. 1998); Stiles v. Blunt, at 266; Zielasko v. Ohio, 873 F.2d. 957, 961 (6th Cir. 1989). Thus, the burden is minimal.
State statute § 115.342 is content neutral and does not draw classifications in an invidious or impermissible manner. It applies to candidates of all political parties, of all races, of all districts. It does not deprive voters of their rights to vote for, associate with, or speak out on behalf of candidates other than plaintiff Walton. Therefore, § 115.342 need only to rationally further a legitimate state interest to be constitutional. See, Stiles v. Blunt, at 266.
As stated before, the Court has found that § 115.342 rationally furthers legitimate state interests of protecting the integrity of the electoral process and the State's tax system. State statute § 115.342 has been recognized by Missouri as a means of promoting ethics within the election process and addressing issues of trust with government officials. It is a reasonable restriction on candidacy and has a de minimus impact on voters' rights.
"The right to vote is vital to the preservation of our democracy: `No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.' However, the `right to vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of our democratic system.'"Worthy v. State of Michigan, at 817 (internal citations omitted).
State statute § 115.342 R.S.Mo. does not violate the Voter Plaintiffs' rights under the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause.
As a final note, the Court is not ignoring the plaintiff's contention that § 115.342 R.S.Mo. was "racially motivated" because "in order to prevent Rep. Walton from being a candidate for election in the Missouri Senate, State Senator Timothy Green amended HB 1900 to include Section 115.342 RSMo." and that "Section 115.342 RSMo, was intentionally amended by Senator Green in order to deny black voters of the thirteenth state senate district an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice."
Even if State Senator Green had ulterior motives in seeking to amend HB 1900 by including § 115.342, the undisputed fact is that the bill with this amendment was passed by a majority of votes. Plaintiff Walton, as well as any other legislator, had a full opportunity to speak out against § 115.342 and vote against it. The reality of our "democratic system" is that partisan interests do play a significant role in the passage of laws. "But if a nondiscriminatory law is supported by valid neutral justifications, those justifications should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators." Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 128 S.Ct. at 1624. The application of § 115.342 is "amply justified by the valid interest in protecting `the integrity and reliability of the electoral process.'" Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 128 S.Ct. at 1624 quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, n. 9.
Plaintiff Walton's secondary constitutional challenge to § 115.342 is a due process claim that the Department of Revenue is trying to hold plaintiff Walton "personally liable" for the debts of a corporation of which she had no personal liability. This claims lacks merit.
Firstly, it is clear that § 115.342 R.S.Mo. is not a statute of "personal liability" but rather seeks to impose a restriction upon ballot access on a past or present corporate officer due to taxes owed by his or her corporation. She claims that § 115.342 runs afoul of Missouri statute § 432.010. Missouri statute § 432.010, as titled, simply directs that a contract must be in writing if its subject matter falls within the Statute of Frauds. Plaintiff Walton asserts that she never made any promise, in writing or otherwise, to answer for the debts of El-Juan Group; thus, making her pay El-Juan Group's debts violates § 431.010 R.S.Mo.
Plaintiff Walton's argument is misconceived. She is not obligated to pay El-Juan Group's default judgment; however, she has the choice to do so and preserve her candidacy. Anyone can pay the debt in order to preserve her candidacy.
Secondly, plaintiff Walton has had more than one opportunity to challenge her connection with the alleged debt, first when the original lawsuit was filed seeking payment of the taxes owed, and secondly, when in March 2008 she sought a "satisfaction of judgment". Both times, plaintiff Walton failed to see the process through to completion.
State statute § 115.342 has been recognized by the Missouri legislature and the Missouri Supreme Court as a legitimate means of protecting the integrity of the electoral process and the tax system, and protecting the public's trust in government. The protection of these vital government interests via § 115.342 R.S.Mo. does not violate plaintiff Walton's due process rights.
The plaintiffs' failure to succeed on their federal constitutional claims precludes this Court from finding that any one of the factors necessary to grant injunctive relief exists.
The remainder of the plaintiff's claims are challenges to § 115.342 R.S.Mo. based upon various violations of the Missouri Constitution. A federal district court has discretion to decline jurisdiction if it has "dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). "[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Barstad v. Murray County, at 888 quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988). Plaintiffs' remaining claims are better suited for a state court to address; an avenue pursued twice before by plaintiffs. This Court believes that the appropriate state court will adjudicate these claims, both factually and legally, with the utmost fairness and efficiency. It is hoped that the plaintiffs, if they choose to refile, will see this adjudication to its end and allow a Missouri court to make a final decision regarding the viability of the alleged debt owed and the Missouri constitutional challenge to § 115.342 R.S.Mo.
In sum, the Court will deny the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction based upon their federal claims, and will dismiss without prejudice their state-law claims.