To conclude otherwise "would have a negative effect on written motions, for to apply [Rule 6(d)] strictly would penalize one who submitted a written motion rather than an oral one which has no time requirement." Walton v. Datry, 185 Ga. App. 88, 91, 363 S.E.2d 295, 298 (1987), cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 911 (Ga. Jan. 13, 1988). Walton also states:
Shepherd v. Greer, Klosic & Daugherty, 325 Ga.App. 188, 189-90 (2013); see also Walton v. Datry, 185 Ga.App. 88, 93-94 (1987) (“The cardinal rule in the construction of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties.”)
Legacy Academy v. JLK, Inc., 330 Ga.App. 397, 401(1), 765 S.E.2d 472 (2014). See e.g., Walton v. Datry, 185 Ga.App. 88, 93(5)(a), 363 S.E.2d 295 (1987) (where a provision of a certain numbered paragraph of a contract referenced an article of the same contract). See generally Blueshift, Inc. v. Advanced Computing Technologies, Inc., 273 Ga.App. 802, 802–805(2), 616 S.E.2d 816 (2005).
, Howell Mill/CollierAssoc. v. Gonzales (allowing late-filed affidavits opposing summary judgment). Walton v. Datry, 185 Ga. App. 88, 91 (2) ( 363 SE2d 295) (1987).Fairington, Inc. v. Yeargin Constr. Co., 144 Ga. App. 491, 492 (1) ( 241 SE2d 608) (1978).
Such contracts must be construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured. Id. Nevertheless, language which is unambiguous will not be construed as ambiguous based on extrinsic circumstances, Walton v. Datry, 185 Ga. App. 88, 94 (5) (a) ( 363 SE2d 295) (1987), and even though ambiguous exclusions may be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly construed against the insurer, this cannot be done when the exclusion is clear and unequivocal. United Svcs. c. Assn. v. hail, 192 Ga. App. 487, 489 (1) ( 385 SE2d 424) (1989).
The trial court properly based its ruling on the witness's anticipated testimony. Walton v. Datry, 185 Ga. App. 88, 90-91 (2) ( 363 SE2d 295) (1987). In any event, while J. B. did not specifically testify at trial that Boynton gave her illegal drugs in exchange for sex, she did testify that he gave her drugs just before he molested her, and that the drug use "always led up to intercourse."
It also follows that, even though the failure to notify the Rices of the hearing on their motions was error, the lack of any legal basis for the motions shows the error was harmless. Ford v. Prudential Investment Co., 174 Ga. 163, 164-165 ( 162 SE 382) (1932); Walton v. Dairy, 185 Ga. App. 88, 90-91 ( 363 SE2d 295) (1987). There is no merit to the Rices' contention that they asserted a valid appearance conflict pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule (USCR) 17, and that the trial court erroneously failed to recognize the conflict and reschedule the hearing on Cannon's dismissal motion.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Walton v. Datry, 185 Ga. App. 88, 95 (5) (b) ( 363 SE2d 295) (1987). (Punctuation omitted.)
This rule does not require that Lawrence be given 6 months in which to complete discovery. Alexander v. Macon-Bibb County Urban Development Auth. c., 257 Ga. 181, 184 ( 357 S.E.2d 62) (1987); Walton v. Datry, 185 Ga. App. 88, 90 ( 363 S.E.2d 295) (1987). Rather, the time for conducting discovery rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.
Thus, there is no specified time within which to conduct discovery, only a limitation on the period that the trial court will enforce discovery; by trial court order, discovery can be shortened or increased. Alexander v. Macon-Bibb County Urban Dev. Auth., 257 Ga. 181, 184(5) ( 357 S.E.2d 62) (1987); Walton v. Datry, 185 Ga. App. 88, 90(1) ( 363 S.E.2d 295) (1987). A trial court has wide discretion to shorten, extend, or reopen the time for discovery, and its decision will not be reversed unless a clear abuse of that discretion is shown.