The court's demand provided that, in the event that plaintiffs failed to comply with the demand, the court upon its own motion would dismiss the complaint based on plaintiffs' unreasonable neglect in proceeding with the action. We note that plaintiffs moved within the 90-day period to vacate the demand and for an extension of time in which to complete discovery, thereby avoiding default with respect to the court's demand ( see Walton v Clifton Springs Hosp. Clinic, 255 AD2d 964, 965; Conway v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 212 AD2d 497; cf. Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 499, 503-504). We further note, however, that "[t]he motion requires the moving party to make a showing of need for the extension or good excuse for past delay" ( Walton, 255 AD2d at 965 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 2004; Cook v City of New York, 11 AD3d 424).
We disagree. When the motion is made pursuant to CPLR 2004, an affidavit will not be required ( see Walton v. Clifton Springs Hosp. Clinic, 255 AD2d 964, 965; Conway v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 212 AD2d 497, 497-498; Carte v. Segall, 134 AD2d 397, 398). Yet, even in those circumstances, the statute "'requires the moving party to make "a showing of need for the extension or good excuse for past delay"'" ( Conway v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., supra at 497, quoting Carte v. Segall, supra at 398 [citation omitted]; accord Walton v. Clifton Springs Hosp. Clinic, supra at 965).
Claimants' counsel did not dispute this fact in his papers in opposition. Upon our review of the record, we find that the Court of Claims did not abuse its discretion in denying claimants' motion for an extension of time or in dismissing the claims for failure to prosecute (see, Carota v. Massapequa Union Free School Dist., 272 A.D.2d 428; Walton v. Clifton Springs Hosp. Clinic, 255 A.D.2d 964; Rada v. City of Yonkers, 204 A.D.2d 523). The record reveals that claimants waited until March 18, 1998 to send out discovery demands to the State in this matter. This was nearly five years after the occurrence forming the basis for the claims, over four years after the first claim was filed and nearly two years after the first order requiring the filing of a note of issue.
CPLR ยง 2004 provides that the Court, in its discretion, may extend the time to, inter alia, file a note of issue (see e.g. Walton v. Clifton Springs Hospital and Clinic, 255 A.D.2d 964 [4th Dept 1998]; see also Salzman & Salzman v. Gardiner, 100 A.D.2d 846 [2d Dept 1984]).
Even without the return receipt, the mailing to Claimant's correct address without it being returned to sender supports the presumption of delivery. Once Defendant has met the requirements of CPLR 3216, the burden shifts to the Claimant to file the note of issue or seek an extension of time to file the note of issue, to show a justifiable excuse for the delay and, if the 90 days have expired, a meritorious cause of action (Walton v Clifton Springs Hosp. & Clinic, 255 AD2d 964 [4th Dept 1998]; Versatile Furniture Prods. v 32-8 Maujer Realty, 97 AD2d 463 [2d Dept 1983]; Keating v Smith, 20 AD2d 141 [2d Dept 1963]).