"Although some of these credibility attacks occurred after [the victim's] prior consistent statement was introduced through [the detective's] testimony, a prior consistent statement may be admissible if the testifying witness's credibility was ‘eventually attacked’ at a later point in the trial." Walters v. State , 335 Ga. App. 12, 17, n. 4, 780 S.E.2d 720 (2015) (citations omitted). Defense counsel's statements were attacks on the victim's general credibility by some means other than impeachment by evidence of character or prior convictions.
While a prior consistent statement can be admitted to rehabilitate a witness if it logically rebuts "any attack on a witness’s credibility," it cannot be admitted "for attacks upon [her] character for truthfulness or evidence of [her] prior convictions." Walters v. State , 335 Ga. App. 12, 14, 780 S.E.2d 720 (2015) (emphasis in original). Here, the victim testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination.
OCGA § 24-6-613 (c), enacted as part of the overhaul of our rules of evidence that took effect on January 1, 2013, see Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2, represents Georgia's first codification of a rule on the admissibility of prior consistent statements. See Walters v. State , 335 Ga. App. 12, 13, 780 S.E.2d 720 (2015). Prior to the adoption of OCGA § 24-6-613 (c), Georgia case law established that prior consistent statements, while not admissible as substantive evidence to bolster or fortify a witness’ trial testimony, could be admitted in the narrow circumstance where (1) a witness was impeached by some "affirmative charge[ ]" that the witness’ testimony was tainted by "recent fabrication, improper influence, or improper motive" and (2) the prior statement predated the alleged fabrication, influence, or motive.
We cite the 2015 Advisory Committee Note here and below not because it is in any way binding on this Court - indeed, Georgia's Civil Practice Act does not include a counterpart to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 (e) - but because the advisory committee's notes are often a persuasive scholarly commentary on civil procedure issues, including common law issues of the sort we address in this case. Cf. Walters v. State, 335 Ga. App. 12, 15 n.3 (780 SE2d 720) (2015). (b) In Phillips, the accused spoliator was the defendant hospital, and we focused on the duty to preserve evidence from that perspective.
See also Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 871–872, 785 S.E.2d 414 (2016) ("[O]ur concern is with the actual text of statutes, not the subjective statements of individual legislators expressing their personal intent in voting for or against a bill"); Walters v. State, 335 Ga. App. 12, 15 n. 3, 780 S.E.2d 720 (2015) ; Day v. Floyd Cty. Bd. of Educ., 333 Ga. App. 144, 150–151, 775 S.E.2d 622 (2015) (Dillard, J., concurring fully and specially); Rutter v. Rutter, 316 Ga. App. 894, 896 (1) n.5, 730 S.E.2d 626 (2012) ; Keaton v. State, 331 [311] Ga. App. 14, 26 n.17, 714 S.E.2d 693 (2011) (Blackwell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).Gibson v. Gibson, 301 Ga. 622, 631–632 (3) (c), 801 S.E.2d 40 (2017) (footnote omitted).
Merritt v. State, 286 Ga. 650 , 656 (690 SE2d 835 ) (2010) (Nahmias, J., concurring specially) (punctuation omitted). See also Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867 , 871-872 (785 SE2d 414 ) (2016) (“[0]ur concern is with the actual text of statutes, not the subjective statements of individual legislators expressing their personal intent in voting for or against a bill.”); Walters v. State, 335 Ga. App. 12 , 15 n.3 (780 SE2d 720 ) (2015); Day v. Floyd County Bd. of Ed., 333 Ga. App. 144 , 150-151 (775 SE2d 622 ) (2015) (Dillard, J., concurring fully and specially); Rutter v. Rutter, 316 Ga. App. 894 , 896 (1) n.5 (730 SE2d 626 ) (2012); Keaton v. State, 311 Ga. App. 14 , 26 n.17 (714 SE2d 693 ) (2011) (Blackwell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).10
Thus, contrary to Johnson's arguments below and on appeal, Hawkins' testimony is not inadmissible merely because Johnson did not, as he claims, "impugn[] [N. J.'s] credibility by charging her with recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." Walters v. State, 335 Ga.App. 12, 14 (780 S.E.2d 720) (2015).
(Citations and emphasis omitted.) McGarity v. State , 311 Ga. 158 (3), 856 S.E.2d 241, 247 (3) (2021) ; see also OCGA § 24-6-613 (c) ; Walters v. State , 335 Ga. App. 12, 14, 780 S.E.2d 720 (2015) (recognizing that under the new Evidence Code, admission of a prior consistent statement was not limited to rebutting an allegation of recent fabrication). In McGarity , our Supreme Court noted that a prior consistent statement was not admissible to rehabilitate a general attack on a witness's credibility.
Evans has thus failed to show that the trial court erred in ruling that letter was properly admitted due to the subsequent attack on the witness’ credibility. See Sterling v. State , 267 Ga. 209, 213 (9), (477 S.E.2d 807) (1996) (rejecting claim of improper bolstering based on the introduction of a witness’ taped statement before the witness testified at trial because the witness’ credibility was eventually attacked and the tape was therefore properly admitted as a prior consistent statement); Walters v. State , 335 Ga. App. 12, 17 n. 4, (780 S.E.2d 720) (2015) ("Although some of these credibility attacks occurred after [the] prior consistent statement [had already been] introduced through [other] testimony, a prior consistent statement may be admissible if the testifying witness's credibility was eventually attacked at a later point in the trial.") (citations and punctuation omitted). The other transcript volumes cited by Evans show that two other state witnesses were extensively cross-examined by the defense; that on redirect examination of each witness the state introduced their respective apology letters; and that there were no objections to those letters.
[Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167, 115 S.Ct. 696, 706, 130 L.Ed. 2d 574 (1995) ] (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) [ (emphasis original) ]; see also Horenkamp v. Van Winkle & Co., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (II) (11th Cir. 2005) (advisory committee notes "are nearly universally accorded great weight in interpreting federal rules") (citation and punctuation omitted).Walters v. State, 335 Ga. App. 12, 15–16, n. 3, 780 S.E.2d 720 (2015). made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describ[e] medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.