In contrast, the implicit holding of Hummer I was that the district judge would have no jurisdiction to do anything other than enter an amended judgment. Jurisdiction to address a subsidiary issue such as attorney fees did not arise as a result of our holding. As we recently noted in Walters v. Industrial Indemnity Company, 130 Idaho 836, 949 P.2d 223 (1997): Where the appellate court remands a cause with directions to enter judgment for one of the parties, the judgment of the appellate court is a final judgment in the cause, and the entry thereof in the lower court is a purely ministerial act. . . . A trial court has no authority to enter any judgment or order not in conformity with the order of the appellate court.

If a given issue is “a subsidiary issue fairly comprised” in the proceedings that were remanded, then the trial court may consider it. Walters v. Indus. Indem. Co. of Idaho, 949 P.2d 223, 225 (Idaho 1997). Any other claims are outside the scope of the mandate and are procedurally barred.

Before moving to the substantive discussion, the State argues the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to even consider Hosey's motion to withdraw his guilty plea because such action would be outside the scope of action directed by this Court's opinion in Hosey I. The State argues because the remand in this case was for the limited purpose of receiving in camera evidence related to the informer privilege and reconsideration of the motion to suppress in light of that evidence, the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to do anything else on remand. The general rule is that, on remand, a trial court has authority to take actions it is specifically directed to take, or those which are subsidiary to the actions directed by the appellate court. Walters v. Industrial Indem. Co., 130 Idaho 836, 838, 949 P.2d 223, 225 (1997). In this case, we believe the issue of the effect of our opinion in Hosey I on the terms of the plea agreement was within the trial court's jurisdiction on remand.

Because the Court declared the issues raised in the direct appeal from the conditional plea to be moot and addressed only the issues raised in the post-conviction appeal, the remand necessarily directed the trial court to address only the relief sought in the post-conviction appeal. See Walters v. Industrial Indem. Co., 130 Idaho 836, 838, 949 P.2d 223, 225 (1997). Concerning the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, while we might defer to a decision of counsel not to file a suppression motion if counsel had investigated all the facts and found a strategic reason not to do so, that is not the case here.

See Walters v. State, 130 Idaho 836, 838, 949 P.2d 223, 225 (1997) (trial court's jurisdiction following amended remittitur did not include consideration of request to amend complaint because constitutional claims were not a subsidiary issue); accord United States v. McKinley, 227 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[W]hen a party fails to seek review of a district court's final order, it is barred from reasserting that issue in any subsequent appeals occurring in that case."). Thus, the district court did not err in denying Branigh's motion to amend his petition upon remand.