Opinion
# 2012-039-281 Claim No. 104981 Motion No. M-79310
02-01-2012
WALSH v. STATE OF NEW YORK
Synopsis
The Court denies defendant's motion to vacate the interlocutory judgment finding for claimants on the issue of liability. Defendant has failed to establish that vacatur of the judgment is warranted pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4) on the ground the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. The Court also declines to exercise its authority to vacate the judgment pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 9 (8). Case information
UID: 2012-039-281 Claimant(s): ALICE P. WALSH AND DUKE GIFT PROPERTIES, INC., on behalf of DUKE UNIVERSITY Claimant short name: WALSH Footnote (claimant name) : Defendant(s): STATE OF NEW YORK Footnote (defendant name) : Third-party claimant(s): Third-party defendant (s): Claim number(s): 104981 Motion number(s): M-79310 Cross-motion number(s): Judge: James H. Ferreira Claimant's attorney: Timothy Nugent, Esq. Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman Attorney General of the State of New York Defendant's attorney: By: Michael A. Sims, Of Counsel Assistant Attorney General Third-party defendant's attorney: Signature date: February 1, 2012 City: Albany Comments: Official citation: Appellate results: See also (multicaptioned case) Decision
By decision dated January 17, 2008, the Court (Sise, P.J.) directed entry of judgment in favor of claimants following a trial on the issue of liability (see Walsh v State of New York, UID # 2008-028-001, Claim No. 104981, Sise, P.J. [filed March 5, 2008]).Defendant now moves for an order vacating the interlocutory judgment and dismissing the claim pursuant to Court of Claims Act §§ 9 (8) and 9 (9) and CPLR 5015 (a) (4). Claimants oppose the motion.
The claim was subsequently transferred to the calendar of Hon. James H. Ferreira.
At the time of trial, claimants Alice P. Walsh and Rosemary F. Biggi-Zweig owned 24 acres of land in the Town of Schodack.Their property was divided into two parallel parcels by a railroad line; the two parcels were connected by an at-grade railroad crossing, frequently referred to as "Walsh's Crossing." CSX Transportation, Inc. (hereinafter CSX) was the owner of the railroad track and bed that bisected claimants' property. CSX leased its property to Amtrak, and Amtrak maintained the track and the at-grade crossing. In May 2001, as part of the State's ongoing high speed rail initiative, CSX and the New York State Department of Transportation (hereinafter DOT) directed Amtrak to remove the at-grade crossing and erect a barricade, thereby preventing travel across the railroad tracks. Upon learning of the closure, claimants commenced this claim seeking damages for the alleged wrongful act by DOT in advising CSX that there was no legal justification for the crossing. In finding for claimants on the issue of liability, the Court determined that DOT "approved the closing of this at-grade rail crossing without carrying out its statutory duty[, pursuant to Railroad Law § 97 (3)] either to assure that all interested parties, including the adjoining landowners, had reached an agreement or to conduct a hearing at which such landowners, if they wished, could be heard" (Walsh v State of New York, UID # 2008-028-001, Claim No. 104981, Sise, P.J. [filed March 5, 2008]).
Biggi-Zweig passed away after the decision on liability was issued. By Decision and Order dated December 23, 2009, the Court (Ferreira, J.), upon claimants' motion and pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 15, substituted Duke Gift Properties, Inc., on behalf of Duke University, as claimant in place of Biggi-Zweig.
In support of its motion, defendant argues that the Court's interlocutory judgment should be vacated because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim pursuant to the Court of Appeals' decisions in McLean v City of New York (12 NY3d 194 [2009]) and Dinardo v City of New York (13 NY3d 872 [2009]), which were rendered subsequent to the Court's decision in this matter. Defendant posits that these decisions establish that the State is absolutely immune from liability for DOT's actions with regard to the closing of the crossing, and the Court's judgment must therefore be vacated pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4) and Court of Claims Act §§ 9 (8) and (9). Defendant also argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the claim because (1) neither Transportation Law § 14 nor Railroad Law § 97 expressly or implicitly provides a private right of action against the State for damages, (2) DOT had legally sufficient authority to close the crossing pursuant to Transportation Law § 14, irrespective of Railroad Law § 97, and (3) the claim essentially seeks review of an agency determination, for which claimants' sole remedy was to commence a CPLR article 78 proceeding.
CPLR 5015 (a) (4) provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just, on motion of any interested person . . . , upon the ground of . . . lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order." In addition, the Court of Claims has authority to vacate its own judgment "in furtherance of justice for any error in form or substance" (Court of Claims Act § 9 [8]; see Court of Claims Act § 9 (9); Robinson v State of New York, 15 AD3d 640, 641 [2005]; see also Siegel, NY Prac § 426, at 750 [5th ed]).
First, the Court is unpersuaded by defendant's argument that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because it essentially seeks review of an agency determination and should have been brought as a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction and has jurisdiction only to "hear and determine claims against the state or by the state against the claimant or between conflicting claimants as the legislature may provide" (NY Const, art VI, § 9; see Court of Claims Act § 9). When a claim against the State is essentially one for money damages, jurisdiction in the Court of Claims is proper (see Matter of Gross v Perales, 72 NY2d 231, 235 [1988]). Thus, "[i]n determining whether the Court of Claims has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, the initial question is '[w]hether the essential nature of the claim is to recover money, or whether the monetary relief is incidental to the primary claim' " (Green v State of New York, 90 AD3d 1577, 1578 [2011], quoting Matter of Gross v Perales, 72 NY2d at 236; see Buonanotte v New York State Off. of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs., 60 AD3d 1142, 1143 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 712 [2009]). The second inquiry is "whether the underlying claim, regardless of how it has been characterized, 'would require review of an administrative agency's determination - which the Court of Claims has no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain' " (Matter of Salahuddin v Connell, 53 AD3d 898, 899 [2008], quoting City of New York v State of New York, 46 AD3d 1168, 1169 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 705 [2008]; see Carver v State of New York, 79 AD3d 1393, 1394 [2010], lv denied 17 NY3d 707 [2011]).
In the instant claim, claimants alleged that DOT employee Clarence Scott, with knowledge of claimants' ownership of the property and use of the railroad crossing for access to the river, gave CSX false and misleading information when it advised CSX that there was no legal justification for the existence of the crossing, resulting in the crossing being closed and blocked. Claimants asserted that "the wrongful action of [DOT] through its agents wrongfully deprived the claimants of the full use of their property causing damage to such property and damage to the claimants" (Claim ¶ 7). Claimants sought $1,000,000 in damages.The Court views this claim as seeking damages for a wrong committed by a DOT employee rather than seeking review of an administrative determination of DOT. Indeed, the gravamen of the claim is that claimants were harmed by the false or misleading representations made by Scott to CSX and does not allege that DOT made an erroneous administrative determination (compare Carver v State of New York, 79 AD3d at 1394; Buonanotte v New York State Off. of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs., 60 AD3d at 1144). To be sure, Railroad Law § 97 (3) provides an administrative procedure by which the Commissioner of DOT may close an existing private rail crossing, and the proper procedure for obtaining review of the Commissioner's determinations pursuant to Railroad Law § 97 (3) would be the commencement of a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see Railroad Law § 97 [3]; Matter of Island Park, LLC v New York State Dept. of Transp., 61 AD3d 1023, 1024 [2009]). Here, however, it is undisputed there was no such determination made by DOT, and claimants commenced this action, not to review any specific administrative determination by DOT, but for monetary relief for DOT's alleged wrongful actions with respect to the crossing. As such, the Court declines to disturb the interlocutory judgment on this ground.
The claim also included a cause of action seeking damages for violations of 42 USC § 1983 which was ultimately withdrawn by stipulation of the parties.
Notably, defendant raised this argument in its post-trial memorandum of law and it was rejected by the Court.
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that vacatur is otherwise warranted pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4). As the Court of Appeals has stated,
"[a] statement that a court lacks 'jurisdiction' to decide a case may, in reality, mean that elements of a cause of action are absent. Similarly, questions of mootness and standing of parties may be characterized as raising questions of subject matter jurisdiction. But these are not the kinds of judicial infirmities to which CPLR 5015 [(a) (4)] is addressed. That provision is designed to preserve objections so fundamental to the power of adjudication of a court that they survive even a final judgment or order" (Lacks v Lacks, 41 NY2d 71, 74-75 [1976] [internal citations omitted]).(See Adams v Adams, 255 AD2d 535, 536 [1998]). The Court finds that defendant's remaining allegations - including its assertions regarding absolute immunity - constitute substantive arguments regarding defendant's liability with regard to the claim rather than challenges to the power of the Court to adjudicate the matter. Indeed, the issue of whether the State is to be afforded absolute or qualified immunity in a particular case is a fact-specific inquiry (see e.g. Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 216 [1988]), and the Court of Claims routinely exercises its power to entertain claims that it ultimately dismisses on the ground that the State is absolutely immune from liability (see e.g. Gorovets v State of New York, 31 Misc 3d 1243 [A] [Ct Cl 2011]; Saint-Guillen v State of New York, 27 Misc 3d 1228 [A] [Ct Cl 2010]). Notably, McLean v City of New York (supra) and Dinardo v City of New York (supra) addressed the liability of a governmental agency for the negligent performance of a governmental function; neither decision established that the Court of Claims lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims such as this one (see McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d at 199-204; Dinardo v City of New York, 13 NY3d at 874-875). As such, defendant has not established that vacatur is warranted pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4).
In addition, the Court declines to exercise its authority to vacate the interlocutory judgment pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 9 (8). A " 'court's inherent power to exercise control over its judgments is not plenary, and should be resorted to only to relieve a party from judgments taken through [fraud,] mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect' " (Long Is. Light. Co. v Century Indem. Co., 52 AD3d 383, 384 [2008], quoting Matter of McKenna v County of Nassau, Off. of County Attorney, 61 NY2d 739, 742 [1984] [internal quotations omitted]; see Katz v Marra, 74 AD3d 888, 890 [2010]). Here, defendant does not assert that the judgment was taken through any such error and has not otherwise established that the Court committed any error of law or fact that was so egregious that justice requires vacating the judgment (see Bilbrew v State of New York, UID # 2004-031-027, Claim No. 101067, Motion No. M-67218, Minarik, J. [signed May 4, 2004]). In part, defendant's motion seeks to reargue points of fact and law that it raised - or could have raised - in its post-trial memorandum of law, and the Court declines to grant vacatur on a ground already considered and rejected by the Court, or on a ground that defendant could have raised before the judgment was rendered.
Finally, the Court rejects defendant's contention that the judgment must be vacated in light of McLean and Dinardo. In the view of the Court of Appeals, "McLean did not announce a new rule - it merely distilled the analysis applied in prior cases" (Valdez v City of New York, 18 NY3d 69, 77 [2011]). In any event, nothing in McLean or Dinardo mandates vacatur of the interlocutory judgment in the interest of justice. As such, defendant's motion is denied.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Motion No. M-79310 is denied.
February 1, 2012
Albany, New York
James H. Ferreira
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Notice of Motion to Vacate Judgment and Dismiss Claim, dated January 11, 2011;
2. Affirmation in Support of Motion by Michael A. Sims, AAG, dated January 11, 2011 and exhibits attached thereto;
3. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion by Michael A. Sims, AAG, dated January 11, 2011;
4. Affidavit in Response by Timothy Nugent, dated May 4, 2011;
5. Reply Affirmation by Michael A. Sims, dated May 10, 2011;
6. Supplemental Affirmation by Michael A. Sims, dated November 18, 2011; and
7. Supplemental Submission by Timothy Nugent, dated November 21, 2011.