Walsh v. Segale

10 Citing cases

  1. Parris v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co.

    395 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1968)   Cited 8 times
    Reviewing decision on cross-claim between co-citizen defendants although plaintiff's diversity claim had been settled during trial

    In Willett v. Village of St. Albans, 69 Vt. 330, 38 A. 72, 74 (1897), the court stated that punitive damages might be awarded where defendant's negligence "was so gross as to amount to wanton and willful disregard of the rights of the plaintiff." Accord, Walsh v. Segale, 70 F.2d 698 (2 Cir. 1934) (interpreting Vermont law). This language is common to most of the cases dealing with the question of the appropriateness of an award of punitive damages in automobile collision cases. In fact situations similar to the instant one, different courts have reached quite different results as to when negligence is so gross as to amount to wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights.

  2. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Alford

    111 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1940)   Cited 11 times
    In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Alford, 111 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1940), certiorari denied 311 U.S. 668, 61 S.Ct. 27, 85 L.Ed. 429, the Court said: "In transporting the property of the Bureau back to the Oklahoma City office, McConnell was acting officially and when, while so engaged, he drove his automobile negligently, he was acting under color of his office.

    Aside from the stipulation, the appellate court has inherent power to review the case upon the whole record and make such disposition as justice requires. Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 55 S.Ct. 575, 79 L.Ed. 1082; State Tax Commission v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511, 59 S.Ct. 605, 83 L.Ed. 950; Minnesota v. National Tea Co. Allied Stores, 60 S.Ct. 676, 84 L.Ed. ___, decided March 25, 1940; Trapp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 70 F.2d 976; Walsh v. Segale, 2 Cir., 70 F.2d 698. The challenged instruction is not clear.

  3. Twachtman v. Connelly

    106 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1939)   Cited 42 times

    Counsel for both parties tried the case on the theory that the sums paid by appellant under statutory liability were recoverable if appellant otherwise proved her claim. This is an error of which we may take notice even though not assigned. Walsh v. Segale, 2 Cir., 70 F.2d 698; Rice v. Baltimore Ohio Railroad Company, 6 Cir., 42 F.2d 387; Thompson v. Hocking Valley Railroad Company, 6 Cir., 45 F.2d 155; New York Central Railroad Company v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 333, 49 S.Ct. 300, 73 L.Ed. 706. The question does not open up a new field of legal investigation.

  4. Mael v. Howard

    18-CV-378JLS(LGF) (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2022)

    ” Downing v. King, 2007 WL 4191765, at * 3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2007) (quoting Pepe v. Maklansy, 67 F.Supp.2d 186, 187-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“‘It is generally recognized that, in cases of personal torts, ‘vindictive actions,' such as assault and battery . . . where the elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence, cruelty, or oppression are involved, punitive or exemplary damages may be recovered.'” (quoting Walsh v. Segale, 70 F.2d 698, 699 (2d Cir. 1934))).

  5. Freeman v. Jacobson

    20-CV-10040 (SN) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2021)   Cited 1 times

    Finally, “in cases of personal torts, ‘vindictive actions,' such as assault and battery . . . where the elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence, cruelty, or oppression are involved, punitive or exemplary damages may be recovered.” Pepe v. Maklansky, 67 F.Supp.2d 186, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Walsh v. Segale, 70 F.2d 698, 699 (2d Cir. 1934)). Punitive damages have “been awarded and upheld in cases involving intentional torts . . .” Laurie Marie M. v. Jeffrey T.M., 559 N.Y.S.2d 336, 340 (2d Dep't 1990), affd, 77 N.Y.2d 981 (1991).

  6. LB ex rel. PB v. Hines

    No. 15-cv-5238 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    The Second Circuit has stated that, "[i]t is generally recognized that, in cases of personal torts, 'vindictive actions,' such as assault and battery . . . where the elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence, cruelty, or oppression are involved, punitive or exemplary damages may be recovered." Pepe v. Maklansky, 67 F. Supp. 2d 186, 187-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Walsh v. Segale, 70 F.2d 698, 699 (2d Cir. 1934)). Furthermore, "'[i]t is well settled that the determination whether to award punitive damages lies in the discretion of the trier of the facts.'"

  7. Denman v. Sanders

    05 Civ. 0025 (RLE) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2006)   Cited 5 times
    Reducing damages from $250,000 to $50,000 where plaintiff's "minimal injury" included laceration and bleeding, resulting in a quarter-inch scar above his eye

    Such damages are particularly appropriate in the case of intentional torts where "'elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence, cruelty, or oppression are involved . . .'" Pepe v.Maklansky, 67 F. Supp. 2d 186, 187-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quotingWalsh v. Segale, 70 F.2d 698, 699 (2d Cir. 1934)). Sanders argues that the facts as presented at trial do not demonstrate the required element of "malice or insult" necessary to sustain the jury's award of punitive damages.

  8. Pepe v. Maklansky

    67 F. Supp. 2d 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)   Cited 25 times
    Denying motion in limine seeking order dismissing employee's punitive damages claim in civil assault action, finding it "well settled that the determination whether to award punitive damages lies in the discretion of the trier of the facts."

    " (Def.Br., p. 5). The Second Circuit has stated that, "[i]t is generally recognized that, in cases of personal torts, `vindictive actions,' such as assault and battery . . . where the elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence, cruelty, or oppression are involved, punitive or exemplary damages may be recovered." Walsh v. Segale, 70 F.2d 698, 699 (2d Cir. 1934). Punitive damages have "been awarded and upheld in cases involving intentional torts . . ."

  9. Fellows v. Mauser

    302 F. Supp. 929 (D. Vt. 1969)   Cited 3 times

    In order to allow plaintiff and Mauser punitive damages in this case, I must find that Hartford acted maliciously in its refusal to pay the plaintiff's judgment. See Walsh v. Segale, 70 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1934). The evidence in this case shows no indication of malice on the part of Hartford.

  10. Sparks v. Milligan

    330 So. 2d 417 (Ala. 1976)   Cited 10 times

    Smith v. Roland, 243 Ala. 400, 10 So.2d 367. Citing Central of Georgia v. Corbitt, 218 Ala. 410, 118 So. 755. Ordinary collision on public highway does not constitute wantoness. Walsh v. Segale, 2 Cir., 70 F.2d 698. For there to be wanton conduct the defendant must with reckless indifference of the consequences consciously and intentionally do some wrongful act or omit some duty which produce the injury and such elements of wantoness cannot be left to conjecture. Griffin Lumber Company v. Harper, 247 Ala. 616, 25 So.2d 505. Citing Zemczonek v. McElroy, 264 Ala. 258, 86 So.2d 824; Taylor v. Thompson, 271 Ala. 18, 122 So.2d 277.