However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not hesitated, in certain circumstances, to declare the absence of proximate cause as a matter of law. See Splendorio, 682 A.2d at 467; Walsh v. Israel Couture Post, No. 2274 V.F.W. of the United States, 542 A.2d 1094, 1097 (R.I. 1988); Clements, 168 A.2d at 474; Kemplin v. H.W. Golden Son, Inc., 52 R.I. 89, 157 A. 872, 873 (1931). In Clements, the defendant allegedly left the key in the ignition of his automobile, unattended on the grounds of a mental institution.
Bettencourt asks the Court to find that Tiverton's failure to properly respond to Oreo's death was the sole cause of the Plaintiffs' alleged injuries. In support, Bettencourt relies on Walsh v. Israel Couture Post, No 2274 V.F.W., 542 A.2d 1094, 1097 (R.I. 1988) for the proposition that a second actor's negligence can relieve an initial actor's negligence if the second actor becomes the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. In particular, she argues that the Town's failure to react to her calls is an intervening cause that absolves her of any liability for Plaintiffs' claims.
In these circumstances, "when a second actor has become aware of a potential danger caused by the negligence of a first actor and the second actor acts negligently with regard to the dangerous condition," the first actor is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Walsh v. Israel Couture Post, No. 2274 V.F.W., 542 A.2d 1094, 1096-97 (R.I. 1988); accord Casador v. First National Stores, Inc., 478 A.2d 191, 193 (R.I. 1984), citing W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 42 at 248 (4th Ed. 1971) (first actor is not the proximate cause of an injury if "the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes"). Alternatively, one might say in this case, that Ralston's intervening failure to incorporate the qualification was not a foreseeable consequence of Gypsum's statements.
Clements v. Tashjoin, 168 A.2d 472, 474 (R.I. 1961). A good illustration of these principles can be found in Walsh v. Israel Couture Post, No. 2274 V.F.W., 542 A.2d 1094 (R.I. 1988). In that case, plaintiff fell from a walkway outside the VFW hall when he leaned against a wooden railing surrounding the walkway and the railing collapsed.
As such, “the condition created by the first actor is merely a circumstance and not the proximate cause of the accident.” Pantalone v. Advanced Energy Delivery Systems, Inc., 694 A.2d 1213, 1215 (R.I.1997) (quoting Walsh v. Israel Couture Post, No. 2274 V.F.W., 542 A.2d 1094, 1097 (R.I.1988)). However, “an intervening act of negligence will not insulate an original tortfeasor if it appears that such intervening act is a natural and probable consequence of the initial tortfeasor's act.”
I [9] The Motion for Directed Verdict Energy argues that Pantalone's failure to summon an electrician and provide an appropriate electrical outlet for his machine and his improper use of an extension cord for sixteen days constituted an independent intervening cause that would absolve Energy from its employee's negligence in lending an extension cord to Pantalone initially. Energy relies on Walsh v. Israel Couture Post, No. 2274 V.F.W., 542 A.2d 1094 (R.I. 1988), wherein we held that the failure of the VFW to repair damage or post warnings relating to structural damage caused by a truck owned by L.W. Fontaine Trucking Co., Inc., constituted an intervening efficient cause that absolved Fontaine from its original negligence. We observed:
See Sartori v. United States, 186 F.2d 679, 682 (10th Cir. 1950) (contributory negligence of beneficiary bar to action for death brought by or for such beneficiary); Hall v. United States, 381 F. Supp. 224, 226 (D.S.C. 1974) (contributory negligence of sole beneficiary or all beneficiaries defeats action for wrongful death). In the later case of Walsh v. Israel Couture Post, No. 2274 V.F.W. of the United States, 542 A.2d 1094 (R.I. 1988), the plaintiff sought damages for injuries that he sustained while working at a Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (VFW) meeting place. The named defendant was an unincorporated association of which the plaintiff was a member.
Russo nonetheless disputes whether Doherty's advice should shield Baxter from liability, arguing that even if Doherty's conduct was an intervening force, it was not a superseding cause. Intervening forces insulate a party from liability only if they are not foreseeable consequences of that party's original negligence or, in other words, if they are not "a natural and probable consequence of the initial tortfeasor's act" (Walsh v. Israel Couture Post, No. 2274 V.F.W., 542 A.2d 1094, 1097 (R.I. 1988)). Russo argues that Doherty's bad advice is not a superseding cause because it was a foreseeable consequence of Baxter's negligence.
The first negligent act will be rendered remote if "a second actor has become aware of the existence of a potential danger caused by the negligence of a first actor and the second actor acts negligently with regard to the dangerous condition, thereby bringing about an accident with injurious consequences to others." Walsh v. Israel Couture Post, No. 2274 V.F.W., 542 A.2d 1094, 1096-97 (R.I. 1988). Further, "an intervening act of negligence will not insulate an original tortfeasor if it appears that such intervening act is a natural and probable consequence of the initial tortfeasor's act."
Your Honors' earlier opinions afford some guidance. Thus, in Walsh v. Israel Couture, Post No. 2272, 542 A.2d 1094 (R.I. 1988), a plaintiff was precluded from maintaining a personal injury action against an unincorporated association of which he was a member. Pointing out that "[a]ll members of a joint enterprise are chargeable with the negligence of a member of the joint enterprise . . . within the scope of the agency created," Your Honors stated: "Simply put, this means that plaintiff is himself chargeable with the negligence that caused his own injury.