Opinion
No. 688 C.D. 2014
01-14-2015
John Walsh, III, Petitioner v. Department of Public Welfare, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEADBETTER
John Walsh, III, petitions pro se for review of an order of the Department of Public Welfare (DPW), which affirmed a decision of an Administrative Law Judge that Walsh's supplemental nutrition assistance program benefits (SNAP; formerly known as food stamps) were properly discontinued because Walsh did not live in Pennsylvania. Because the record supports this finding, we affirm.
While it is not necessary to review the SNAP program in detail, an applicant for benefits must live in the state in which he applies for benefits. The applicable federal regulatory provision states, in pertinent part:
See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 - 2036.
[An individual] shall live in the State in which [he] files an application for participation. . . . The State agency shall not impose any durational residency requirements. The State agency shall not require an otherwise eligible [individual] to reside in a permanent dwelling or have a fixed mailing address as a condition of eligibility. Nor shall residency require an intent to reside permanently in the State or project area.7 C.F.R. § 273.3(a) (entitled, "Residency").
Walsh, who was approximately 32 years old, applied for SNAP benefits in July 2013 through an on-line application process wherein he provided a home address in Scott Township, Pennsylvania and indicated that he had lived at that address for over 30 years. Following a telephone interview with Walsh, benefits were granted. Subsequently, however, the County Assistance Office received information that Walsh was repeatedly using his benefits out-of-state in Los Angeles, California, which prompted an inquiry into Walsh's place of residence and the resulting termination of benefits based on the conclusion that he was not a resident of Pennsylvania. The termination was appealed and a hearing followed.
According to testimony elicited at the subsequent hearing, the oral interview with Walsh occurred while Walsh was in the State "because his Pennsylvania driver's license was just renewed . . . ." Notes of Testimony at 15, Hearing of February 12, 2014.
Before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Mr. Martin, DPW's income maintenance caseworker, testified to the above facts as well as the conversation that he had with Walsh's father when he investigated Walsh's place of residence. He noted that when he attempted to contact Walsh at the given address, he actually reached Walsh's father (Walsh Sr. for ease of reference), who resides at that address. Walsh Sr. purportedly told Martin that the Scott Township home was Walsh's residence but Walsh had "dual residency," and that he also lived in Los Angeles. In addition to entering into evidence the record of the execution of benefits out-of-state, a copy of Walsh's 2012 federal tax return was admitted, showing that Walsh listed his Los Angeles address in completing his tax return.
Walsh Sr., who appeared on behalf of his son at the hearing, testified that Walsh went to graduate school in California in 2010 and remained there after his graduation in 2012. According to Walsh Sr., his son is an "entrepreneur," and "he does art," and "he does it there and he sells it, a lot of it, in the international art fairs." Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 14, Hearing of February 12, 2014. He also noted that his son is in town once or twice a year for art shows in the area, most recently for a show in New York. He noted that while Walsh's car is located in Los Angeles, his car is registered in Pennsylvania and he maintains a Pennsylvania driver's license and votes via absentee ballot in Pennsylvania. Walsh Sr.'s testimony also established that Walsh pays rent in Los Angeles, where he shares a home with others, and pays rent to use a studio in Los Angeles.
Finally, Walsh Sr. testified:
[T]he reason we try to maintain his residency in Scott Township is that he moves around quite frequently. And he needs to have a fixed address where he receives his mail. If he gets a parking violation and forgets to pay it, we'll know about it. If he gets a student loan bill that he forgets to pay, we'll know about it. And this way we can help him from getting a bad credit rating and from defaulting on student loans.N.T. at 29.
Based upon the evidence, the ALJ denied the appeal. In doing so, the Judge found that while Walsh demonstrated that he maintained a Pennsylvania mailing address and that he used that address for vehicle registration and insurance purposes, he failed to demonstrate that he was a resident of the Commonwealth. DPW affirmed and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Walsh essentially argues that the facts set forth above demonstrate a sufficient presence in the Commonwealth to satisfy the residency requirement set forth in 7 C.F.R. § 273.3(a). Walsh also suggests that the word "shall" in Section 273.3(a) does not mandate a mandatory requirement but rather suggests a desirable quality or characteristic. In making this argument, he compares the language of a SNAP policy manual provision referred to by the ALJ, which provides: "While there is no policy restricting [electronic benefit transfer] usage to in-state transactions, a client's continued pattern of conducting out-of-state transactions may indicate that they are no longer Commonwealth residents. Eligibility for both cash and SNAP benefits includes the requirement that applicants and recipients must be residents of Pennsylvania . . . ." ALJ's Decision and Order at 5 (quoting Operations Memorandum Cash Assistance SNAP OPS12020, dated February 21, 2012) (emphasis added).
It appears that unlike other benefit programs administered by DPW, neither the federal provisions nor DPW's regulations define "residency" for purposes of the SNAP program. However, in In re Residence Hearing Before Board of School Directors, 744 A.2d 1272, 1275 (Pa. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted), our Supreme Court approved of the following analysis for determining residency and domicile:
See, e.g., 55 Pa. Code § 147.23(a) (pertaining to residence requirements for AFDC/GA), which states: "Residence is established by a person living in this Commonwealth voluntarily with the intention of making his home here, and not for a temporary purpose." See also 55 Pa. Code § 147.41.
The courts of this Commonwealth have historically recognized the classic definitions of the words domicile and residence. Domicile is that place where people have their true, fixed and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which whenever they are absent they have the intention of returning. Residence, in contrast, is a factual place of abode evidenced by a person's physical presence in a particular place.See also Paek v. Pen Argyl Area Sch. Dist., 923 A.2d 563 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Similarly, the term "live," also used in Section 273.3(a), is commonly understood in this context to mean "to occupy a home: dwell, reside." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1323 (1993). Thus, applying this construction of the terms "residency" and "live" for purposes of the residency requirement of 7 C.F.R. § 273.3(a), we agree that Walsh failed to demonstrate that he lived, resided or intended the Scott Township residence to be his home; the record simply does not demonstrate that Walsh had any meaningful physical presence at that location. Rather, the facts clearly demonstrate that Walsh resided in Los Angeles, which is where he spent his time when not traveling, accessed his SNAP benefits, paid rent to live in a home and use a studio, and where he obviously kept his personal belongings and his car.
. . . .
This analysis is a correct application of the established law regarding residence and domicile. As we stated in Lesker Case, [105 A.2d 376, 380 (Pa. 1954)], "in strict technical terminology a habituation may be defined as an abode for the moment, residence a tarrying place for some specific purpose of business or pleasure, and domicile the fixed, permanent, final home to which one always intends to return." (Emphasis in original). ... DuPuy Estate, [96 A.2d 318, 319-20 (Pa. 1953)] (differentiating residence, meaning physical presence in a location, from permanent legal residence, to wit, domicile.).
While this analysis occurred in the context of determining residence for purposes of Section 1302 of the Public School Code of 1949, Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. § 13-1302, the Court noted that the terms "resident" and "resides" in the statutory section at issue were to be given their "classic definitions." 744 A.2d at 1275. Accordingly, we construe this analysis to be of general and universal application.
Our construction of the residency requirement for purposes of eligibility for SNAP benefits is also consistent with the manner in which "residency" has been defined for qualification for other benefit programs. --------
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of January, 2015, the order of the Department of Public Welfare is AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge