Nissenson , 316 Ill.App.3d at 1041, 250 Ill.Dec. 370, 738 N.E.2d 586 (quoting Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Anderson , 177 Ill.App.3d 615, 627, 126 Ill.Dec. 910, 532 N.E.2d 595 (1988) ). While an attorney need not amend or withdraw a pleading if, after filing it, he discovers that it is unfounded, he must bring the erroneous factual allegation " ‘to the attention of [the] court and opposing counsel, at the least in the next available court filing.’ " Walsh v. Capital Engineering & Manufacturing Co. , 312 Ill.App.3d 910, 916, 245 Ill.Dec. 493, 728 N.E.2d 575 (2000) (quoting Chicago Title & Trust , 177 Ill.App.3d at 627, 126 Ill.Dec. 910, 532 N.E.2d 595 ).¶ 43 For example, in Walsh , this court held that the plaintiff's attorney violated Rule 137 when he failed to inform the trial court that certain allegations of a complaint, which were based on a report of an accountant, no longer had factual support when the accountant testified in a deposition that he had changed his mind.

Rule 137 mandates that a party "make reasonable investigation into the facts prior to filing" his pleading. Walsh v. Capital Engineering &Manufacturing Co., 312 Ill.App.3d 910, 914 (2000). A party's signature and that of his attorney on the pleading certifies that they have read it and that, "to the best of [their] knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose." Ill. S. C. R. 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018); see Baker v. Daniel S. Berger, Ltd., 323 Ill.App.3d 956, 963 (2001) (this rule is meant to penalize those parties who plead false or frivolous matters or seek to impose vexatious litigation, without sufficient legal or factual basis). If a party violates this rule, a court may impose an appropriate sanction, such as the payment of the other party's attorney fees and costs.

Based upon our review of this cause, we agree with defendants. ¶ 27 Rule 137 mandates that a party "make reasonable investigation into the facts prior to filing" his pleading. Walsh v. Capital Engineering & Manufacturing Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 910, 914 (2000). His signature, and that of his attorney, on the pleading certifies that he has read it and that, "to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law *** and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose."

Whitmer, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 514 (quoting Pritzker v. Drake Tower Apartments, Inc., 283 Ill. App. 3d 587, 590 (1996) (party/attorney's signature on pleading constitutes certification that he has read it and made reasonable inquiry into facts alleged therein (quoting Fremarek v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1074-75 (1995))). Rule 137 mandates that a party "make reasonable investigation into the facts prior to filing" her pleading. Walsh v. Capital Engineering & Manufacturing Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 910, 914 (2000). Her signature, and that of her attorney, on the pleading certifies that she has read it and that, "to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law *** and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose."

Based on our review of the record here, we do not find any abuse in the trial court's determination that Webber's actions in this cause did not merit the imposition of Rule 137 sanctions. Wight Co. relies heavily on Walsh v. Capital Engineering Manufacturing Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 910 (2000), for its contention of sanctionable conduct on the part of Webber. In Walsh, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were engaged in a scheme to transfer profits and assets in an effort to deprive her of her financial interests in a trust.

We conclude that contemnor had a duty to notify the court of the false medical report. In Walsh v. Capital Engineering Manufacturing Co., 312 Ill. App.3d 910 (2000), the court found an attorney has a continuing duty of inquiry throughout the pendency of litigation. When plaintiff's expert testified at his deposition that six allegations were no longer an issue based on his review, plaintiff's attorneys should not have claimed to have other evidence to support these allegations, but should have been "forthcoming" with counsel and the court about the expert's current negative opinion concerning those specific allegations.

While an attorney need not amend or withdraw a pleading if, after filing it, he discovers that it is unfounded, he must bring the erroneous factual allegation " 'to the attention of [the] court and opposing counsel, at the least in the next available court filing.' " Walsh v. Capital Engineering and Manufacturing Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 910, 916 (2000) (quoting Chicago Title & Trust, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 627).¶ 44 For example, in Walsh, this court held that the plaintiff's attorney violated Rule 137 when he failed to inform the trial court that certain allegations of a complaint, which were based on a report of an accountant, no longer had factual support when the accountant testified in a deposition that he had changed his mind.

Further, "a litigant cannot expect to avoid all sanctions under Rule 137 merely because the pleading was not entirely frivolous." Walsh v. Capital Engineering & Manufacturing Co. , 312 Ill. App. 3d 910, 919, 245 Ill.Dec. 493, 728 N.E.2d 575, 582 (2000). ¶ 50 2.

¶ 21 In so ruling, we note that the defendant relies upon several cases that pertain to Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. July 1, 2013), not Rule 219. See Sanchez v. City of Chicago, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 1021-1025 (2004); Nissenson v. Bradley, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 1040-1042 (2000); and Walsh v. Capital Engineering and Manufacturing Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 910, 914-919 (2000)). Supreme Court Rules 137 and 219 embrace different facets and dynamics of litigation and it would be unfair to consider Rule 137 sanctions in proceedings under Rule 219.

Tang responds that "[a]fter being provided with copies of the Orders and calculations, it was not reasonable for Attorney Winston and her client to continue to rely on an incomplete Order, especially where the Respondent was personally present for entry of that Order on July 21, 2003, and the Order specifically referenced additional amounts due for retroactive support and a continued hearing on that issue." ¶ 45 The appellants cite Walsh v. Capital Engineering and Mfg. Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 910, 916 (2000), for the proposition that "Rule 137 does not require counsel to amend or withdraw a paper or pleading if he discovers, after signing, that it is unfounded. An attorney need not revise the pleadings to conform with newly discovered information." The appellant's reliance on Walsh is misplaced for a number of reasons.