Opinion
3:02-CV-0093-P
January 11, 2002
ORDER
Now before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order Against City of Garland and Housing Standards Board, filed with the Court on January 10, 2002. After considering the parties' briefing and arguments, and the applicable law, the Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED and Plaintiff's remaining causes of action are DISMISSED.
I. Background and Procedural History
The action before the Court originally arose from an appeal of two orders issued by the Garland Housing Standards Board ("the Board") on September 12, 2000 and October 24, 2000. Def.'s App. at 1-2. In essence, the Board made findings of multiple violations by the Plaintiff, Walnut Villa Apartments, in maintaining a residential apartment complex. Id.
The Plaintiff subsequently appealed these orders in state court, challenging the sufficiency of notice and the weight of the evidence. Plaintiff brought suit alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983, the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Section 19 of the Bill of Rights of the Texas Constitution. Def.'s App. at 228-236 (PL's Third Am. Pet. at 17-25).
On January 31, 2001, Judge Canales of the 298th Judicial District, Dallas County Court issued a temporary injunction against the City of Garland, prohibiting it from taking any action to effect a demolition of the Walnut Villa Apartments prior to conclusion of a final hearing on the merits of this case. Pl.'s App., Ex. I-1, at 2. The City was further enjoined from enforcing any portion of the September 12, 2000 and October 23, 2000 Board orders prior to conclusion of said hearing. Pl.'s App., Ex. I-1, at 2. A trial date was set for May 2, 2001. Pl.'s App., Ex. I-1, at 3.
Notwithstanding this trial setting, on November 2, 2001, Judge Canales ordered that "the review of Garland Housing Standard Board's Order at issue in this case shall be bifurcated from all other claims pending in this case." Pl.'s App., Exh. A. Plaintiff's counsel objected by letter of October 25, 2001, arguing that the two separate issues, the appeal of the Board's orders, and the Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, could not be determined by a bifurcated proceeding because they both turned on issues of notice and violations of due process rights. Pl.'s App., Ex. B. Nevertheless, a hearing was held by Judge Sims, a visiting judge for the 298th Judicial District, Dallas County Court, on November 8, 2001. Pursuant to Judge Canales's instructions, Judge Sims considered first whether Plaintiff had received adequate notice of the Board's hearings, and second, whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board's findings. PI.'s App, Ex. H.
Judge Sims memorialized his findings by Order of November 29, 2001, holding that "adequate notice of the hearings on September 7, 2000 and October 19, 2000 was given to Plaintiff." Pl.'s App., Ex. F. Subsequently, Judge Sims issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on December 13, 2001. Specifically, Judge Sims found that "[n]otice of the proceedings was given, mailed and published in accordance with law" for both hearings. Pl's App., Ex. G, at 2, 6. In addition, Judge Sims found that as a matter of law, "notice of the proceedings was duly and properly given to Walnut Villa Apartments and all other persons entitled to notice in accordance with law thereby conferring jurisdiction on the Board over [both] proceeding[s]." PL's App., Ex. G, at 9, 10.
In their briefing to Judge Sims, Plaintiff argued that its due process rights were violated by the Board's proceedings. For example, Plaintiff stated, "Plaintiff having not been provided the required notice was deprived of its Federal and State constitutional rights to due process." Def.'s App. at 102 (PL's Reply to Def.'s Resp. to Pl's Supp. Brief, at 3). In letters to Judge Sims after the hearing, Defendants' counsel indicated that they were aware that the federal due process claims would be considered in hearing the appeal of the Board's orders. PL's App., Ex. H (letters from City of Garland's counsel Michael Betz and Crispin Gorham's counsel Karen Brophy).
Subsequently, Judge Sims lifted the preliminary injunction in place, effective January 7, 2002. PL's App., Ex. I-2, at 1. In the same order, Judge Sims severed "[t]he Appeal of the Orders of the Garland Housing Standards Board . . . from the remaining claims in this case." PL's App., Ex. I-2, at 2. The 5th District Court of Appeals stayed Judge Sims's order on January 4, 2002. Def.'s App. at 160. Plaintiff, meanwhile, brought a Motion to Suspend Judgment and Set Bond and Judge Sims held a hearing on that motion on January 7, 2002. Def.'s App. at 161. Judge Sims denied Plaintiff's motion on January 7, 2002. The 5th District Court of Appeals subsequently vacated their stay of the lifting of the injunction, on January 9, 2002. Def.'s App. at 191. Finally, Plaintiff filed a "Reurged" Motion for Expedited Temporary Relief, which was denied by the Fifth District Court of Appeals on January 10, 2002.
On January 10, 2002, Plaintiff filed with this Court their Original Complaint and the instant motion seeking a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the City of Garland from enforcing any portions of the September 12, 2000 and October 19, 2000 Board orders until a full trial on the merits. The Court considered oral arguments by both Plaintiff and Defendant City of Garland on January 10, 2002. The Court ordered expedited briefing on the issue of whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's Complaint and motion.
II. Federal Jurisdiction
The Court must first address whether Plaintiff's federal claims were resolved by the state courts. Plaintiff argues that federal jurisdiction is proper in this case because the appeal of the Board's orders was bifurcated from consideration of Plaintiff's section 1983 claims. Defendants respond that any violations of Plaintiff's due process rights were adequately considered and addressed during the hearing before Judge Sims and were rejected by his order.
The Court finds that Plaintiff's federal constitutional claims regarding issues of notice and due process as to the Board's orders were conclusively decided by the Texas state courts. Judge Sims, in a later hearing, stated that all of Plaintiff's claims, constitutional or otherwise, were fully adjudicated by his hearing regarding notice and substantial evidence. Judge Sims added,
I will stick with my ruling in connection with the constitutional rights I did consider in the way of notice and the way of whether it was adequate notice and as far as the hearing's concerned for the condemnation or destruction of that property. . . . I read the case law in connection with all of that. I don't know how it wasn't presented. I sure went through it as far as my review was concerned about how an administrative hearing and what kind of notice had to be given and things of that sort before it would be an effective administrative hearing.
Def.'s App. at 183-84.
Further, all the counsel during the arguments in state court linked the issue of notice with Plaintiff's due process concerns. Even Plaintiff in briefing to Judge Sims urged that Plaintiff's due process and federal constitutional rights had been violated by the Defendants. In correspondence with the court, Defendants' counsel noted the distinction between the appeal of the Board's orders and the other remaining issues in the case. The City of Garland's counsel, both at the bond hearing before Judge Sims, and before this Court, emphasized that Plaintiff's other federal causes of action, namely damages claims, were the claims that had been bifurcated by Judge Canales and later severed by Judge Sims.
Because the Court finds that the federal issues regarding notice and due process were duly decided by the state court, this Court cannot consider such claims. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to consider collateral attacks on state court judgments. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983) ("United States district court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings"). If there are constitutional questions arising from the state court proceedings, these are to be resolved by the appropriate state appellate court, not the federal district courts. Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 906 (1994) (citing Rooker and Feldman). This rule announces the position that state courts are competent to review violations of federal constitutional law. If appeal through the state court system is not satisfactory, the litigant's sole option at the federal level is the filing of an application for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Id. Further, a long line of Fifth Circuit precedent holds that a plaintiff may not seek reversal of a state court decision by casting a complaint in the form of a civil rights action. Liedtke, 18 F.3d at 317; U.S. v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994); Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1986); Reed v. Terrell, 759 F.2d 472, 473 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 968 (1985); Kimball v. Florida Bar, 632 F.2d 1283, 1284 (5th Cir. 1980); Sawyer v. Overton, 595 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1979).
Stripped to its core, Plaintiff's motion is a collateral attack on the state court decision lifting the injunction against the City and denying Plaintiff's motion for a bond. Plaintiff's recourse is by appeal through the state court system and then by application for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. See Liedtke, 18 F.3d at 318; Reed, 759 F.2d at 473-74. "Judicial errors committed in state courts are for correction in the state court systems . . . such errors are no business of ours." Hale, 786 F.2d at 691.
For these reasons, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's notice and due process claims, even if they are federal claims. The Court, therefore, DENIES Plaintiff's motion for Temporary Restraining Order because the Court lacks jurisdiction on the underlying claims regarding the appeal of the Board's orders.
III. Plaintiff's Remaining Claims
Plaintiff's Original Complaint filed in this Court is substantively identical to the state court Petition and the remaining damages claims are now pending before this Court. However, the Court finds that abstention is proper in this case and thereby DISMISSES the remainder of Plaintiff's complaint.
"Abstention" refers to judicially created doctrines that allow a federal court to abstain from the exercise of federal jurisdiction and dismiss a case when there is a similar action pending in state court. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-819 (1976). While the pendency of a state court action does not bar proceedings concerning the same matter in federal court, dismissal or a stay of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding may be appropriate in certain circumstances. Id. at 818-19. Dismissal or a stay may be proper on grounds set forth in the United States Supreme case, Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800. This ground is "one resting not on considerations of state-federal comity or on avoidance of constitutional decisions, as does abstention, but on `considerations of wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.'" Moses H Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp, 460 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983) ( quoting Colo River, 424 U.S. at 817). The Colorado River doctrine raises the question of "whether a federal court may stay or dismiss an action on the sole ground that there is a similar action pending in state court in which the controversy between the parties can be resolved." Lee Wilkins, supra, at 357. Thus, a court can avoid piecemeal litigation and encourage comprehensive settlement of a controversy by declining to exercise its jurisdiction. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817; Armco, Inc. v. Moore Exploration, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1, 1 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
A court should consider all of the circumstances surrounding a case when determining whether the Colorado River doctrine allows for the dismissal or stay of a federal action. The Supreme Court has developed a list of six general factors relevant to the inquiry of whether a federal court should dismiss or stay its proceedings due to the existence of the related state court proceeding. Those factors are: (1) the assumption by either court over any res or property; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the avoidance of piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained; (5) whether federal or state law supplies the rule of decision; and (6) whether the state court proceeding will adequately protect the rights of the party seeking to invoke the federal jurisdiction. Evanston Ins Co v. Jimco, 844 F.2d 1185, 1191-93 (5th Cir. 1988); Garber v. Sir Speedy Inc., 930 F. Supp. 267, 270 (N.D. Tex. 1995). aff'd, 91 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1996). No one factor is necessarily determinative. Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 15. This list is not exclusive and other factors may be considered. Id. at 16, Fox v. Maulding, 16 F.3d 1079, 1082 914 F.2d 1364, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1990). A federal district court must take into account both its obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the factors counseling against that exercise. Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 15-16. The duplicative nature of the actions cannot alone justify abstention. Black Sea Investment, Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp., 2000 WL 201829, at *2 (5th Cir. March 9, 2000).
1. Assumption by either court of jurisdiction over a res
This case does not involve any res or property over which any court, state or federal, has taken control. However, the absence of this factor is not neutral. Rather, the absence of the first factor weighs against abstention. Murphy v. Uncle Ben's, Inc. 168 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1999).
2. The relative inconvenience of the forums
This factor mainly involves the physical proximity of the federal forum to the evidence and witnesses. Evanston, 844 F.2d at 1191. Both the state and the federal forum are equally convenient in this case.
3. The desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation Piecemeal litigation occurs when different tribunals consider the same issue, thereby duplicating efforts and possibly reaching different results. Vance v. Boyd Miss, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 905, 912 (S.D. Miss. 1996) citing Am. Int'l Underwriters, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 1988)). The policy behind avoiding piecemeal litigation is to encourage wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation. Vance, 923 F. Supp. at 912.
In this case, identical claims against Defendants are pending before both the Texas state courts and this Court. All causes of action pursued against Defendants in state court have been re-alleged in the federal Complaint. This creates the threat of inconsistent rulings. See Am Int'l Underwriters, 843 F.2d at 1258 (weighing this factor in favor of abstention where parallel proceedings threatened not only a waste of judicial resources due to duplicative litigation, but also possibly conflicting results). In addition, Plaintiff brought the federal suit only after the state suit had been pending for more than a year. It is unclear if Plaintiff's state claims are still pending. Plaintiff only filed its Motion to Nonsuit on January 11, 2002. This motion appears likely to fail, due to the fact that an Intervenor in the state suit has a pending cross-claim against Plaintiff, and in such a case, "plaintiff shall not be permitted by a discontinuance of his suit, to prejudice the right of the defendant to be heard on such a counterclaim." Tex. R. Civ. Pro. 96. In addition, motions for sanctions against Plaintiff are still pending in state court. Because claims remain in state court, this factor weighs in favor of abstention.
4. The order in which jurisdiction was obtained
Priority should not be measured exclusively by which complaint was filed first, but rather in terms of how much progress has been made in the two actions. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21. Here, the state claim has been through several hearings and the appellate process has begun. Because to begin the process anew in federal court would greatly delay the proceedings, this factor weighs in favor of abstention.
5. The extent to which federal law provides the rules of decision on the merits
This factor weighs against abstention, as Plaintiffs seek to pursue federal claims against Defendants.
6. Adequate protection in state court
This is a factor that can only be a neutral factor or weigh against, not for, abstention. Evanston 844 F.2d at 1193. The Texas court are fully capable of resolving the parties' disputes concerning the alleged constitutional violations. Therefore, this factor does not weigh against abstention.
7. Other considerations
Other considerations weigh in favor of abstention in this case. Plaintiff has clearly engaged in forum shopping in this case. Plaintiff's federal Complaint and motion for a Temporary Restraining Order are simply a third attempt to a bite at the apple. Plaintiff has litigated this dispute through the Texas trial level courts, and twice at the state appellate level and lost. Plaintiff cannot now make a last minute appeal to this Court to prevent enforcement of lawfully obtained judgments. These additional considerations weigh in favor of abstention.
9. Conclusion
After reviewing the all of the factors, the Court finds that the present action does constitute the type of exceptional case in which abstention is appropriate. Therefore, the Court abstains from hearing Plaintiff's Complaint and DISMISSES Plaintiff's remaining causes of action.
IV. Conclusion
Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order Against City of Garland and Housing Standards Board is DENIED. Plaintiff's remaining causes of action are DISMISSED.
It is so ordered.