As stated previously by this Court, both are "formal requirements for a protest denial." Wally Packaging, Inc. v. United States, 7 CIT 19, 23, 578 F. Supp. 1408, 1412 (1984). Hence, the notice of denial was incomplete.

Pentax Corp. v. Robison, 125 F.3d 1457, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Wally Packaging, Inc. v. United States, 7 CIT 19, 20, 578 F.Supp. 1408, 1410 (1984) (noting that "[w]hen the court's jurisdiction is challenged, the party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists"). If a Rule 12(b)(1) motion controverts factual allegations in the complaint, the allegations in the complaint are not controlling and are subject to factfinding by the court.

Thus, Plaintiffs were on notice of both the relevant denial and the sixty-day filing deadline. Compare Wally Packaging, Inc. v. United States, 7 CIT 19, 22, 578 F. Supp. 1408, 1411 (1984) (holding that equitable tolling was not available where plaintiff had received from agency notice of adverse determination and of filing deadline but chose to defer filing suit). Second, although Plaintiffs subsequent to their conversation with Mr. Beale, and up until receipt of Mr. Tomchick's letter of October 25, 1999, believed that they were in the midst of an administrative reconsideration process, this mistaken belief does not justify equitable tolling.

Generally, when faced with Farrell Lines, the court has either sought to clarify and limit its holding, or have found it inapposite. See, e.g., Transmarine Navigation Corp. v. United States, 7 CIT 42 (1984); Wally Packaging v. United States, 7 CIT 19, 578 F. Supp. 1408 (1984); Noury Chem. Corp. v. United States, 4 CIT 68 (1982). In Irwin, the Supreme Court relaxed the theory underlying these decisions by creating a rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling is available in suits against the United States.

"Air-Sea Brokers, Inc. v. United States, 66 C.C.P.A. 64, 68, 596 F.2d 1008, 1011 (1979). See also United States v. Reliable Chemical Co., 66 C.C.P.A. 123, 128, 605 F.2d 1179, 1184 (1979); Wally Packaging, Inc. v. United States, 7 CIT 19, 21, 578 F. Supp. 1408, 1410-11 (1984). This view is also supported by Richmond, where considerations of preventing collusion and protecting the public treasury supported the holding that "claims for estoppel cannot be entertained where public money is at stake.

The Court finds, however, that more than 90 days had elapsed between the liquidation contested by plaintiff, the last of which took place on August 28, 1981, and the filing of plaintiff's protests on April 19 and 20, 1982. Where a protest is filed more than 90 days after notice of liquidation, the Court does not have jurisdiction over an action contesting the denial of such protest. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(2) (1982); see Computime, Inc. v. United States, 8 CIT 259, 261, 601 F. Supp. 1029, 1030 (1984), aff'd, 772 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Wally Packaging, Inc. v. United States, 7 CIT 19, 22, 578 F. Supp. 1408, 1411-12 (1984). Plaintiff contends that a trial is necessary to resolve the question of whether notices of liquidation regarding the 46 entries were actually posted by Customs pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 159.9(b).

This position has been reiterated on numerous occasions by both the Federal Circuit and this court. United States v. Reliable Chemical Co., 66 CCPA 123, 128, 605 F.2d 1179, 1184 (1979); Wally Packaging, Inc. v. United States, 7 CIT 19, 21, 578 F. Supp. 1408, 1410-11 (1984); Spearhead Industries, Inc. v. United States, 6 CIT 176, 180 (1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 454 (1984); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. United States, 5 CIT 33, 41 (1983); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 4 CIT 229, 232, 551 F. Supp. 1148, 1150 (1982). The court notes that, without making a proprietary/sovereign distinction, the Supreme Court has explicitly left open the issue of whether estoppel may run against the government under some circumstances.

Plaintiff's second argument is that it could validly request duty-free treatment under the GSP in its protests of the reliquidations, and cites 19 C.F.R. § 10.112, which provides, in pertinent part, that the appropriate duty-free document "may be filed at any time prior to liquidation of the entry or, if the entry was liquidated, before the liquidation becomes final." But the requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1514 are conditions precedent for jurisdiction in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 724 F.2d 121, (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("The judgment appealed from is affirmed on the basis of the opinion filed by the CIT. Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 561 F. Supp. 441 (C.I.T. 1983)"); Wally Packaging Inc. v. United States, 7 CIT ___, 578 F. Supp. 1408, 1411-12 (1984), and the Court may not construe 19 C.F.R. § 10.112 to increase its jurisdiction, AtakaAmerica, Inc., supra. As plaintiff failed to timely request duty-free treatment, the Court is without jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).