Opinion
No. 102, 2002
Submitted: September 30, 2002
Decided: October 10, 2002
Court Below-Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County Cr.A. Nos. IN01-05-0600 IN01-05-0602 IN01-05-0605
Affirmed.
Unpublished opinion is below.
CHRISTOPHER WALLS, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below-Appellee. No. 102, 2002 In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: September 30, 2002 Decided: October 10, 2002
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices
Randy J. Holland, Justice
ORDER
This 10th day of October 2002, upon consideration of the appellant's brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, Christopher Walls, was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of Offensive Touching, Disorderly Conduct and Resisting Arrest. On each of the convictions for offensive touching and disorderly conduct, Walls was sentenced to 30 days incarceration at Level V, to be suspended for 30 days at Level III. On the conviction for resisting arrest, he was sentenced to 6 months incarceration at Level V, to be suspended for 6 months at Level III. This is Walls' direct appeal.
This appeal relates solely to Walls' conviction for resisting arrest. His sentences on the other charges fall below this Court's jurisdictional threshold. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11( 1) (b); Marker v. State, 450 A.2d 397, 399 (Del. 1982).
(2) Walls' trial counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c). The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
(3) Walls' counsel asserts that: a) based upon a careful and complete examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues;
b) he informed Walls of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying brief and the complete hearing transcript; and c) he informed Walls of his right to supplement counsel's presentation. Walls responded with a brief that raises several issues for this Court's consideration. The State has responded to the position taken by Walls' counsel as well as the issue raised by Walls and has moved to affirm the Superior Court's judgment.
In light of Walls' contention that he did not receive counsel's letter, motion to withdraw or draft Rule 26(c) brief, we afforded Walls additional time to supplement his points for consideration by this Court. Walls' supplemental points were filed on September 6, 2002. The State's supplemental response was filed on September 30, 2002.
(4) Walls raises several issues for this Court's consideration, which may fairly be summarized as follows. He claims that: a) the Superior Court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that an individual has a statutory right to refuse medical treatment; b) it was a violation of his constitutional rights for the police to detain him in the hospital emergency room and permit him to be medicated; and c) the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because he was never arraigned.
(5) At trial, the State presented the testimony of Sergeant Michael DiOssi, a constable employed by Christiana Care Health Systems. Sergeant DiOssi testified that on the evening of April 22, 2001 he was called to the Christiana Hospital Emergency Department, Trauma Room D, to assist with a disorderly patient. He was accompanied by two other constables, Sergeant Edward Davis and Corporal David Melvin. When they arrived at the trauma room, Officer David Cajuste of the New Castle County Police Department was already there. Sergeant DiOssi saw Walls standing in a corner of the room in a fighting posture, with clenched fists, and yelling obscenities. Walls had bloodshot eyes, was slurring his speech and appeared to be intoxicated.
(6) The officers conferred with each other and decided that, for his own safety and the safety of others, Walls should be placed on a stretcher.
As they attempted to escort Walls over to a stretcher about four to five feet away, Walls became increasingly agitated and started kicking and throwing punches. Officer Cajuste was struck. The officers then handcuffed Walls to the stretcher so no one else would be injured. During the altercation, Sergeant DiOssi suffered abrasions to his right arm. Walls then spat blood on the constables and damaged the stretcher by kicking at it. Sergeant DiOssi testified that it is hospital policy not to release an intoxicated person from treatment until they are no longer a danger to themselves or others.
(7) Officer David Cajuste testified next for the State. On the evening of April 22, 2001, he was called to the scene of a motor vehicle accident. He saw Walls being transported from the scene on a stretcher and then saw him again in the trauma room at the hospital. Officer Cajuste attempted to interview Walls about the accident, but Walls refused to answer his questions. He appeared to be intoxicated. Walls became increasingly belligerent and screamed obscenities, at which point Officer Cajuste warned him that he could be arrested for disorderly conduct. Walls continued to act belligerently and threatened to throw a nearby vial of blood at him.
(8) Officer Cajuste realized at that point that the situation was getting out of hand and called the constables for assistance. Together they managed to control Walls' upper body and handcuff him to the stretcher.
Walls kicked Sergeant DiOssi and tried to bite him. He spat blood upon Sergeant DiOssi and another constable and damaged the stretcher. Finally, a doctor arrived and administered a drug to Walls to calm him down. Later, after Walls was treated, Officer Cajuste took him into custody. In refusing to answer questions about the accident, Walls told Officer Cajuste to talk to his lawyer.
(9) Following trial, defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed that there is a statutory right to refuse medical treatment. The Superior Court judge refused to give such an instruction, stating that such a right would not provide a defense to the crimes with which Walls had been charged and would not excuse any alleged criminal conduct. Following the judge's ruling, defense counsel stated, "I have no argument in that regard, Your Honor."
(10) Walls' first claim that the Superior Court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that there is a statutory right to refuse medical treatment is without merit. The statute upon which Walls relies clearly does not govern situations in which an individual brought to a hospital emergency room for treatment becomes violent and threatens to injure himself and hospital personnel. It was, therefore, proper for the Superior Court to refuse to instruct the jury regarding that statute.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502 (1995), which is part of the Delaware Death With Dignity Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2518 (1995).
(11) Walls' claim that it was improper for the police to detain him and permit him to be medicated is equally without merit. Walls improperly characterizes what occurred in the emergency room as a "detention" by the police. Rather, Walls was injured in an auto accident, was taken to the emergency room and, while in the emergency room, committed several criminal offenses. There is no evidence in this record that either the police or medical personnel acted unreasonably or illegally in response to Walls' conduct.
(12) Finally, Walls claims that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because he was never arraigned. There is no documentation in the Superior Court record reflecting that Walls was arraigned. However, the record reflects that Walls was represented by counsel prior to his indictment and that his case proceeded to trial with no objection concerning the absence of an arraignment. There is, moreover, neither a claim, nor any evidence, of any prejudice to Walls due to the absence of an arraignment. Under such circumstances, there is no merit to Walls' claim.
Ray v. State, 262 A.2d 643, 644-45 (Del. 1970).
(13) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that Walls' appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue. We are also satisfied that Walls' counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that Walls could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
The motion to withdraw is moot.