Opinion
April 13, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gerard, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
It is well settled that where, as here, a moving party has made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action ( see, Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 334; Mayer v. McBrunigan Constr. Corp., 105 A.D.2d 774; Krupp v. Aetna Life Cas. Co., 103 A.D.2d 252, 261-262). It is readily apparent, even after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff ( see, Robinson v. Strong Mem. Hosp., 98 A.D.2d 976), that the plaintiff has failed to raise any triable issues of fact. The evidence shows that the defendant Fleet Bank (hereinafter the Bank) neither engaged the services of the plaintiff nor agreed to pay him a commission. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment to the Bank ( see, Julien J. Studley, Inc. v. New York News, 70 N.Y.2d 628; Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 203 A.D.2d 517; Lubeck Realty v. Flintkote Co., 170 A.D.2d 800). Neither the prior denial of the Bank's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) nor the plaintiff's purported need for further discovery is sufficient to deny summary judgment in this case ( see, Schwartz v. Licht, 173 A.D.2d 458, 460; Garnham Han Real Estate Brokers v. Oppenheimer, 148 A.D.2d 493, 495).
Bracken, J.P., O'Brien, Santucci and Joy, JJ., concur.