276 N.C. 725, 726, 174 S.E.2d 524, 525 (1970) (per curiam) (stating that a particular judgment was "reviewable only by way of certiorari if the court in its discretion chooses to grant such writ" (second italics added) (first citing State v. Lewis , 274 N.C. 438, 164 S.E.2d 177 (1968) ; then citing In re Croom , 175 N.C. 455, 95 S.E. 903 (1918) ; and then citing 4 Strong's North Carolina Index 2d: Habeas Corpus § 4, at 149-50 (1968) ) ); State v. Walker , 245 N.C. 658, 659, 97 S.E.2d 219, 220 (1957) (stating that a writ of certiorari "may be allowed by the Court in its discretion , on sufficient showing made, but such writ is not one to which the moving party is entitled as a matter of right" (emphasis added) ), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 946, 78 S.Ct. 793, 2 L.Ed.2d 821 (1958) ; Womble v. Moncure Mill & Gin Co. , 194 N.C. 577, 579, 140 S.E. 230, 231 (1927) ("Certiorari is a discretionary writ, to be issued only for good or sufficient cause shown ...." (second italics added) (first citing Waller v. Dudley , 193 N.C. 354, 137 S.E. 149 (1927) ; then citing People's Bank & Tr. v. Parks , 191 N.C. 263, 131 S.E. 637 (1926) ; then citing Finch v. Comm'rs of Nash Cty. , 190 N.C. 154, 129 S.E. 195 (1925) ; and then citing State v. Farmer , 188 N.C. 243, 124 S.E. 562 (1924) ) ); Luther v. Seawell , 191 N.C. App 139, 142, 662 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2008) (stating that the Court of Appeals has "the authority ... to ‘treat the purported appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari’ and grant it in [its ] discretion " (emphasis added) (quoting State v. SanMiguel , 74 N.C. App. 276, 277-78, 328 S.E.2d 326, 328 (1985) ; and then citing Guthrie v. Conroy , 152 N.C. App. 15, 19, 567 S.E.2d 403, 407 (2002) ) ).--------

It clearly appears from the record in this case that the trial was concluded on Wednesday, 8 August 1956. The case was not required to be docketed in this Court until 28 August 1956, for hearing at the call of the docket of the Sixth District on Tuesday, 18 September 1956 if the additional time allowed by the amendment to Rule 5, published in Appendix, Advance Sheets IV, Volume 245, is disregarded. It is further said in Pruitt v. Wood, supra, that "We have held in a number of cases that the rules of this Court, governing appeals, are mandatory and not directory. Calvert v. Carstarphen, 133 N.C. 25, 45 S.E. 353. They may not be disregarded or set at naught (1) by act of the Legislature (Cooper v. Commissioners, 184 N.C. 615, 113 S.E. 569), (2) by order of the judge of the Superior Court (Waller v. Dudley, 193 N.C. 354, 137 S.E. 149), (3) by consent of litigants or counsel. S. v. Farmer, 188 N.C. 243, 124 S.E. 562. The Court has not only found it necessary to adopt them, but equally necessary to enforce them and to enforce them uniformly. Womble v. Gin Co., 194 N.C. 577, 140 S.E. 230.

Neither the parties, nor their counsel, nor the Superior Court may disregard them or set them at naught. Waller v. Dudley, 193 N.C. 354, 137 S.E. 149; S. v. Farmer, supra. Judgments affirmed; appeals dismissed.

S. v. Taylor, 194 N.C. 738, 140 S.E. 728; Dunbar v. Tobacco Growers, 190 N.C. 608, 130 S.E. 505; Jordan v. Simmons, 175 N.C. p. 540, 95 S.E. 919; Avery v. Pritchard, 93 N.C. 266. Nor is the situation bettered when the time for serving statement of case on appeal and exceptions thereto or counter-statement of case is enlarged by order of the judge trying the case as he is authorized, in his discretion, under C. S. 643, as amended by chapter 97, Public Laws 1921, to do, for this statute gives him no more authority to abrogate the rules of the Supreme Court than litigants or counsel would have to impinge upon them by consent or agreement. Waller v. Dudley, 193 N.C. 354, 137 S.E. 149; Cooper v. Comrs., 184 N.C. 615, 113 S.E. 569. We have held in a number of cases that the rules of this Court, governing appeals, are mandatory and not directory. Calvert v. Carstarphen, 133 N.C. 25, 45 S.E. 353. They may not be disregarded or set at naught (1) by act of the Legislature ( Cooper v. Comrs., supra), (2) by order of the judge of the Superior Court ( Waller v. Dudley, supra), (3) by consent of litigants or counsel. S. v. Farmer, supra.

Honeycutt v. Watkins, 151 N.C. 652. In Waller v. Dudley, 193 N.C. 354, we found it necessary to say: "We again call the attention of the profession to the fact that the rules governing appeals are mandatory and not directory. The Court has not only found it necessary to adopt them, but equally necessary to enforce them and to enforce them uniformly." However, a perusal of the record filed here leaves with us the impression that this case is governed by Rea v. Mirror Co., 158 N.C. 24, and that his Honor was correct in holding, upon the defendant's petition, that it should be removed to the Federal Court, where, of course, the plaintiff would have the right to traverse the petition upon a motion to remand.

Dunbar v. Tobacco Growers, 190 N.C. 608, 130 S.E. 505; Jordan v. Simmons, 175 N.C. p. 540, 95 S.E. 919; Avery v. Pritchard, 93 N.C. 266. We have held in a number of cases that the rules of this Court, governing appeals, are mandatory and not directory. Calvert v. Carstarphen, 133 N.C. 25, 45 S.E. 353. They may not be disregarded or set at naught (1) by act of the Legislature ( Cooper v. Commissioners. 184 N.C. 615, 113 S.E. 569), (2) by order of the judge of the Superior Court ( Waller v. Dudley, 193 N.C. 354, 137 S.E. 149), (3) by consent of litigants or counsel. S. v. Farmer, 188 N.C. 243, 124 S.E. 562. The Court has not only found it necessary to adopt them, but equally necessary to enforce them and to enforce them uniformly. Womble v. Gin Co., 194 N.C. 577, 140 S.E. 230.

On facts identical in principle with those appearing on the present record, the appeal in the case of Stone v. Ledbetter, 191 N.C. 777, 133 S.E. 162, was dismissed ex mero motu. For a similar reason, the motion, lodged by the defendants, to dismiss the appeal in the instant case was allowed. This ruling is further supported, either directly or in tendency, by the following recent authorities: Covington v. Hosiery Mills, ante, 478; S. v. Crowder, ante, 335; S. v. Taylor, 194 N.C. 738; S. v. Angel, 194 N.C. 715; Womble v. Gin Co., 194 N.C. 577; Waller v. Dudley, 193 N.C. 354, 137 S.E. 149; Trust Co. v. Parks, 191 N.C. 263, 131 S.E. 637; Finch v. Comrs., 190 N.C. 154, 129 S.E. 195; S. v. Farmer, 188 N.C. 243, 124 S.E. 562; S. v. Surety Co., 192 N.C. 52, 133 S.E. 172. No sufficient cause having been shown to warrant a reinstatement of the appeal, the motion to this effect must be denied.

The Court has not only found it necessary to adopt them, but equally imperative to enforce them and to enforce them uniformly. Waller v. Dudley, 193 N.C. 354, 137 S.E. 149. For the convenience of litigants, counsel and the Court, a fixed schedule is arranged for each term of the Court and a time set apart for the call of the docket from each of the judicial districts of the State.

" But this is at variance with the record, or else the whole of the record proper is not before us. Notice of appeal from the judgment of 29 June was filed in the office of the clerk of the Superior Court for Chatham County 7 July, 1927, and there is no suggestion of any extension of time, by agreement or otherwise, for preparing and serving statement of case on appeal. Certiorari is a discretionary writ, to be issued only for good or sufficient cause shown, and it is not one to which the moving party is entitled as a matter of right. Waller v. Dudley, 193 N.C. 354; Trust Co. v. Parks, 191 N.C. 263, 131 S.E. 637; Finch v. Comrs., 190 N.C. 154, 129 S.E. 195; S. v. Farmer, 188 N.C. 243, 124 S.E. 562. A party is entitled to a writ of certiorari when — and only when — the failure to perfect the appeal is due to some error or act of the court or its officers, and not to any fault or neglect of the party or his agent. Trust Co. v. Parks, supra; Bank v. Miller, 190 N.C. 775, 130 S.E. 616.

Affirmed. Cited: Howard v. Hinson, 191 N.C. 367 (2f); Gilliken v. Norcom, 193 N.C. 354 (2g); Howard v. Coach Co., 212 N.C. 204 (2f); Cody v. Hovey, 217 N.C. 410 (3p).