Wallen v. Salon of Music, Inc.

8 Citing cases

  1. Wolbert, Saxon Middleton v. Warren

    444 So. 2d 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 4 times
    Denying compensability where claimant's severe asthma attacks were brought on by emotional trauma after she discovered some alleged discrepancies and irregularities in her employer's trust account

    Since then both the Florida Supreme Court and this court have held that when a heart attack or other internal failure results from an identifiable accident, the claimant need not satisfy the legal causation prong of the Victor Wine test. See Tingle v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1965); Reynolds v. Whitney Tank Lines, 279 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1973); Wallen v. Salon of Music, Inc., 418 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Lone Star of Florida v. Rodriguez, 416 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Great Dane Trailers v. Flis, 435 So.2d 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Particularly compelling, I think, is the recent case of Popiel v. Broward County School Board, 432 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), in which Popiel and a fellow school board employee were enroute to a school board facility when they became lost and stopped to ask directions. A thief approached the car, and, while reaching through the window, snatched a gold chain from around Popiel's neck. Although she suffered no physical trauma from the incident, Popiel collapsed and died of a heart attack a few hours later.

  2. Mangold v. Rainforest Golf Sports

    675 So. 2d 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that it is presumed substantial, material statutory change by Legislature is intended for some specific objective or alteration of law, in absence of clear contrary indication

    For example, relying on Reynolds, 279 So.2d 293, this court has previously held that a standard requiring a showing that the work-related injury was the actual, as opposed to a possible, cause of a subsequent heart attack was too burdensome, and that compensability depends merely upon a showing of a causal connection. Wallen v. Salonof Music, Inc., 418 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Thus, the "major contributing cause" standard of section 440.09 (1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994) is entirely new.

  3. Coons v. Pete's Elec

    543 So. 2d 821 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

    Where a claimant's preexisting asymptomatic atherosclerotic or heart condition is aggravated or accelerated by an industrial accident, the resulting condition is compensable. See Wallen v. Salon of Music, Inc., 418 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); cf. Vyajkora v. Farm Stores, 378 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). In the instant case, Dr. Haggman's testimony was clear that claimant's accident aggravated and accelerated his preexisting cardiac disease and that the stress stemming from the accident played a large part in rendering claimant symptomatic.

  4. Dean Jaye Construction v. Johnson ex rel. Johnson

    486 So. 2d 664 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 2 times

    Rather, this case is more akin to the line of cases in which an identifiable accident actually occurred, resulting in a heart attack. Reynolds v. Whitney Tank Lines, 279 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1973); Wallen v. Salon of Music, Inc., 418 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Lone Star of Florida v. Rodriguez, 416 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Popiel v. Broward County School Board, 432 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Reynolds and Popiel hold that the relevant question is not whether the claimant was under unusual strain or overexertion at the time of the heart attack but whether the heart attack is causally related to an identifiable accident. In Popiel, the claimant suffered a heart attack an hour after a thief pulled a gold chain from her neck.

  5. Broadfoot v. Albert Hugo Ass'n

    478 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 7 times
    In Broadfoot v. Albert Hugo Ass'n, Inc., 478 So.2d 863, 866 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), we held that otherwise sufficient testimony is not rendered unsatisfactory merely because the doctor testifying does not use "magic words" such as "reasonable medical probability."

    In McCall, 408 So.2d at 792, this court held that a doctor's testimony that a certain event "could have triggered" McCall's chest pains and myocardial infarction constituted sufficient evidence of medical causation. See also, Wallen v. Salon of Music, Inc., 418 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand to the deputy for further consideration in the light of this opinion, and for the entry of an order meeting the requirements of law.

  6. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Bryant

    451 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

    AFFIRMED. See Reynolds v. Whitney Tank Lines, 279 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1973); Wallen v. Salon of Music, Inc., 418 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) and Sheraton Bal Harbour v. Platis, 447 So.2d 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). MILLS, SHIVERS and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.

  7. City of Lakeland v. Cushman

    445 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

    However, in situations such as the one presented in the instant case, where a heart attack follows a prior compensable injury, the test for compensability is whether the heart attack is the direct and natural result of the compensable injury. Sosenko v. American Airmotive Corporation, 156 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1963); Reynolds v. Whitney Tank Lines, 279 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1973); Lone Star of Florida v. Rodriguez, 416 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). We held in Wallen v. Salon of Music, Inc., 418 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), that medical testimony based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty that a claimant's myocardial infarction could have been related to a prior compensable injury is sufficient to establish causation. Likewise, we find that Dr. Naiman's testimony in this case constitutes competent substantial evidence in support of the deputy commissioner's finding of causation.

  8. Popiel v. Broward County School Bd.

    432 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 8 times

    Another line of cases, however, finds compensability where an employee is injured in an identifiable accident which either immediately or subsequently results in a heart attack. Reynolds v. Whitney Tank Lines, 279 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1973); Wallen v. Salon of Music, Inc., 418 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Lone Star of Florida v. Rodriguez, 416 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Reynolds holds that in those situations where the claimant is injured in an identifiable accident, there is no requirement that the claimant must be under unusual strain or over-exertion at the time of the heart attack. The relevant question in that situation is whether the heart attack is causally related to the accident.