However, OCGA § 24–4–6 does not apply because there was direct evidence of Sherman's guilt in the form of Sherman's statement to Brown that Sherman thought Kent took his pills and that after he killed her, he found the pills. See Wallace v. State, 279 Ga. 26(1), 608 S.E.2d 634 (2005) (where the defendant's own statement was direct evidence of his guilt, reliance on OCGA § 24–4–6 was misplaced). We find that the evidence in this case was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Sherman was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted.
Moreover, Bunnell's argument that the State relied solely on circumstantial evidence is belied by the admission of his statement to police that he hit Eason with the ax handle. See Wallace v. State, 279 Ga. 26(1), 608 S.E.2d 634 (2005) (defendant's reliance on circumstantial evidence rule of OCGA § 24–4–6 was misplaced because his own statement was direct evidence of his guilt). After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's determination of guilt, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Bunnell guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
Contrary to appellant's argument, the evidence against him was not entirely circumstantial, because there was direct evidence of his guilt in the form of his admission to Dawson that he "didn't really mean to shoot [Taylor]." See Wallace v. State, 279 Ga. 26 (1) ( 608 SE2d 634) (2005). The evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted.
(Citation omitted.) Wallace v. State, 279 Ga. 26, 27 (2) ( 608 SE2d 634) (2005). 3. Savage next asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict on Count 1, the armed robbery of the North Broad Street Dollar General. Savage claims that the evidence of his guilt is insufficient because it is based on the uncorroborated testimony of his accomplice, McCarrell. As there is corroborating evidence in the record, we disagree.
Because the due process issue Franklin raises on appeal was not raised in the trial court, this claim presents nothing for appellate review. Wallace v. State, 279 Ga. 26, 27 ( 608 SE2d 634) (2005). Judgment vacated and case remanded.
We find the evidence sufficient to find Barrino guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of MDMA. See Wallace v. State, 279 Ga. 26, 27 (1) ( 608 SE2d 634) (2005); Stewart v. State, 243 Ga. App. 468, 469 ( 533 SE2d 737) (2000). See Helton v. State, 271 Ga. App. 272, 274 (a) ( 609 SE2d 200) (2005) (evidence of possession held sufficient where bags of methamphetamine were found in the exact location where defendant had leaned over after exiting his vehicle).
Lopez contends the admission of hearsay statements violated the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because this claim of error was not specifically raised by objection at trial, it presents nothing for appellate review. Wallace v. State, 279 Ga. 26, 27 ( 608 SE2d 634) (2005). 3. Lopez argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because it shows only his mere presence in the vicinity of contraband.
Having rejected Sanders' contention that the jury was required to disregard Rakestraw's testimony, this Court finds no merit to Sanders' claim that his conviction was based upon insufficient circumstantial evidence. There was direct evidence of Sanders' guilt, thus his reliance on OCGA § 24–4–6 is misplaced.Wallace v. State, 279 Ga. 26, 27, 608 S.E.2d 634 (2005). OCGA § 24–4–6 states: “To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”