Opinion
No. 05-05-00622-CR
Opinion issued February 1, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F04-59577-IP. Affirmed.
Before Justices MORRIS, BRIDGES, and FRANCIS.
OPINION
Kylon Jamal Wallace waived a jury trial and entered an open plea of guilty to aggravated robbery. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.03 (Vernon 2003). The trial court sentenced appellant to twenty-five years' imprisonment and made an affirmative finding that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, a firearm, during the commission of the offense. In a single point of error, appellant contends his guilty plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Appellant argues his guilty plea was involuntary because counsel (1) failed to investigate the facts of a juvenile case for which appellant was on probation at the time of the robbery, (2) did not prepare appellant to address the juvenile case, and (3) failed to let appellant review the presentence investigation report (PSI) and make corrections to it before it was admitted as evidence. The State responds that appellant's guilty plea was not involuntary nor was counsel ineffective. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings would have been different in the absence of counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Appellant has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). An appellate court ordinarily will not declare trial counsel ineffective where there is no record showing counsel had an opportunity to explain himself. See Goodspeed v. State, No. PD-1882-03, 2005 WL 766996, at *2 (Tex.Crim.App. Apr. 6, 2005). Without evidence of the strategy involved concerning counsel's actions at trial, the reviewing court will presume sound trial strategy. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814; see also Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). The record shows the trial court properly admonished appellant orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (d) (Vernon Supp. 2005); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). At the hearing, appellant testified he understood the charge in the indictment, the punishment range for the offense, and that counsel "went over" all of the documents in the case with him and he understood them. Appellant testified he was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty because he committed the offense exactly as charged in the indictment. Appellant's signed judicial confession and stipulation of evidence was offered into evidence without objection. Appellant acknowledged that a PSI was prepared by the probation department, testified he had no changes or objections to it, and he wanted the trial court to consider the PSI in determining his punishment. Nothing in the record shows counsel failed to adequately investigate or discuss the juvenile case. We conclude appellant has not met his burden of showing trial counsel was ineffective or that his guilty plea was involuntary. See Goodspeed, 2005 WL 766996, at *2; Rylander, 101 S.W.3d at 111; Kirk, 949 S.W.2d at 771. We overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.