Prior to 1987, this statute did not contain the language "or the judgment has been paid;" thus, it did not authorize relief after the judgment had been paid. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1304 (1982) (predecessor statute to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-204); Wallace v. State, 223 Tenn. 255, 443 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tenn. 1969) (holding relief was unavailable under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1304 after final judgment, execution and collection of forfeiture). In 1987, the statute was amended to specifically authorize relief even after "the judgment has been paid."

Unfortunately, language in the earliest decisions of this Court purported to constrict severely this statutory discretion. See State v. Frankgos, 114 Tenn. 76, 85 S.W. 79, 81 (1905) (recognizing that the statutory language, now codified as Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-204, provides trial courts with authority to "do all and everything therein as they shall deem just and right" when determining whether relief should be granted on a forfeited recognizance, but nevertheless stating that trial courts should exercise that discretion "only in extreme cases , such as where the sureties cannot produce their principal in court on account of his death, or some other condition of affairs ... which make it equally impossible for them to surrender him" (emphasis added)); see also Diehl v. Knight, 158 Tenn. 246, 12 S.W.2d 717, 718 (1929) ; Wallace v. State, 196 Tenn. 577, 269 S.W.2d 780, 784 (1954) ; Wallace v. State, 223 Tenn. 255, 443 S.W.2d 656, 657 (1969). The Court of Criminal Appeals has correctly recognized the inconsistency between the statutory language and our own earlier decisions.