Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-0579, SECTION T Mag.(4)
December 10, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion by Defendant, Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans ("MCLNO"), for summary judgment [Doc. 46] against Plaintiff, Henry Wallace, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. Defendant's motion is supported by memorandum of law and exhibits to which the Plaintiff has responded by filing an opposition memorandum including exhibits to the motion for summary judgment. The Court having considered the legal memoranda submitted by the panics, the record, and relevant law is fully advised and ready to rule.
I. BACKGROUND
Between 1990 and 1994, Charity Hospital of New Orleans ("Charity") was in the process of merging with Hotel Dieu, which had been acquired by the State of Louisiana, The combined organization is now known as Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans ("MCLNO") composed of Charity Hospital and University Hospital. MCLNO is operated by the Health Care Services Division of Louisiana State University Medical Center. Prior to the merger, each Hospital had its own Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"). Prior to the merger, Joel Sellers, a Caucasian female, was the CFO at University Hospital and Joseph Jankite, a Caucasian male, was the CFO at Charity. Once the merger took place, there was no need for two CFO positions.
From April 12, 1993, to June 30, 1994, Joseph Jankite, a Caucasian male, held the position of Director of Fiscal and Business Affairs and CFO over the merged organization. He was hired for a one year unclassified appointment at a salary of EIGHTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTEEN DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($88,416.00) per year. Following the resignation of Jankite, there was no CFO over the merged organization.
On January 1, 1995, Joel Sellers, a Caucasian female, and former CFO at Hotel Dieu, accepted a probational appointment as Administrative Director 5/CFO, continuing to earn the same salary she earned as CFO over Hotel Dieu of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHT DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($105,528.00) per year. Effective January 1, 1995, Civil Service caused the job title of Administrative Director 5/CFO to be allocated in the state classified service at a GS-24 level. The then maximum salary for the GS-24 level was FIFTY-NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($59,256.00) annually. Ms. Sellers' salary, continued from her employment at Hotel Dieu, was more than 28 percent above the maximum amount for the GS-24 level. She was scheduled for a significant reduction in salary, and thereafter resigned on February 9, 1996.
Effective February 22, 1996, the job title of Administrative Director was allocated to a new job title of A/C Hospital Associate Administrator 3 at the GS-25 level. The GS-25 level is 7 percent higher than the GS-24 level. This new GS-25 level position is the one to which Henry Wallace was detailed. Plaintiff held this position from January 22, 1996 until December 6, 1998 and maintained a salary of FIFTY-NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX DOLLARS AND NO/100 (559,256.00) annually.
By memo dated August, 9, 1996, Plaintiff wrote to Ron Broadus, Director of Human resources requesting that his "detail to the position of Chief Financial Officer be established as an unclassified position with a salary of NINETY THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/100 (590,000.00) retroactive to January 22, 1996, when he assumed the position. By e-mail dated August 9, 1996, Ron Broadus acknowledged receiving Plaintiffs August 9, 1996 memo and advised Plaintiff that his request was not possible.
Effective June 29, 1998, through November 30, 1998, a Caucasian female, Helen Bates was placed in the position of the Director of Patient Billing at a salary of EIGHTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($85,000.00) per year. This position had been placed in the unclassified service by the Director of the Department of Civil Service. This was to be a temporary job for the purpose of bringing collections up to date which was said to be seriously in arrears. Starting in February 1, 1999, Bates also began serving as the acting CFO with no increase in salary. She has since left the position.
Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on or around July 14, 1999. In conjunction therewith he prepared and signed a Charge Questionnaire dated July 12, 1999, as well as an Affidavit and a Supplemental Intake Questionnaire. In the charge, he marked "Race" indicating the basis for his charge of discrimination, and described the particulars of the discrimination taking place from January 22, 1996, to December 6, 1998, in that he was denied equal wages while he held the detailed position of Chief Financial Officer. He did not mark that his cause of discrimination was based on sex or any type of discrimination, nor did he indicate that the alleged discrimination was a `continuing action' on the EEOC charge form.
Plaintiff filed his action, on March 6, 2001, based on sex discrimination and race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., i.e. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206, et seq., i.e. the Equal Pay Act, On December 11, 2002, the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment was granted in part by dismissing the plaintiffs sex discrimination claim, and denied in part regarding the plaintiffs race discrimination claim. Defendant files partial summary judgment claiming that the Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII or wage discrimination in violation of the Equal Pay Act.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. The Law on Summary Judgment
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a court should grant a motion for summary judgment only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The non-moving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (emphasis added);Tubacex. Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, when the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2545, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
B. Title VII (Race Discrimination)
In a Title VII race discrimination case, plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In order to meet this initial burden, plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he was a member of a protected class; (2) that he was qualified for the position in question; (3) that he was discharged from that position; and, (4) that he was either replaced by someone outside the protected class or otherwise discharged because of the protected trait. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries, Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993).
Once plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment action.Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994). "This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it `can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citation omitted)). The presumption of unlawful discrimination disappears once the employer offers admissible evidence that is sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that there was a legitimate reason for the discharge. See id.
Because the ultimate burden of proving discrimination lies at all times with the plaintiff, he is then afforded the opportunity to prove that the employer's proffered reasons for termination were not true and that the true reason was, in fact, discrimination. See id. The Supreme Court ruled in Reeves that a prima facie showing of the elements of an employment discrimination claim in conjunction with substantial evidence that the employer's stated reason for termination was pre-textual, could alone, with no additional evidence of discrimination being offered by the plaintiff, allow a reasonable jury to infer that the employer's motivation for the termination was discriminatory. See 120 S.Ct. at 2106 (emphasis added). However, the Reeves Court did caution:
[t]his is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability. Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational fact-finder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. Id at 2108.
Thus under Reeves, summary judgment is appropriate, even after z prima facie showing of a discrimination claim has been made, if the record conclusively revealed some other, non-discriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and un-controverted, independent evidence that no discrimination has occurred. See id at 2108.
In the present case, the Mr. Wallace has already met his burden because he: (1) established that he is a member of a historically protected class (African-American) and that he is a "protected individual" within the peer group of executives at MLCNO; (2) that he was qualified for the position of CFO of MCLNO and held that exact position from January 22, 1996, until December 6, 1998; (3) was discharged from his position as CFO; and (4) was replaced with a Caucasian female.
Since Mr. Wallace has set forth a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden rests with MLCNO to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment action to allow its past and present CFO's to maintain an unclassified salary as CFO. However, MCLNO has not met its burden. In the case of Mr. Wallace, the defendant took almost a year and a half to re-establish an abolished classified CFO position for Mr. Wallace, rather than in a pre-existing and active unclassified position. Yet, when it came to Helen Bates, the defendant was able to find an unclassified position for her while functioning as CFO.
It also remains questionable why Ms. Bates was able to receive an unclassified position as acting CFO, when such a position was denied the plaintiff. The plaintiff has explained that Ms. Bates was appointed as acting CFO on December 8, 1998. MCLNO's own newsletter and organizational charts list Ms. Bates as an unclassified Chief Financial Officer. The plaintiff goes on to explain that Ms. Bates was allowed to resign her classified position on January 31, 1999, in order to allow her to avoid being placed into the classified Acute Care Hospital Associate Administrator 3 position like Mr. Wallace. This argument demonstrates the presence of a pretext that remains unaddressed by the defendant. Because showing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action of allowing Ms. Seller's to be employed as the CFO of MLCNO in an unclassified position is a matter of production, and not one of persuasion, the defendant's argument must fail in summary judgment.
See Plaintiffs Opposition to Third Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibits J and P, X-1 through 3.
Furthermore, when Bates was installed as the successor to Henry Wallace in the position of CFO on December 8, 1998, defendant contends that her duties exceeded that of Wallace's prior duties. The defendant contends that Ms. Bates was not only CFO, but also retained the position of Director of Patient Billing. The defendant's organizational charts for the Patient Billing and Receivables section of MCLNO demonstrates that the September 1998 chart shows the unclassified position of Director of Patient Financial Services reported directly to Mr. Wallace, while he maintained the position of CFO. However, the MCLNO oganizational chart, dated February 2000, shows Ms. Bates as the unclassified CFO only, and no position of Director of Patient Financial Services, much less Bates as occupant of that position. These facts are clearly subject to different interpretation and this court cannot reasonably conclude that there is no genuine issue for trial in the present case.
C. The Equal Pay Act
1. History of the Equal Pay Act
Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act to remedy what was perceived as a serious and deeply engrained problem of employment discrimination in private industry: the fact that u[t]he wage structure of all too many segments of American industry has been based on an ancient but outmoded belief that a man, because of his role in society, should be paid more than a woman even though his duties are the same." Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1, 818 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1974) (citing S. Rep. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 109 Cong. Rec. 8914, 8914 (1963)). The existence of wage differentials based upon sex in American industry had a number of unhealthy effects upon the nation's economy, such as the depression of wages and living standards of employees necessary for their health and efficiency, the prevention of the maximum utilization of available labor resources, and the proliferation of labor disputes — all of which burdened commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce. Corning Glass Works, 818 F.2d at 1152 (citation omitted). In response to these concerns about the economic and social consequences of disparate wages, Congress adopted a solution that "was quite simple in principle: to require that `equal work will be rewarded by equal wages.'" Id at 1152-53 (citation omitted).
In response to repeated industry fears about a new and unfamiliar bureaucracy being set up to administer the Act, Congress enacted its new sex discrimination legislation as an amendment to the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Corning Glass Works, 818 F.2d at 1153. The Equal Pay Act would thus be administered by a familiar agency equipped with enforcement procedures focused by years of judicial interpretation. 818 F.2d at 1153. Moreover, the scope of the Act's application would be limited by the Fair Labor Standard Act's careful definitions of "employers," "employee," and "establishment." Id at 1153 (see e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 202).
2. The Structure of the Equal Pay Act
The Act's structure is relatively straightforward. Corning Glass Works, 818 F.2d at 1153. It proscribes discrimination "between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which [the employer] pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions." 29 U.S.C. § 209(d)(1). Thus, to establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that his or her employer is subject to the Act;
(2) that he or she performed work in a position requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions; and
(3) that he or she was paid less than the employees of the opposite sex providing the comparison.
Corning Glass Works, 818 F.2d at 1153 (citation omitted).
A showing of "equal work" requires only that the plaintiff prove that the "skill, effort and responsibility" required in the performance of the jobs compared are substantially equal. Corning Glass Works, 818 F.2d at 1153 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Unlike the showing required under Title VII's disparate treatment theory, proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 1153 (citation omitted). Once the plaintiff meets his prima facie case, the burden of proof "shifts to the employer to show that the differential is justified under one of the Act's four exceptions." Id. at 1153 (citation omitted). The Act provides one general and three specific exceptions for disparate wage payments "made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex." Id (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)). These exceptions "are affirmative defenses on which the employer has the burden both of production and of persuasion." Id. at 1153 (citation omitted).
In establishing a prima facie case against the defendant in violation of the Equal Pay Act, the plaintiff has shown that (1) MCLNO is subject to the Act and (2), that Mr. Wallace was paid less than Ms. Sellers — a member of the opposite sex. However, whether the plaintiff engaged in job duties that were "substantially equal" to his successor, Helen Bates is a primary issue for this court to address.
At the time of this appointment, Mr. Wallace, in addition to his other duties as CFO, supervised the Patient Billing and Accounting section of MCLO, despite the fact that his salary was considerably below that of Ms. Bates. Furthermore, the plaintiff has shown that Helen Bates appeared as CFO in the MCLNO newsletter of October 4-10, 1999, which described her areas of responsibility as "Admit/Registration, Coding/Revenue Enhancement, Finance and Patient Billing," potentially far less than the areas of responsibility which Mr. Wallace had during his tenure. Mr. Wallace has shown that although certain job functions were initially moved from his supervision when he first began acting as CFO, this shifting of responsibility was only temporary and supervision of those areas did, in fact, revert back to him thereafter. Not only did Mr. Wallace regain supervisory authority over these areas, he did so before being placed into the unclassified position of Acute Care Hospital Associate Administrator 3, the position which defendant claims was the only available position available to Mr. Wallace. Thus, Mr. Wallace has shown that his job duties were at least, substantially equal to those of Ms. Bates.
Since Mr. Wallace has met his prima facie burden, the burden shifts to MCLNO to prove that it falls under one of the Act's four exceptions. However, MCLNO has neither met its burden of production or persuasion regarding a seniority system, a merit system, a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality, or a differential based on any other factor other than sex. As such, summary judgment on this issue would be inappropriate.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court has reviewed the record, the law, and the memoranda submitted by the parties. The Court finds that the Defendant's motion for summary judgment must be denied as there are genuine issues of material fact which can only be resolved by a trial on the merits in the present case.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the defendant, Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans ("MCLNO"), be and the same is hereby DENIED.