Opinion
June Term, 1857.
It is no objection to the declarations of a slave, as to the state of its health, that it furnishes additional evidence of its truthfulness.
Therefore, where a female slave declared that she was affected with a prolapsus uteri, and offered to submit to an examination of a person, in verification of her statement, the latter part of the discourse forms no good ground of exception to the evidence.
ACTION of COVENANT for a breach of warranty, tried before DICK, Judge, at the last Spring Term, of Mecklenburg Superior Court.
The only question in this case was, whether the declaration of Mary, the slave, whose ill health was alleged as the breach of the covenant declared on, was admissible. The overseer proved, that more than once, the slave told him she had a falling of the womb, and in the last conversation, she added, that she would exhibit her person to prove what she stated. This latter part of the slave's statement was objected to, upon the ground, that nothing, besides the declarations as to the mere facts of the disease, were admissible, and declarations going to prove the truth of her statement, were improper. The testimony was excluded by his Honor, and the plaintiff excepted.
Verdict and judgment for the defendant. Appeal by the plaintiff.
Wilson, for plaintiff.
Osborne and Jones, for defendant.
That the declarations of a slave as to the state of his health at the time when they are made, are admissible in evidence, in a suit against a white man, is settled. See Roulhac v. White, 9 Ire. Rep. 63; Biles v. Holmes, 11 Ire. Rep. 19, and the cases therein referred to. This was not disputed on the trial in the present case, and the declarations of the girl, Mary, as to her bodily condition, on several occasions, when she abstained from field-labor, were admitted without objection. The testimony which was excepted to, seems to us, to have been of the same character, and ought to have been received. The only perceptible difference between it, and that which was admitted, is, that is furnished additional evidence of its truthfulness. Its tendency was to show that the woman was not feigning illness with the view to avoid the performance of her duty as a field-hand. It was calculated, therefore, to furnish the very means which would enable the jury to determine whether she was speaking the truth, or uttering false complaints of sickness. In such cases, "it must be left, (say the court in Biles v. Holmes,) to the good sense of the jury, connecting the declarations with the acts and looks of the party and other circumstances, to say how far such evidence is to be relied on." Here, the offer of the woman to subject herself to the examination of the overseer, at the very time when she declared that she was then laboring under a disease, was a circumstance well calculated to show that she was not uttering a falsehood. It was, indeed, a part of the declaration, and could not fairly be separated from it, and in excluding it, we think the presiding Judge committed an error. The judgment must be reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.
PER CURIAM. Judgment reversed.