Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-2656
November 25, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 3)
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by defendant C. Hunter King ("Judge King"). Plaintiff, Barbara Wallace ("Wallace"), opposes the motion. The motion, set for hearing on November 19, 2003, is before the Court on the briefs without oral argument:. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
Wallace was employed Judge King as the official court reporter of Division M of Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. Judge King terminated Wallace's employment effective October 2, 2001. Wallace alleges that Judge King used veiled threats of termination to coerce members or his court staff to sell tickets to his re-election fund raiser. Wallace also claims that Judge King ordered her to travel to Patterson, Louisiana en a personal errand for him during her work hours as a public employee. Wallace alleges that King terminated her employment when she refused to comply with his orders.
On October 4, 2001, Wallace complained in writing to the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana ("the Commission") about her termination. On November 6, 2001, the Commission sent Wallace a letter containing the following language:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your complaint of October 4, 2001. . . . Due to the mandatory confidentiality of our proceedings, we will be unable to provide you with additional information. You will be advised of the Judiciary Commission's resolution of this file in the future . . .
Please be advised that all documents filed with and evidence and proceedings before the Judiciary Commission are confidential pursuant to Rule XXIII, § 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, you are prohibited from discussing your complaint or any correspondence you receive from this office with anyone.
Complaint, Exh. A.
The Commission concluded its proceedings and released its official report in May 2003. Wallace asserts that the May 2003 report contained certain defamatory remarks by Judge King and that: she first had notice of those remarks when the Commission issued the report. On September 23, 2003, Wallace filed a complaint in this Court alleging a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of various constitutional rights, defamation, and other violations of state law. Original jurisdiction was based upon Wallace's federal claims under § 1983 and jurisdiction over the state claims was alleged to be proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a) (supplemental jurisdiction). Judge King now moves to dismiss those claims arguing that they are time-barred.
DISCUSSION
1. Judge King's Motion to Dismiss
Judge King argues that all of Wallace's claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations which began to run on the date Judge King terminated her employment — October 2, 2001. Because Wallace waited until September 23, 2003 to file suit, Judge King argues that all of Wallace claims are prescribed.
In opposition, Wallace argues that the doctrine of contra non valentem suspended prescription until the Commission released its report in May 2003. Wallace argues that the instructions contained in the Commission's November 6, 2001, letter and Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 23 operated to prevent her from filing suit on her claims. At the very least, she argues, that she reasonably and truly believed that she was prohibited from filing a complaint until the conclusion of the Commission's proceedings. Further, Wallace argues that the prescriptive period on her defamation claim did not begin to run until May 2003 when the Commission released its report. She argues that prior to chat date, she had no knowledge of Judge King's defamatory statements.
Supreme Court Rule XXIII, The Judiciary Commission, provides in pertinent part:
All documents filed with, and evidence and proceedings before the judiciary commission are confidential. The commission may provide documents, evidence and information from proceedings to the disciplinary board of the Louisiana State Bar Association in appropriate cases when approved by this court. In such cases, the confidentiality provisions of La. S. Ct. Rule XIX, Section 16A shall be maintained. The record filed by the commission with this court and proceedings before this court are not confidential.
La. Sup.Ct. R. XXIII, § 23(a).
In response, Judge King argues that Wallace was neither statutorily nor contractually obligated to resort to the Commission's complaint procedure and await its completion before filing suit on her own behalf. Judge King argues that the Louisiana Supreme Court rules merely prohibited Wallace from disclosing the fact that she had lodged a complaint with the Commission or from discussing the evidence she had provided. Judge King maintains that Wallace was free at all times to pursue her federally-created rights. 2. Law and Analysis
Federal courts borrow state statutes of limitation to govern claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 996 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1993)). The forum state's personal injury limitations period applies to claims brought under § 1983. Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Moore v. McDonald. 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1998)). In Louisiana, that period is one year. Id. (citing Elzy v. Roberson, 868 F.2d 793, 794 (5th Cir. 1989)); La. CIV. Code art. 3492. Consistent with the practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations for § 1983 claims, federal courts also look to state law for its tolling provisions. Burge, 996 F.2d at 788 (citing Hardin v. Staub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989); Jackson v. Johnson, 950 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Judge King terminated Wallace's employment on October 2, 2001. Wallace filed the instant complaint on September 23, 2003 — clearly more than one year after her allegedly unlawful termination. Thus, her § 1983 claims are time-barred unless some type of tolling applies to suspend the running of the statute of limitations. The Court must therefore determine whether Louisiana law would toll the one year prescriptive period while Wallace's ethics complaint was pending before the Commission.
Louisiana courts apply the doctrine of contra non valeniem to prevent the running of prescription in four distinct situations: 1) where there was some legal cause which prevented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting or. the plaintiff's action; (2) where there was some condition coupled with the contract or connected with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from suing or acting; (3) where the defendant has done some act effectually to prevent the plaintiff from availing himself of his cause of action; and (4) where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though his ignorance is not induced by the defendant. Whitnell v. Menville, 540 So.2d 304, 308 (La. 1939) (citing Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., 502 So.2d 1034 (La. 1987); Corsey v. State Dept. of Corrections, 375 So.2d 1319 (La. 1979)) The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that the first two categories are generally not applicable in "modern times." Id. (citing Corsey, 375 So.2d at 1321).
Wallace argues that the second contra non valentem category applies to her case because the Commission's confidentially rules prevented her from filing suit prior to May 23, 2003 — the day the Commission released its final report. She asserts that Rule XXIII, § 23 was a legal impediment which prevented her from pursuing her claims in court.
Neither party has cited, nor has the Court located, any authority addressing the implications that Rule XXIII's confidentiality provisions would have on pursuing civil remedies. The Rule's plain language, however, does not purport to preclude complainants from pursuing civil remedies. Nor does the Rule purport to require a complainant to seek action from the Commission prior to pursuing civil remedies. Thus/ Wallace was not required to administratively exhaust any claims before the Commission before pursuing her federal claims.
Rule XXIII clearly prevented Wallace from discussing the judiciary complaint itself with others and from disclosing her knowledge or involvement in the proceedings or anything she received from the Commission regarding the proceedings while the matter was pending. It does not follow, however, that this prohibition meant that Wallace was prevented from filing a civil lawsuit. The events giving rise to her cause of action took place completely outside of the Commission's proceedings and she therefore could have filed a civil complaint that disclosed nothing about the confidential proceedings pending before the Commission. In fact, Wallace's complaint in this Court alleges claims under federal law without referring to anything that took place before the Commission or any evidence obtained from the Commission. Pla. Comp. at ¶¶ 5, 17. Thus, the act of filing a civil lawsuit based upon events occurring wholly outside of the Commission is not inconsistent with Rule XXIII as long as the complaint is silent as to the Commission's proceedings. The pendency of proceedings before the Commission is simply not a fact upon which Wallace's federal claims are based.
Wallace's federal complaint does mention the proceeding before the Commission but only as a means of illustrating why her complaint is not facially time-barred. Pla. Comp. at ¶¶ 13-14.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the doctrine of contra non valentem does not apply to toll the one-year limitations period. Judge King terminated Wallace on October 2, 2001, and she filed her federal complaint on September 23, 2003, well over one year later. Her claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are therefore time-barred.
The Court expresses no opinion as to the timeliness or viability of Wallace's state law claims. Having dismissed all claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Wallace's state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3).
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 3) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by defendant C. Hunter King should be and is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff's state law claims which are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.