Opinion
CV 21-08885-RSWL-SKx
10-24-2022
SHAYNE WALLACE, Plaintiff, v. LOUIS DEJOY, POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, ET AL., Defendants.
ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION TO STRIKE [21], AND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE [21-1]
HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Shayne Wallace (“Plaintiff”) brought the instant Action against Defendant Louis DeJoy, the Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service (“Defendant”), alleging racial discrimination, gender discrimination, retaliation, harassment, disability discrimination, and failure to accommodate. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike [21] (“Motion”), and Request for Judicial Notice [21-1].
Having reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to this Motion, the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend, DENIES Defendant's Motion to Strike, and GRANTS Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Defendant hired Plaintiff to be a city carrier assistant in 2015. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 9, ECF No. 19. Prior to September 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed at least seven Equal Employment Opportunity complaints (“EEO complaints”) against her supervisor and Defendant. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges that her supervisor became aware of the EEO complaints and as a result, intentionally and purposely retaliated and harassed Plaintiff. Id.
Plaintiff references a now time-barred incident occurring in 2019, and states that subsequent to this incident, she “was again subjected to harassment, retaliation, and discrimination by Defendant.” Id. ¶ 12.
Plaintiff also asserts that “[d]uring this time period,” she suffered from a “medical condition/disability” that included “panic attacks, stress, and other symptoms,” and was placed on medical leave. Id. ¶ 14. Defendant required Plaintiff to submit medical leave documentation directly to her supervisor. Id. Plaintiff alleges she submitted medical leave documentation and that her supervisor stopped accepting the documentation, wrote her up, suspended her, attempted to terminate her, and forced her to return from medical leave against her provider's orders. Id.
Next, Plaintiff states that on several occasions, she requested Defendant reassign her to a different facility so she could avoid her supervisor, but Defendant failed to act. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff eventually requested a civil restraining order against her supervisor from the Los Angeles Superior Court. Id.
Plaintiff now alleges that she exhausted administrative remedies for her current claims but did not provide the date that she initiated Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) contact, nor the dates of the alleged misconduct. Id. ¶ 8. Defendant contends that Plaintiff initiated contact with the EEOC on July 7, 2020, so her allegations regarding incidents that occurred prior to May 23, 2020, are time-barred. Mot. 6:22-23, ECF No. 21 (citing Decl. of Haley 2:3-4, ECF No. 21-2).
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed her FAC [19] on July 29, 2022. Defendant filed the instant Motion [21] on August 12, 2022. Plaintiff opposed [22] the Motion on August 19, 2022. Defendant replied [23] on August 30, 2022.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
1. Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for dismissal of one or more claims if the pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). Dismissal is warranted for a “lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may generally consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice. Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007); see also White v. Mayflower Transit, LLC, 481 F.Supp.2d 1105, 1107 (C.D. Cal 2007), aff'd sub nom. White v. Mayflower Transit, L.L.C., 543 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2008). (“unless a court converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment, a court cannot consider material outside of the complaint (e.g., facts presented in briefs, affidavits, or discovery materials”).
A court must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Klarfeld v. United States, 944 F.2d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1991). “[T]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 184 (2005) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
2. Motion to Strike
Under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(f), the Court may, by motion or sua sponte, strike “an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter” from the pleadings. The purpose of 12(f) is “to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)). “Immaterial” matters have no bearing on the controversy. See Fantasy, 984 F.2d at 1527. “Motions to strike are generally disfavored.” Leghorn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 950 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Sapiro v. Encompass Ins., 221 F.R.D. 513, 518 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“Courts have long disfavored Rule 12(f) motions, granting them only when necessary to discourage parties from making completely tendentious or spurious allegations.”). “If there is any doubt as to whether the allegations might be an issue in the action, courts will deny the motion.” In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 114 F.Supp.2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters which the court may judicially notice. SEC v. Sands, 902 F.Supp. 1149, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1995). In addition, the Court must view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the pleading party. In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 114 F.Supp.2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000). As a result, motions to strike are infrequently granted. Freeman v. ABC Legal Servs., Inc., 877 F.Supp.2d 919, 923 (N.D. Cal. 2012). “[C]ourts frequently require the moving party to demonstrate prejudice before granting the requested relief, and ultimately whether to grant a motion to strike falls on the sound discretion of the district court.” Cook v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 19-2417 JVS (KLSx), 2021 WL 1502704, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
If a claim is stricken, leave to amend should be freely given when doing so would not prejudice the opposing party. Vogel v. Huntington Oaks Del. Partners, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 438, 440 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Wyshak v. City Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1979)).
B. Analysis
1. Judicial Notice
Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of the EEO Alternative Dispute Resolution Specialist Inquiry Report and the Letter of Acceptance for Investigation for Agency Case Number 4F-900-0247-20. See Def.'s Req. for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 21-1; Decl. of Marissa Haley, Exs. 1 and 2, ECF No. 21-2. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice “is an incomplete and partial representation of Plaintiff's EEO Complaint,” but fails to specify how it is partial or incomplete. Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. (“Opp'n.”) 2:23-26. Plaintiff also provides an EEO Complaint dated October 14, 2020, a Notice of Right to File Individual Complaint for Case Number 4F-900-0247-20, and an EEO Alternative Dispute Resolution Specialist's Inquiry Report for Case Number 4F-900-0247-20 (collectively, the “EEOC Charge”). See Decl. of Christopher Ellison (“Decl. of Ellison”), Exs. D and E, ECF No. 22-2.
A court may take judicial notice of "a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). Courts may also take judicial notice of administrative bodies' records and reports. Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1094 n.l (9th Cir. 2012). "This includes EEOC charges." Griggs v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., No. 2:20-CV-0724-KJM-JDP, 2021 WL 1614405, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2021); accord Lacayo v. Donahoe, No. 14-CV-04077-JSC, 2015 WL 993448, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015) (holding that in employment discrimination cases, "it is well established that courts may consider the administrative record of a plaintiff s claims before the EEOC as judicially noticeable matters of public record"); see also Dornell v. City of San Mateo, 19 F.Supp.3d 900, 904 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding judicial notice appropriate for EEOC charges as "public records whose accuracy is not in dispute"); Hellmann-Blumberg v. Univ. of Pac, No. 2:12-CV-00286-GEB, 2013 WL 1326469, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2013) (granting judicial notice of an EEOC right to sue letter and EEOC charge as "public records subject to judicial notice").
The Court takes judicial notice of the parties' proffered documents because they constitute EEOC records, reports, and documentation and therefore are judicially noticeable matters of public record. Thus, for the current Motion, the Court may consider the EEOC documents. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d at 763 (a court may consider matters properly subject to judicial notice when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion); Hellman-Blumberg, 2013 WL 1326469, at *4 (considering a plaintiff's factual statements and her EEOC Charge).
2. Motion to Dismiss
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's claims are untimely and asks the Court to instruct Plaintiff to provide dates of the alleged misconduct in the event that the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims with leave to amend. See generally Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 21. Plaintiff counters that she has only included untimely information to provide context, but fails to specify which allegations are to be used solely for context. See generally Opp'n. For the foregoing reasons, the Court declines to determine whether each of Plaintiff's allegations are timely, and instead DISMISSES Plaintiff's claims with leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff's claims arise under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act. Title VII prohibits employment practices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-16. The Rehabilitation Act adopted the rights, remedies, and procedures of Title VII and made them applicable to disabled persons. See 29 U.S.C. §794(a)(1). Accordingly, the same EEOC regulations apply to claims under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103(a).
Before filing Title VII and Rehabilitation Act complaints in federal court, federal employees must exhaust administrative remedies by consulting an EEO counselor within forty-five days of the allegedly unlawful conduct. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a); Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 2001); Cherosky v. Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2003). “Failure to comply with this regulation is ‘fatal' to . . . a claim.” Cherosky, 330 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1105 (9th Cir. 2002)).
The Court can only assess claims that (1) were alleged in the EEOC Charge and accepted for investigation, (2) are reasonably related to the allegations in the EEOC Charge, or (3) fall within an investigation that can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charges. Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 708 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies for several allegations in her Complaint. See FAC ¶¶ 11-12; Opp'n. 6:3-4. In fact, Plaintiff already filed a claim pertaining to those allegations, and the Honorable Dean D. Pregerson of the United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the claim with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Decl. of Ellison, Ex. A, ECF No. 22-2. Plaintiff still pled those incidents in this Action, though she later conceded that “some of the alleged harassing conduct occurred outside of the statutory time period.” FAC ¶¶ 10-13; Opp'n. 6:3-4. Accordingly, these prior incidents are not actionable, and the Court's discussion centers on her remaining allegations.
Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to only four discrete events that the EEOC accepted for investigation. Decl. of Ellison, Ex. E, at 00011. Plaintiff's allegations that are not clearly time-barred will only be deemed timely if they fall within these four discrete events, relate to the events, or are reasonably likely to be discovered in an investigation of these events. Regardless of whether Plaintiff's allegations fall within, relate to, or would be discovered in an investigation of these events, she still has not pled plausible claims for relief. The Court therefore declines to address whether Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to her current allegations. The Court addresses Plaintiff's claims in turn.
a. Title VII Claims
i. Claims One and Two: Racial and Gender Discrimination
To establish a prima facie disparate treatment case, plaintiffs must offer evidence “(1) that they [belong to] a protected class; (2) that they were qualified for their positions and perform[ed] their jobs satisfactorily; (3) that they experienced adverse employment actions; and (4) that ‘similarly situated individuals outside [their] protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.'” Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004)). Each “adverse employment action[]” must be adequately supported by “specific factual support.” Mohsin v. California Dep't of Water Res., 52 F.Supp.3d 1006, 1013-14 (E.D. Cal. 2014). A plaintiff can use either direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent to satisfy their prima facie burden. Godwin, 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998).
Importantly, a plaintiff is not required to plead a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss. Sheppard v. David Evans & Assoc., 694 F.3d 1045, 1050 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012). Instead, courts look to the elements of the prima facie case to decide, in light of judicial experience and common sense, whether the challenged complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See id.
Here, the Court finds Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to establish plausible discrimination claims because her only possibly timely allegations lack specific factual support. Plaintiff states that after September 2019, she was subjected to “harassment, retaliation and discrimination by Defendant.” Id. ¶ 13. She also alleges that after her supervisor became aware of the EEO complaints she filed prior to September 19, 2019, her supervisor became “more aggressive, harassing, hostile, and retaliatory towards Plaintiff.” Id. But Plaintiff “must plead factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw a reasonable inference that the [D]efendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Mohsin, 52 F.Supp.3d at 1013-14; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions'” or “‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement'” fails to state a claim) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57). And here, Plaintiff's conclusory contentions are inadequate to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). See Mohsin, 52 F.Supp.3d at 1013-14 (finding bare allegations of defendant “retaliating” and “refusing to provide” reasonable accommodations insufficient to state a claim).
ii. Claim Three: Retaliation
To establish a prima facie retaliation claim, federal employees must show (1) they engaged in protected activity; (2) their employer subjected them to an adverse employment action; (3) and a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). The EEOC interprets adverse employment action as any adverse treatment based on a retaliatory motive reasonably likely to deter the party or others from engaging in protected activity; accordingly, the Ninth Circuit defines adverse employment action broadly. Id. at 1240, 1243.
Here, Plaintiff has not pled a plausible Title VII retaliation claim. Plaintiff alleges that after her supervisor learned of Plaintiff's EEO complaints, she became “more aggressive, harassing, hostile, and retaliatory towards Plaintiff” and “intentionally and purposely retaliated and harassed Plaintiff due to the filing” of the EEO complaints without specifying what actions constitute retaliation. FAC ¶ 13. Just as with Plaintiff's discriminations claims, here, Plaintiff's assertions are unsupported by specific facts and therefore do not state a plausible claim. See Mohsin, 52 F.Supp.3d at 1013-14 (finding the plaintiff did not plead a plausible claim where she asserted only that defendant was “retaliating” against her without providing factual support).
iii. Claim Four: Harassment
To establish a prima facie Title VII claim for harassment resulting in a hostile work environment, federal employees must allege that (1) they were subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a racial or sexual nature because of their identity in a protected category, (2) the conduct was unwelcome, and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment. Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003); Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 2, 2004).
Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible harassment claim. Once again, Plaintiff's only potentially timely allegations are conclusory and without factual support. Indeed, Plaintiff makes the same bare allegations of harassment, discrimination, aggression, hostility, and retaliation without identifying specific facts. FAC ¶¶ 12-13. Thus, Plaintiff's allegations do not amount to a plausible harassment claim.
b. Rehabilitation Act Claims
i. Claim Five: Failure to Accommodate Disability
In determining whether an employee has stated a claim for failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act, courts look to the “substantive standards of liability under the ADA.” Blanchard v. LaHood, 2010 WL 11508016, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2010), aff'd, 461 Fed.Appx. 542 (9th Cir. 2011). A prima facie case of failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act requires a plaintiff to establish that: (1) she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the employer had notice of her disability; (3) she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her job; and (4) despite its knowledge of her disability, the employer did not offer reasonable accommodations. See id. If “an employee requests accommodation[,] . . . the employer must engage in an interactive process to find a reasonable accommodation.” Id.
Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible failure to accommodate claim. The ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). “Major life activities” include “working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B). Plaintiff alleges she suffered “panic attacks, stress, and other symptoms” and that her medical provider placed her “on medical leave.” FAC ¶ 14. She also asserts that her supervisor “caused [her] the panic attacks and stress.” Id. Moreover, it appears the accommodations she requested were additional medical leave and reassignment to a different facility to “avoid and prevent the unlawful actions of her supervisor.” Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
But Plaintiff does not plead that her “panic attacks, stress, and other symptoms” substantially limit her major life activities. Instead, she makes conclusory statements lacking factual support. Indeed, she contends that “[a]s a result of [her] disability, [she] was unable to perform the essential functions of her job position without reasonable accommodation” without specifying facts to support this claim. Id. ¶ 44. And to the extent that she is insinuating that she is prevented from working under her supervisor but could work in another facility under a different supervisor, she still fails to show substantial impairment. See Potter v. Xerox Corp., 1 Fed.Appx. 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that an employee who was prevented from working under his supervisor due to his depression, anxiety, and panic attacks was not substantially impaired in his ability to engage in major life activity of working and thus was not “disabled.”). Thus, Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim for failure to accommodate.
ii. Claim Six: Disability Discrimination
The Rehabilitation Act provides that “no otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). To establish discrimination on the basis of disability, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is disabled under the Act; (2) she is otherwise qualified; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. See Snead v. Metro Prop. & Cas. Ins., 237 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff fails to establish that she suffered an adverse employment action due to her alleged disability. Plaintiff states that she was “was subject to adverse employment actions and treated less favorably than those similarly situated employees who were not part of [P]laintiff's protected class.” FAC ¶ 50. But Plaintiff fails to provide facts supporting her statement and has not shown that any adverse employment actions she may have experienced occurred due to her alleged disability. Plaintiff instead asserts that she was subject to harassment and retaliation due to her EEOC complaints. Id. ¶ 13. She also states that she was “subjected to harassment, retaliation and discrimination by Defendant," but does not claim Defendant's conduct was motivated by discriminatory intent related to her alleged disability. Id. 5 12. Finally, Plaintiff contends that "Defendant refused to provide [reasonable] accommodation[s]," but this assertion does not show that Defendant denied accommodations due to animus toward Plaintiff s alleged disability. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief on her disability discrimination claim.
3. Leave to Amend
"Where a motion to dismiss is granted, a district court must decide whether to grant leave to amend." Winebarger v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 411 F.Supp.3d 1070, 1082 (CD. Cal. 2019). "The court should give leave [to amend] freely when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). In the Ninth Circuit, "Rule 15's policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with extreme liberality.'" United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981). Against this extremely liberal standard, the Court may consider "the presence of any of four factors: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and/or futility." Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, leave to amend Plaintiff s claims should be granted because Plaintiff can cure her claims by pleading specific facts supporting her claims. There is no evidence of bad faith or undue delay by Plaintiff, nor potential prejudice to Defendant by allowing amendment. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claims with leave to amend.
4. Motion to Strike
Under Rule 12(f), a court may strike “immaterial” matter that has no bearing on the controversy. See Fantasy, 984 F.2d at 1527. However, “[i]f there is any doubt as to whether the allegations might be an issue in the action, courts will deny the motion.” 2TheMart.com, 114 F.Supp.2d at 965.
Here, Defendant requested the Court strike allegations of the September 2019 incidents as time-barred and Defendant's failure to accommodate Plaintiff's reassignment requests for not appearing in the EEO investigation. Mot. 6:25-7:8; see also FAC ¶¶ 11-12, 15. However, prior acts can constitute background evidence or “circumstances [that] give rise to an inference of discrimination” for disparate treatment claims. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The Court should not determine that there is “no doubt” as to whether either will impact the amended Action. Therefore, the Court DENIES the motion to strike.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Claim with leave to amend, DENIES Defendant's Motion to Strike, and GRANTS Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by no later than November 20, 2022.
IT IS SO ORDERED.