2. "`Before a statute can be attacked by anyone on the ground of its unconstitutionality, he must show that its enforcement is an infringement upon his right of person or property, and that such infringement results from the unconstitutional feature of the statute upon which he bases his attack. Reid v. Mayor c. of Eatonton, 80 Ga. 755 ( 6 S.E. 602); Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686 ( 30 S.E. 759, 42 LRA 181); Wallace v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 749 ( 38 S.E.2d 596); Villyard v. Regents of University System of Ga., 204 Ga. 517 ( 50 S.E.2d 313); West v. Housing Authority of Atlanta, 211 Ga. 133, 136 ( 84 S.E.2d 30); Southern R. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524, 534 ( 30 S.C. 594, 54 LE 868); Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 ( 34 S.C. 359, 58 LE 713). He must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature of the statute injures him, and so operates as to deprive him of rights protected by the Constitution of this State or by the Constitution of the United States, or by both. Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588 ( 110 S.E. 726, 20 ALR 1105); Harrell v. Cane Growers Co-op Assn., 160 Ga. 30, 72 ( 126 S.E. 531); 19 RCL 109; and Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Missouri, 238 U.S. 41, 54 ( 35 S.C. 671, 59 LE 1192), in which the Supreme Court of the United States held: "As has been often pointed out, one who seeks to set aside a state statute as repugnant to the Federal Constitution must show that he is within the class with respect t
"Before a statute can be attacked by anyone on the ground of its unconstitutionality, he must show that its enforcement is an infringement upon his right of person or property, and that such infringement results from the unconstitutional feature of the statute upon which he bases his attack. Reid v. Mayor c. of Eatonton, 80 Ga. 755 ( 6 S.E. 602); Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686 ( 30 S.E. 759, 42 LRA 181); Wallace v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 749 ( 38 S.E.2d 596); Villyard v. Regents of University System of Ga., 204 Ga. 517 ( 50 S.E.2d 313); West v. Housing Authority of Atlanta, 211 Ga. 133, 136 ( 84 S.E.2d 30); Southern R. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524, 534 ( 30 S.C. 594, 54 LE 868); Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 ( 34 S.C. 359, 58 LE 713). He must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature of the statute injures him, and so operates as to deprive him of rights protected by the Constitution of this State or by the Constitution of the United States, or by both. Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588 ( 110 S.E. 726, 20 ALR 1105); Harrell v. Cane Growers Co-op Assn., 160 Ga. 30, 72 ( 126 S.E. 531); 19 RCL 109; and Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Missouri, 238 U.S. 41, 54 ( 35 S.C. 671, 59 LE 1192), in which the Supreme Court of the United States held: `As has been often pointed out, one who seeks to set aside a state statute as repugnant to the Federal Constitution must show that he is within the class with respect t
The appeals are from this judgment and the order overruling defendants' motion to dismiss Count 2 of the complaints. 1. "Before a statute can be attacked by anyone on the ground of its unconstitutionality, he must show that its enforcement is an infringement upon his right of person or property... Reid v. Mayor c. of Eatonton, 80 Ga. 755 ( 6 S.E. 602); Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686 ( 30 S.E. 759, 42 LRA 181); Wallace v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 749 ( 38 S.E.2d 596); Villyard v. Regents of University System of Ga., 204 Ga. 517 ( 50 S.E.2d 313); West v. Housing Authority of Atlanta, 211 Ga. 133, 136 ( 84 S.E.2d 30); Southern R. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524, 534 ( 30 S.C. 594, 54 LE 868); Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 ( 34 S.C. 359, 58 LE 713)." South Ga. Natural Gas Co. v. Ga. Public Service Commission, 214 Ga. 174 (1) ( 104 S.E.2d 97); Crumley v. Head, 225 Ga. 246 (3) ( 167 S.E.2d 651). "As has been often pointed out, one who seeks to set aside a state statute as repugnant to the Federal Constitution must show that he is within the class with respect to whom the act is unconstitutional, and that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him.
"Before a statute can be attacked by anyone on the ground of its unconstitutionality, he must show that its enforcement is an infringement upon his right of person or property, and that such infringement results from the unconstitutional feature of the statute upon which he bases his attack. Reid v. Mayor c. of Eatonton, 80 Ga. 755 ( 6 S.E. 602); Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686 ( 30 S.E. 759, 42 LRA 181); Wallace v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 749 ( 38 S.E.2d 596); Villyard v. Regents of University System of Ga., 204 Ga. 517 ( 50 S.E.2d 313); West v. Housing Authority of Atlanta, 211 Ga. 133, 136 ( 84 S.E.2d 30); Southern R. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524, 534 ( 30 S.C. 594, 54 LE 868); Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 ( 34 S.C. 359, 58 LE 713). He must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature of the statute injures him, and so operates as to deprive him of rights protected by the Constitution of this State or by the Constitution of the United States, or by both." South Ga. Natural Gas. Co. v. Ga. Public Service Commission, 214 Ga. 174 ( 104 S.E.2d 97).
Since, therefore, it does not appear that plaintiffs will be hurt by the act complained of, they cannot complain. Wallace v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 749 ( 38 S.E.2d 596). As to plaintiffs' allegation of injury to business and property rights, the question here being one of privilege rather than of right, the revocation of the privilege can raise no question of deprivation of or injury to property.
1. Before a statute can be attacked by anyone on the ground of its unconstitutionality, he must show that its enforcement is an infringement upon his right of person or property, and that such infringement results from the unconstitutional feature of the statute upon which he bases his attack. Reid v. Mayor c. of Eatonton, 80 Ga. 755 ( 6 S.E. 602); Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686 ( 30 S.E. 759, 42 L.R.A. 181); Wallace v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 749 ( 38 S.E.2d 596); Villyard v. Regents of University System of Ga., 204 Ga. 517 ( 50 S.E.2d 313); West v. Housing Authority of Atlanta, 211 Ga. 133, 136 ( 84 S.E.2d 30); Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524, 534 ( 30 Sup. Ct. 594, 54 L. ed. 868); Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 ( 34 Sup. Ct. 359, 58 L. ed. 713). He must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature of the statute injures him, and so operates as to deprive him of rights protected by the Constitution of this State or by the Constitution of the United States, or by both. Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588 ( 110 S.E. 726, 20 A.L.R. 1105); Harrell v. Cane Growers Co-op Assn., 160 Ga. 30, 72 ( 126 S.E. 531); 19 R. C. L. 109; and Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Missouri, 238 U.S. 41, 54 ( 35 Sup. Ct. 671, 59 L. ed. 1192), in which the Supreme Court of the United States held: "As has been often pointed out, one who seeks to set aside a state statute as repugnant to the Federal Constitution must show that he i
2. The petition does not set out any grounds for injunctive relief because it does not show any present injury or such action by the defendant newspaper company as would result in injury. See Wallace v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 749 ( 38 S.E.2d 596). The petition simply alleges that, unless enjoined, "said ad may be repeated not only on Nov. 7, 1955, but on future dates." It is nowhere alleged that the newspaper company has even threatened or planned to publish again said advertisement, or any fact from which the plaintiff could reasonably apprehend that the defendant newspaper might do any act which would result in injury to the plaintiff or her property.
( a) The defendants' threatened act to prevent use of the street by force, which they have not followed up by any overt act, being a mere apprehension of injury to property or property rights, will not authorize the grant of an injunction. Wallace v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 749 ( 38 S.E.2d 596); City of Brunswick v. Anderson, 204 Ga. 515 (3) ( 50 S.E.2d 337), and citations; Nottingham v. Elliott, 209 Ga. 481 ( 74 S.E.2d 93). In Nottingham's case, supra, which involved a controversy respecting the boundary line between adjacent tracts of land, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had threatened to shoot his agent if he entered upon the land in dispute for the purpose of cutting timber; and that the plaintiff had recently moved a sawmill on the disputed boundary, but had moved it off because of the defendant's threats of violence.
Standard Cigar Co. v. Doyal, 175 Ga. 857 ( 166 S.E. 434). See also Wallace v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 749 ( 38 S.E.2d 596), and Messenheimer v. Windt, 211 Ga. 575 ( 87 S.E.2d 402), and citations. 3. The power of the City of Moultrie to extend its water system beyond its corporate limits and to serve customers outside of the city was originally granted by the legislature in 1931 (Ga. L. 1931, p. 908).
Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686 (2) ( 30 S.E. 759, 42 L.R.A. 181). See also Stegall v. Southwest Ga. Regional Housing Authority, 197 Ga. 571 ( 30 S.E.2d 196); Wallace v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 749 ( 38 S.E.2d 596). The petitioners not being in position to attack these various acts of the legislature, it is unnecessary for us to pass upon their validity. 2. It is asserted that the increased water rates under the ordinance adopted in 1954, whereby the rates on nonresident users were increased by 38% and the rates on residents of the city were increased only 9%, were invalid, because the ordinance violates the due-process and equal-protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions (Code, Ann., §§ 2-102, 2-103), in that it unreasonably discriminates against the petitioners and amounts to the taking of their property without due process of law, and further violates the rights, privileges, and immunities provided by the Georgia Constitution by art. 1, see. 1, par. 25 (Code, Ann., § 2-125), as well as art. 7, see. 7, par. 5 of that Constitution (Code, Ann., § 2-6005), because a majority of the registered voters in the City of Macon have not been allowed or permitted to vote