ee also Solazzo v. New York City Tr. Auth., 6 N.Y.3d 734, 735, 810 N.Y.S.2d 121, 843 N.E.2d 748;Barresi v. Putnam Hosp. Ctr., 71 A.D.3d 811, 812, 897 N.Y.S.2d 182). On a motion for summary judgment, the question of whether a reasonable time has elapsed may be decided as a matter of law by the court, based upon the circumstances of the case ( see Valentine v. City of New York, 57 N.Y.2d 932, 933–934, 457 N.Y.S.2d 240, 443 N.E.2d 488). In support of its motion, the Medical Center established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that it did not have a reasonable opportunity after a snow storm ended to correct the hazard which allegedly caused the plaintiff's accident ( see Lanos v. Cronheim, 77 A.D.3d 631, 632–633, 909 N.Y.S.2d 101;Barresi v. Putnam Hosp. Ctr., 71 A.D.3d at 812, 897 N.Y.S.2d 182;Russo v. 40 Garden St. Partners, 6 A.D.3d 420, 421, 775 N.Y.S.2d 327;Fuks v. New York City Tr. Auth., 243 A.D.2d 678, 663 N.Y.S.2d 639;Wall v. Village of Mineola, 237 A.D.2d 511, 656 N.Y.S.2d 883). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

On a motion for summary judgment, the question of whether a reasonable time has elapsed may be decided as a matter of law by the court, based upon the circumstances of the case ( see Valentine v City of New York, 57 NY2d 932). In support of their motion for summary judgment, the movants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that they did not have a reasonable opportunity after the snowfall ended to correct the hazard which allegedly caused the plaintiffs fall ( see Barresi v Putnam Hosp. Ctr., 71 AD3d 811, 812; Sfakianos v Big Six Towers, Inc., 46 AD3d 665; Russo v 40 Garden St. Partners, 6 AD3d 420, 421; Whitt v St. John's Episcopal Hosp., 258 AD2d 648; Fuks v New York City Tr. Auth., 243 AD2d 678; Wall v Village of Minenla, 237 AD2d 511; Drake v Prudential Ins. Co., 153 AD2d 924). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

"A property owner will not be held liable for accidents occurring on its property as a result of the accumulation of snow and/or ice until a reasonable period of time has passed, following the cessation of the storm, within which the owner has the opportunity to ameliorate the hazards caused by the storm" ( Sfakianos v Big Six Towers, Inc., 46 AD3d 665, 665). Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that it did not have a reasonable opportunity after the snowfall ended to correct the hazard which allegedly caused the plaintiffs fall ( see Russo v 40 Garden St. Partners, 6 AD3d 420, 421; Fuks v New York City Tr. Auth., 243 AD2d 678, 678; Wall v Village of Mineola, 237 AD2d 511, 512). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, the appellants submitted the affidavit of a meteorologist establishing that the storm that created the condition which allegedly caused the injured plaintiff to fall ceased 50 minutes before she fell. The appellants thereby demonstrated their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law ( see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853), by showing that they did not have a reasonable opportunity after the precipitation ended to take protective measures ( see Whitt v. St. John's Episcopal Hosp., 258 A.D.2d 648; Fuks v. New York City Tr. Auth., 243 A.D.2d 678; Wall v. Village of Mineola, 237 A.D.2d 511, 512). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

The accident occurred at around 8:45 PM in a portion of the parking lot that had been plowed earlier that day by the defendant City of Poughkeepsie. It is well settled that the defendants cannot be held liable in negligence for a naturallyoccurring icy condition in the parking lot "unless a reasonable amount of time [had] elapsed, subsequent to the cessation of the storm, for taking protective measures" ( Chapman v. City of New York, 268 A.D.2d 498; see also Dowden v. Long Is. R.R., 305 A.D.2d 631). Under the circumstances of this case, there was insufficient time, as a matter of law, to impose liability on any of the defendants for failing to clear the parking lot of naturally-occurring snow and ice ( see Wines v. City of New York, 283 A.D.2d 639; Whitt v. St. John's Episcopal Hosp., 258 A.D.2d 648; Drevis v. City of New York, 257 A.D.2d 595; Fuks v. New York City Tr. Auth., 243 A.D.2d 678; Wall v. Village of Mineola, 237 A.D.2d 511). The plaintiffs' further contention that the City of Poughkeepsie, by undertaking to remove the snow in the parking lot, either negligently created the hazardous condition or exacerbated the naturally hazardous condition created by the storm, is not supported by any evidence other than their own speculation, which was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Joseph v. Danice Stores of Nostrand Ave., 290 A.D.2d 536; Grau v. Taxter Park Assocs., 283 A.D.2d 551; Gibbs v. Rochdale Vil., 282 A.D.2d 706).

In her complaint and bill of particulars the plaintiff alleged that her fall occurred on March 19, 1994, a day following a snowstorm, and that the defendants were negligent in failing to clear the accumulated snow from their property. The defendant Avon Green, Inc. (hereinafter Avon), the owner of the property, and the defendant Darcey Associates (hereinafter Darcey), the property manager, moved for summary judgment, contending that they were not negligent because the accident actually occurred on March 18, 1994, while the snowstorm was still in progress, and therefore, liability could not attach for any failure to clear the snow (see generally, Smith v. Leslie, 270 A.D.2d 333; Wall v. Village of Mineola, 237 A.D.2d 511). The Supreme Court properly denied their motion. Although Avon and Darcey submitted evidence that called into question the accuracy of the plaintiff's recollection regarding the date of her accident, that evidence was insufficient to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the accident occurred on March 18, 1994.

Both reported significant precipitation on March 12. Cejka opined that, based upon the data he reviewed, the snow storm was still in progress at the time of plaintiff's fall. "It is well settled that a party in possession or control of real property has a reasonable time after the cessation of a storm to take corrective action to remedy hazardous snow and ice-related conditions created by the storm" ( Ruck v. ISS Intl. Serv. Sys., 236 A.D.2d 702; see also, Dunn v. 726 Main Pine, 255 A.D.2d 981; Williams v. Scruggs Community Health Care Ctr., 255 A.D.2d 982; Fuks v. New York City Tr. Auth., 243 A.D.2d 678; Wall v. Village of Mineola, 237 A.D.2d 511, 512). In my view, defendant submitted sufficient proof to establish that a winter storm was in progress at the time of plaintiff's fall.

The plaintiff claims that she slipped on old ice from a previous snowstorm. A party in control of real property may be held liable for a hazardous condition created on its premises because of the accumulation of snow or ice only if it had a reasonably sufficient time from the cessation of the precipitation to remedy the condition ( see, Simmons v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 N.Y.2d 972; Mangieri v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 251 A.D.2d 632; Wall v. Village of Mineola, 237 A.D.2d 511). A defendant cannot be held liable for an injury caused by a storm which was in progress at the time of the injury. Based upon the record, there is simply no proof that ice from a prior storm remained in the particular area where the plaintiff fell at the time of the accident or that old ice caused her fall ( cf., Granato v. Bella Vista Group Assocs., 239 A.D.2d 781). As it would be pure speculation that preexisting ice caused the plaintiff's fall, it was error to deny the defendant's motion.

As an abutting landowner, DeLucia could not be held liable for the failure to remove snow or ice from a public sidewalk based upon a violation of Administrative Code of the City of New York § 16-123, which does not explicitly impose liability for personal injuries ( see, Norcott v. Central Iron Metal Scraps, 214 A.D.2d 660; see also, Roark v. Hunting, 24 N.Y.2d 470; Gohn v. Hoffman, 248 A.D.2d 435; Conlon v. Village of Pleasantville, 146 A.D.2d 736). The Supreme Court also correctly granted the City's motion for summary judgment because, as a matter of law, the City did not have a reasonable time to clear the snow and/or ice from the area where the plaintiff fell ( see, Valentine v. City of New York, 86 A.D.2d 381, affd 57 N.Y.2d 932; see, Walker v. City of New York, 251 A.D.2d 653; Wall v. Village of Mineola, 237 A.D.2d 511).

An employee of the defendant testified that it was the defendant's policy to shovel a path on the platform at least five feet from the edge of the platform and that on the day of the accident such a path had actually been shoveled across the whole length of the platform. A property owner may not be held liable for snowy or icy conditions unless it has actual notice of the condition or it has had a reasonably sufficient time from the cessation of the precipitation to remedy the conditions caused by it ( see, Simmons v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 N.Y.2d 972, 973; Bernstein v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 1020; Valentine v. City of New York, 57 N.Y.2d 932; Fuks v. New York City Tr. Auth., 243 A.D.2d 678; Wall v. Village of Mineola, 237 A.D.2d 511; Grillo v. New York City Tr. Auth., 214 A.D.2d 648). There exist triable issues of fact, inter alia, as to whether the ice upon which the plaintiff had fallen was the residue of the snow storm which occurred six days prior to the accident and whether the defendant had sufficient time to remedy the situation ( see, Pui Fong Tam v. City of New York, 257 A.D.2d 613; Ferguson v. City of New York, 201 A.D.2d 422; Krause v. City of New York, 152 A.D.2d 473). S. Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Friedmann, Luciano and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.