Wall v. C S Bank of Houston County.Wall v. C S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216-217(1) ( 274 S.E.2d 486) (1981). Because the sellers had an election as to acceleration, the entire indebtedness did not ipso facto become due upon the buyers' default.

The Connells first contend under authority of Quakenbush v. Quakenbush, 230 Ga. 649, 651 (4) ( 198 S.E.2d 851) (1973), and Fried v. Fried, 208 Ga. 861 ( 69 S.E.2d 862) (1952), that the trial court was without authority to modify the jury verdict so as to eliminate substantial findings in their favor. Next, they contend the court erred procedurally in that the court entered, in effect, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict although no proper motion for directed verdict had been made, no motion jnov was pending, and judgment had not been entered on the verdict. They cite Code Ann. § 81A-150, Wall v. C. S. Bank, 153 Ga. App. 29, 30 (2) ( 264 S.E.2d 523) (1980), affirmed, 247 Ga. 216 ( 274 S.E.2d 486) (1981), and Gleaton v. City of Atlanta, 131 Ga. App. 399 ( 206 S.E.2d 46) (1974). Mrs. Long argues that none of the foregoing contentions has any merit because the suit was in equity and the jury's findings on the specific questions or interrogatories addressed by the court to the jury were merely advisory and could be ignored by the court.

See generally id. The Heads also cite Wall v. C. & S. Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216, 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981), for the proposition that, "[w]hen a lender elects acceleration," both "the statute of limitations and the reversionary period begin[ ] to run upon such acceleration." But the decision in Wall — an action to recover on a promissory note — says no such thing.

The statute of limitation for simple contracts is six years under OCGA § 9-3-24, and it begins to run upon acceleration if a note is accelerated. See Wall v. C S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 (1) ( 274 SE2d 486) (1981). Gilliam is a named defendant but has not been served.

In Connell v. Long, 248 Ga. 716, 718 (1), 719, supra, those appellants complained that the trial court was without authority to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict prior to entry of a judgment on a jury's verdict and the Supreme Court held that "the trial court should not in effect have entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on [a] legal claim [that was properly resolved by a jury] prior to entry of judgment on the verdict. [ Wall v. C S Bank of Houston County, 153 Ga. App. 29, 30 (2) ( 264 S.E.2d 523), affirmed 247 Ga. 216 ( 274 S.E.2d 486)]." Connell v. Long, 248 Ga. 716, 718 (1), 719, supra.

Camp v. Jordan, 168 Ga. App. 339 ( 309 S.E.2d 384); Siegel v. Gen. Parts Corp., 165 Ga. App. 339, 340 (2) ( 301 S.E.2d 292); Attwell v. Heritage Bank Mt. Pleasant, 161 Ga. App. 193, 194 ( 291 S.E.2d 28); Harris v. Clark, 157 Ga. App. 549 (2) ( 278 S.E.2d 132). "The affidavit, deposition and oral testimony provisions of [OCGA § 9-11-43 (b)], pertaining to the hearing of motions based on facts not appearing of record, cannot be used to cure the absence of a transcript of proceedings for post-trial motions or for appellate review." Wall v. C S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216, 217 (2) ( 274 S.E.2d 486). We also note that there has apparently been no attempt by appellant to provide a transcript by any of the methods provided by OCGA § 5-6-41.

It was thus not error to deny the motion for judgment n.o.v. or for new trial on that ground. Wall v. C S Bank, 153 Ga. App. 29 (1), (2) (3) ( 264 S.E.2d 523) (1980), affirmed 247 Ga. 216 ( 274 S.E.2d 486) (1981); Georgia Kraft Co. v. Laborer's Intl. Union, 170 Ga. App. 581, 587 (5) ( 317 S.E.2d 602) (1984); Harrison, supra; Joiner, supra. A motion for new trial which is invalid as the procedurally improper vehicle for securing review, and not merely due to its prematurity, does not extend the time for filing the notice of appeal.

When this occurs, most jurisdictions rule that the statute of limitations runs as to future installments from the date the creditor exercises the acceleration clause. See Dos Cabezas Corp. (action for future installments accrues when their due date accelerated); Central Home Trust (statute commences on installments not yet due when holder exercises right to accelerate); Wall v. Citizens Southern Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216, 274 S.E.2d 486, 487 (1981) (statute runs from date of acceleration rather than date of last installment); Templeton (action for unmatured installments accrues when creditor takes advantage of acceleration clause). The interplay of these two rules is summarized as follows in 54 C.J.S. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS § 153 (1987):