Opinion
1:00CV00960
January 22, 2002
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that on two occasions while he was held in pretrial detention at the Richmond County Jail, privileged mail from the North Carolina Industrial Commission was improperly opened outside his presence. He claims that on the first of these occasions, June 16, 2000, a calender which had been enclosed in the mailing was not given to him. He states that this caused him to miss a hearing in front of the Industrial Commission and that this resulted in his case being dismissed. Plaintiff contends that the improper openings are part of a regular pattern of such incidents at the Richmond County Jail and asks that defendants be enjoined from opening plaintiff's privileged mail outside his presence in the future and allow plaintiff to receive his privileged mail. He also seeks compensatory damages for emotional injuries resulting from having his privileged mail opened and his Industrial Commission case dismissed. Finally, he seeks punitive damages.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment as to all of plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff has responded to that motion. Plaintiff has also filed a motion for partial summary judgment, a motion for appointment of counsel, and a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. All of these motions are ready for decision. However, because the outcome of defendants' motion for summary judgment controls the outcome of the other motions, the Court will address that motion first.
When confronted with a motion for summary judgment defendants, a plaintiff must make a sufficient showing with respect to each essential element of his case for which he bears a burden at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.s. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). He may not rely on mere allegations in his pleadings but must set forth specific facts within his personal knowledge. Kipps v. Ewell, 538 F.2d 564 (4th Cir. 1976). This response must be specific and based on more than mere allegations of error or the falsity of defendants' affidavits. Bloodgood v. Garraghty, 783 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff must show that there are issues of genuine material facts and he must produce evidence to support his contentions. A mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient. Rather, there must be enough evidence for a jury to render a verdict in his favor. A few isolated disputed facts are not sufficient.Sibley v. Lutheran Hosp. of Maryland, Inc., 871 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1989)
Here, plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because, if for no other reason, he requests relief that cannot be granted. Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief is most easily disposed of because, even if a violation occurred, plaintiff is no longer housed in the Richmond County Jail. Having been convicted of his fifth violent crime, this time a murder, he is now in custody in Raleigh, North Carolina, pursuant to a judgment sentencing him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Therefore, his return to the Rockingham County Jail appears to be extremely unlikely. Plaintiff cannot show that the violations he alleges will occur again in the future and his claim for injunctive relief is moot.
Likewise, plaintiff's claims for emotional damages also fail because they are barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Under the PLRA, prisoners such as plaintiff cannot sue for emotional damages without first showing physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e).Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 596-97, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 1596, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998). Petitioner has not even alleged such an injury here. Therefore, his emotional damage claims are barred.
Finally, plaintiff requests punitive damages. Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages absent proof of either an evil motive or intent or a reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights by defendants. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). Here, plaintiff has not even alleged any evil motive or intent on the part of defendants. As for a reckless or callous disregard, he has alleged that his privileged mail had been opened in the past, that he had complained about this, and that it occurred again. However, all of his allegations in this regard are conclusory and unsupported. He has not produced proof of any widespread abuse which would rise to the level of reckless disregard for his rights. Plaintiff has not even shown that the mail from the Industrial Commission was marked so that defendants could have known that it was privileged. As for the alleged loss of the calender, he has not shown that, if this occurred, it was more than mere negligence. Overall, plaintiff has either not alleged or not produced evidence of any conduct which would justify punitive damages. Because he has requested forms of relief which are either unnecessary at this time, barred, or unjustified, he has asked for relief which cannot be granted and his claims should be dismissed.
In fact, he has not shown that it was privileged. So far as is shown by the pleadings, the mail contained items such as calenders and decisions which are ordinarily public records.
The Court notes that plaintiff's claims appear to fail on the merits for numerous reasons. First, he has shown no more than isolated instances of mail opening. This is ordinarily not enough to amount to a constitutional violation. Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1983) Second, as stated earlier, he has not shown that the materials were marked privileged or that they actually were privileged, rather than public, documents. Third, plaintiff blames defendants for the dismissal of his case in front of the Industrial Commission. However, the dismissal order states that the dismissal occurred not only due to plaintiff's nonappearance, but also for his longstanding failure to pursue his case and failure to inform the Industrial Commission of his whereabouts. Fourth, plaintiff was in custody at the time of the hearing that resulted in the dismissal. He has not shown that he could have made an appearance to forestall dismissal even if the calender were who could have ref lied the case at any time. Obviously, he is simply attempting to create a civil rights action out of an Industrial Commission case which he voluntarily abandoned long ago.
As for the remaining motions made by plaintiff, they must all be denied. For the reasons previously stated, plaintiff's claims cannot succeed. Therefore, his motion for partial summary judgment should be denied. As for his motion for counsel and motion to amend his complaint, the Court has reviewed them and found that granting them would in no way affect the outcome of the case. Therefore, they are denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint (docket no. 19) and plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (docket no. 39) be, and the same hereby are, denied.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (docket no. 25) be denied, that defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket no. 29) be granted, and that Judgment be entered dismissing this action.