Walker v. Walker

17 Citing cases

  1. Mayorga v. Benton

    364 Ga. App. 665 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 6 times

    There are relatively few reported cases addressing the dismissal of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, particularly with regard to whether the alleged conduct is sufficiently outrageous. In Walker v. Walker , 293 Ga. App. 872, 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008), we reversed the trial court's dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's complaint, finding that his complaint asserted that the defendants’ intentional conduct was extreme and outrageous and that this caused him severe emotional distress.

  2. Ga. Dept. of Labor v. McConnell

    305 Ga. 812 (Ga. 2019)   Cited 35 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding no general legal duty to all the world not to subject others to unreasonable risk of harm

    See, e.g., Dortch v. Atlanta Journal , 261 Ga. 350, 352 (2), 405 S.E.2d 43 (1991) (holding that unlisted telephone numbers were not offensive and objectionable); Cumberland Contractors, Inc. v. State Bank & Trust Co. , 327 Ga. App. 121, 126 (2) (a), 755 S.E.2d 511 (2014) (holding that social security numbers were not embarrassing private facts). Compare Walker v. Walker , 293 Ga. App. 872, 875 (2) (c), 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008) (holding that allegations by ex-husband that ex-wife, her attorney, and a psychologist made disclosure of objectionable private facts to the public in connection with custody dispute were sufficient to support claim for public disclosure of private facts); Zieve v. Hairston , 266 Ga. App. 753, 758 (1) (c), 598 S.E.2d 25 (2004) (holding that the matter of plaintiff's hair replacement treatment was one that a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would find offensive and objectionable under the circumstances). McConnell does not cite any authority that the information disclosed here was offensive and objectionable.

  3. N. Atlanta Golf Operations, LLC v. Ward

    363 Ga. App. 259 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 12 times
    Recognizing that mere statements of opinion or rhetorical hyperbole are not actionable and providing examples

    Because the posts concern the plaintiffs’ trade, office, or occupation and are defamation per se, damages are also inferred and the plaintiffs need not show special damages. See OCGA § 51-5-4 (a) (3) ; Cottrell , 299 Ga. at 524 (II) (A), 788 S.E.2d 772 ; Walker v. Walker , 293 Ga. App. 872, 876 (2) (e), 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008). (b) Some of the Twitter posts are not actionable as a matter of law.

  4. 280 Partners v. Bank of N. Ga.

    352 Ga. App. 605 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that the defendants' "mutual departure defense" failed because, "[a]lthough the defendants pointed to evidence that the bank departed from the terms of the April 2013 note . . ., they did not point to evidence that any consideration was paid or received under this alleged departure."

    Napper v. Ga. Television Co. , 257 Ga. 156, 160-161 (c), 356 S.E.2d 640 (1987) (citations and punctuation omitted). Accord Walker v. Walker , 293 Ga. App. 872, 875 (2) (c) (ii), 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008). The defendants characterize Hall’s disclosure of information about 280 Partners’ loan to Hastings as a "public disclosure" of private facts.

  5. Mayor of the City of Richmond Hill v. Maia

    336 Ga. App. 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 8 times
    Holding the statute applicable to intentional infliction of emotional distress and other intentional torts

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga.App. 872, 875(2)(c)(ii), 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008). See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489(III), 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975) (describing the tort of public disclosure under Georgia law as that “in which the plaintiff claims the right to be free from unwanted publicity about his private affairs, which, although wholly true, would be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities”).

  6. Omni Builders Risk v. Bennett

    750 S.E.2d 499 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)

    We therefore reverse the trial court's order as to fees under OCGA § 9–15–14 and remand for further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, limited to the amount of reasonable fees incurred by Dillard and properly awarded against Bennett's counsel and/or her law firm concerning the fraudulent inducement claim. See Johnston v. Correale, 285 Ga.App. 870, 871(1), 648 S.E.2d 180 (2007) (“In order to recover attorney fees [under OCGA § 9–15–14], a prevailing party must prove both their actual cost and their reasonableness”) (foonote omitted); Bankston v. Warbington, 319 Ga.App. 821, 823(2), 738 S.E.2d 656 (2013) (vacating an award of fees under OCGA § 9–15–14 and remanding for a hearing, “if requested on remand,” as to the “appropriate amount of attorney fees”) (citation omitted); Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga.App. 872, 878–879(4), 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008) (vacating an award of fees where the trial court failed to make “necessary findings, including that the fees were reasonable,” when it made the award) (citations omitted). 4. Dillard also argues that the trial court erred when it barred her from offering evidence on fees at the April 2012 hearing, when it authorized Bennett's counsel to state matters in her place concerning the prosecution of the fraudulent inducement claim, and when it granted Bennett's motion to quash subpoenas of Bennett and her attorneys and denied Dillard's motion to strike Bennett's motion.

  7. Omni Builders Risk v. Bennett

    A13A1137 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2013)

    We therefore reverse the trialcourt's order as to fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 and remand for furtherproceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, limited to the amount ofreasonable fees incurred by Dillard and properly awarded against Bennett'scounsel and/or her law firm concerning the fraudulent inducement claim. See Johnstonv. Correale, 285 Ga. App. 870, 871 (1) (648 SE2d 180) (2007) ("In order torecover attorney fees [under OCGA § 9-15-14], a prevailing party must proveboth their actual cost and their reasonableness") (foonote omitted); Bankstonv. Warbington, 319 Ga. App. 821, 823 (2) (738 SE2d 656) (2013) (vacating anaward of fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 and remanding for a hearing, "if requestedon remand," as to the "appropriate amount of attorney fees") (citationomitted); Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga. App. 872, 878-879 (4) (668 SE2d 330)(2008) (vacating an award of fees where the trial court failed to make"necessary findings, including that the fees were reasonable," when it made theaward) (citations omitted). 4. Dillard also argues that the trial court erred when it barred her fromoffering evidence on fees at the April 2012 hearing, when it authorizedBennett's counsel to state matters in her place concerning the prosecution ofthe fraudulent inducement claim, and when it granted Bennett's motion to quashsubpoenas of Bennett and her attorneys and denied Dillard's motion to strikeBennett's motion.

  8. Omni Builders Risk, Inc. v. Dillard

    325 Ga. App. 293 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 4 times

    We therefore reverse the trial court's order as to fees under OCGA § 9–15–14 and remand for further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, limited to the amount of reasonable fees incurred by Dillard and properly awarded against Bennett's counsel and/or her law firm concerning the fraudulent inducement claim. See Johnston v. Correale, 285 Ga.App. 870, 871(1), 648 S.E.2d 180 (2007) ("In order to recover attorney fees [under OCGA § 9–15–14 ], a prevailing party must prove both their actual cost and their reasonableness") (footnote omitted); Bankston v. Warbington, 319 Ga.App. 821, 823(2), 738 S.E.2d 656 (2013) (vacating an award of fees under OCGA § 9–15–14 and remanding for a hearing, "if requested on remand," as to the "appropriate amount of attorney fees") (citation omitted); Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga.App. 872, 878–879(4), 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008) (vacating an award of fees where the trial court failed to make "necessary findings, including that the fees were reasonable," when it made the award) (citations omitted).4. Dillard also argues that the trial court erred when it barred him from offering evidence on fees at the April 2012 hearing, when it authorized Bennett's counsel to state matters in her place concerning the prosecution of the fraudulent inducement claim, and when it granted Bennett's motion to quash subpoenas of Bennett and her attorneys and denied Dillard's motion to strike Bennett's motion.

  9. Wylie v. Denton

    323 Ga. App. 161 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 40 times
    Holding a former bank employee lacked standing against former employer because the loss of employment was only indirectly caused by the bank's alleged wrongdoing

    Additionally, because plaintiffs have alleged defamatory statements that both imputed to them a crime punishable by law and made charges against them in reference to their trade or profession, damage is presumed and they were not required to plead special damages. See Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga.App. 872, 876(2)(e), 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008); OCGA § 51–5–4. Nevertheless, we must conclude that to provide Wylie with the notice he needs to defend against the defamation claim, some more specific facts are required. Specifically, the plaintiffs must amend their complaint to include facts sufficient to provide Wylie with notice of both the content of the allegedly defamatory statements and the context in which those statements were made. See Benedict v. State Farm Bank, FSB, 309 Ga.App. 133, 134, 709 S.E.2d 314 (2011) (a complaint must contain “enough detail to afford the defendant ... a fair opportunity to frame a responsive pleading”) (citations omitted).

  10. Estate of William J. Shannon v. Ahmed

    304 Ga. App. 380 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit was not required to provide an expert affidavit for her wrongful death claims premised on fraud and battery, because those claims were intentional torts and not negligence

    (1) That the defendant made the representations; (2) that at the time he knew they were false; (3) that he made them with the intention and purpose of deceiving the plaintiff; (4) that the plaintiff relied on the representations; [and] (5) that the plaintiff sustained the alleged loss and damage as the proximate result of their having been made.Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga. App. 872, 874 (2) (a) ( 668 SE2d 330) (2008). These allegations must be pled with particularity.