There are relatively few reported cases addressing the dismissal of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, particularly with regard to whether the alleged conduct is sufficiently outrageous. In Walker v. Walker , 293 Ga. App. 872, 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008), we reversed the trial court's dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's complaint, finding that his complaint asserted that the defendants’ intentional conduct was extreme and outrageous and that this caused him severe emotional distress.
See, e.g., Dortch v. Atlanta Journal , 261 Ga. 350, 352 (2), 405 S.E.2d 43 (1991) (holding that unlisted telephone numbers were not offensive and objectionable); Cumberland Contractors, Inc. v. State Bank & Trust Co. , 327 Ga. App. 121, 126 (2) (a), 755 S.E.2d 511 (2014) (holding that social security numbers were not embarrassing private facts). Compare Walker v. Walker , 293 Ga. App. 872, 875 (2) (c), 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008) (holding that allegations by ex-husband that ex-wife, her attorney, and a psychologist made disclosure of objectionable private facts to the public in connection with custody dispute were sufficient to support claim for public disclosure of private facts); Zieve v. Hairston , 266 Ga. App. 753, 758 (1) (c), 598 S.E.2d 25 (2004) (holding that the matter of plaintiff's hair replacement treatment was one that a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would find offensive and objectionable under the circumstances). McConnell does not cite any authority that the information disclosed here was offensive and objectionable.
Because the posts concern the plaintiffs’ trade, office, or occupation and are defamation per se, damages are also inferred and the plaintiffs need not show special damages. See OCGA § 51-5-4 (a) (3) ; Cottrell , 299 Ga. at 524 (II) (A), 788 S.E.2d 772 ; Walker v. Walker , 293 Ga. App. 872, 876 (2) (e), 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008). (b) Some of the Twitter posts are not actionable as a matter of law.
Napper v. Ga. Television Co. , 257 Ga. 156, 160-161 (c), 356 S.E.2d 640 (1987) (citations and punctuation omitted). Accord Walker v. Walker , 293 Ga. App. 872, 875 (2) (c) (ii), 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008). The defendants characterize Hall’s disclosure of information about 280 Partners’ loan to Hastings as a "public disclosure" of private facts.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga.App. 872, 875(2)(c)(ii), 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008). See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489(III), 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975) (describing the tort of public disclosure under Georgia law as that “in which the plaintiff claims the right to be free from unwanted publicity about his private affairs, which, although wholly true, would be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities”).
We therefore reverse the trial court's order as to fees under OCGA § 9–15–14 and remand for further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, limited to the amount of reasonable fees incurred by Dillard and properly awarded against Bennett's counsel and/or her law firm concerning the fraudulent inducement claim. See Johnston v. Correale, 285 Ga.App. 870, 871(1), 648 S.E.2d 180 (2007) (“In order to recover attorney fees [under OCGA § 9–15–14], a prevailing party must prove both their actual cost and their reasonableness”) (foonote omitted); Bankston v. Warbington, 319 Ga.App. 821, 823(2), 738 S.E.2d 656 (2013) (vacating an award of fees under OCGA § 9–15–14 and remanding for a hearing, “if requested on remand,” as to the “appropriate amount of attorney fees”) (citation omitted); Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga.App. 872, 878–879(4), 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008) (vacating an award of fees where the trial court failed to make “necessary findings, including that the fees were reasonable,” when it made the award) (citations omitted). 4. Dillard also argues that the trial court erred when it barred her from offering evidence on fees at the April 2012 hearing, when it authorized Bennett's counsel to state matters in her place concerning the prosecution of the fraudulent inducement claim, and when it granted Bennett's motion to quash subpoenas of Bennett and her attorneys and denied Dillard's motion to strike Bennett's motion.
We therefore reverse the trialcourt's order as to fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 and remand for furtherproceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, limited to the amount ofreasonable fees incurred by Dillard and properly awarded against Bennett'scounsel and/or her law firm concerning the fraudulent inducement claim. See Johnstonv. Correale, 285 Ga. App. 870, 871 (1) (648 SE2d 180) (2007) ("In order torecover attorney fees [under OCGA § 9-15-14], a prevailing party must proveboth their actual cost and their reasonableness") (foonote omitted); Bankstonv. Warbington, 319 Ga. App. 821, 823 (2) (738 SE2d 656) (2013) (vacating anaward of fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 and remanding for a hearing, "if requestedon remand," as to the "appropriate amount of attorney fees") (citationomitted); Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga. App. 872, 878-879 (4) (668 SE2d 330)(2008) (vacating an award of fees where the trial court failed to make"necessary findings, including that the fees were reasonable," when it made theaward) (citations omitted). 4. Dillard also argues that the trial court erred when it barred her fromoffering evidence on fees at the April 2012 hearing, when it authorizedBennett's counsel to state matters in her place concerning the prosecution ofthe fraudulent inducement claim, and when it granted Bennett's motion to quashsubpoenas of Bennett and her attorneys and denied Dillard's motion to strikeBennett's motion.
We therefore reverse the trial court's order as to fees under OCGA § 9–15–14 and remand for further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, limited to the amount of reasonable fees incurred by Dillard and properly awarded against Bennett's counsel and/or her law firm concerning the fraudulent inducement claim. See Johnston v. Correale, 285 Ga.App. 870, 871(1), 648 S.E.2d 180 (2007) ("In order to recover attorney fees [under OCGA § 9–15–14 ], a prevailing party must prove both their actual cost and their reasonableness") (footnote omitted); Bankston v. Warbington, 319 Ga.App. 821, 823(2), 738 S.E.2d 656 (2013) (vacating an award of fees under OCGA § 9–15–14 and remanding for a hearing, "if requested on remand," as to the "appropriate amount of attorney fees") (citation omitted); Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga.App. 872, 878–879(4), 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008) (vacating an award of fees where the trial court failed to make "necessary findings, including that the fees were reasonable," when it made the award) (citations omitted).4. Dillard also argues that the trial court erred when it barred him from offering evidence on fees at the April 2012 hearing, when it authorized Bennett's counsel to state matters in her place concerning the prosecution of the fraudulent inducement claim, and when it granted Bennett's motion to quash subpoenas of Bennett and her attorneys and denied Dillard's motion to strike Bennett's motion.
Additionally, because plaintiffs have alleged defamatory statements that both imputed to them a crime punishable by law and made charges against them in reference to their trade or profession, damage is presumed and they were not required to plead special damages. See Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga.App. 872, 876(2)(e), 668 S.E.2d 330 (2008); OCGA § 51–5–4. Nevertheless, we must conclude that to provide Wylie with the notice he needs to defend against the defamation claim, some more specific facts are required. Specifically, the plaintiffs must amend their complaint to include facts sufficient to provide Wylie with notice of both the content of the allegedly defamatory statements and the context in which those statements were made. See Benedict v. State Farm Bank, FSB, 309 Ga.App. 133, 134, 709 S.E.2d 314 (2011) (a complaint must contain “enough detail to afford the defendant ... a fair opportunity to frame a responsive pleading”) (citations omitted).
(1) That the defendant made the representations; (2) that at the time he knew they were false; (3) that he made them with the intention and purpose of deceiving the plaintiff; (4) that the plaintiff relied on the representations; [and] (5) that the plaintiff sustained the alleged loss and damage as the proximate result of their having been made.Walker v. Walker, 293 Ga. App. 872, 874 (2) (a) ( 668 SE2d 330) (2008). These allegations must be pled with particularity.