Opinion
01 Civ. 3668 (SHS)
August 12, 2002
OPINION ORDER
Plaintiff Kwane K. Walker filed this action pro se seeking the return of a 1993 BMW automobile that was seized and administratively forfeited by the Drug Enforcement Administration (the "DEA"). Walker alleges that the DEA failed to give him adequate notice of the forfeiture proceedings and that the seizure violated his constitutional rights pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The DEA has moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12 (b)(6). Walker has moved separately to compel the DEA to produce investigative reports and other documents pertaining to the forfeiture. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of the administrative forfeiture, and Walker received adequate notice of the forfeiture proceedings, the DEA's motion is granted. Walker's motion to compel the production of documents is denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
In September 1996, DEA agents stopped Walker and his brother in the BMW in connection with a purchase of crack cocaine made three days earlier by an informant under the supervision of the DEA. The DEA seized several thousand dollars from the car, which it later determined to be the currency used to make the drug purchase. Walker subsequently pled guilty to violating federal narcotics laws and also admitted that he had purchased the BMW with drug proceeds. (Porzeinski Decl. ¶ 2(b).)
On April 2, 1997, DEA agents seized the BMW and initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings. (Hieronymous Decl. ¶ 4(a).) On July 23, 1997, having received no claims of ownership from any party for the seized vehicle, the DEA administratively forfeited the BMW to the United States pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1609, 21 U.S.C. § 881 and 21 C.F.R. § 1316.77. (Hieronymus Decl. ¶ 4(1); Ex. 20.)
DISCUSSION
Congress has authorized the DEA, as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub.L. 91-513, Title II, § 511, 84 Stat. 1276 (1970), to seize and forfeit any item of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance, and all proceeds traceable to such an exchange. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a). If the value of the seized property is less than $500,000, the DEA may proceed administratively. See 19 U.S.C. § 1607. An administrative forfeiture is commenced by the publication of notice of the seizure. See 19 U.S.C. § 1607; 21 C.F.R. § 1316.75. The DEA must also send written notice of the seizure with information on the applicable procedures to each party who appears to have an interest in the seized property. 19 U.S.C. § 1607. Within twenty days after the first publication of the notice of seizure, a claimant who has received notice of intent to forfeit can contest the forfeiture by filing a claim with the DEA, together with a cost bond. See Boero v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 111 F.3d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1997); 19 U.S.C. § 1608. If no such claim is filed within the twenty days, then an administrative forfeiture occurs by default. 19 U.S.C. § 1609; 21 C.F.R. § 1316.77.
In general, a federal court lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of administrative forfeiture decisions. United States v. One 1987 Jeep Wrangler, 972 F.2d 472, 480 (2d Cir. 1992). See also Boero, 111 F.3d at 304-05 ("[A]n administrative forfeiture ordinarily removes the subject matter of the action — the property or res — from the district court, and thereby deprives the court of jurisdiction to review administrative decisions once the administrative process has begun."). However, courts have recognized a limited exception to this rule where there exists a procedural deficiency in the administrative process. See Lopes v. United States, 862 F. Supp. 1178, 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). That review "is limited to determining whether the agency followed the proper procedural safeguards when it declared [the claimant's] property summarily forfeited." One 1987 Jeep Wrangler, 972 F.2d at 480 (citation omitted). See Onwubiko v. United States, 969 F.2d 1392, 1398 (2d Cir. 1992). See also United States v. Cruz, No. 97 CR. 54, 1998 WL 326732, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1998) ("Judicial review is limited to the procedural deficiencies of the administrative forfeiture, if any.").
The DEA correctly argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the merits of Walker's claims that the seizure of the BMW violated the Fourth Amendment, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Because these claims do not relate to procedural deficiencies in the forfeiture proceeding, they must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Sandoval v. United States, No. 00 Civ. 1259, 2001 WL 300729, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2001) ("This lack of jurisdiction extends even to constitutional challenges to the search and seizure leading to forfeiture."); Dawson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 927 F. Supp. 748, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (district court lacks jurisdiction to review "constitutional challenges to the search and seizure"), aff'd, 112 F.3d 503 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Pinilla No. 93 CR. 341, 1996 WL 145953, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1996) ("invocation of the Double Jeopardy Clause cannot help petitioner show procedural deficiency in an administrative forfeiture"); Lopes, 862 F. Supp. at 1185; Ezennwa v. United States No. 93-CV-2789, 1997 WL 63318, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 1997) (dismissing the plaintiff's Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). In addition, because Walker's motion to compel the DEA to produce certain documents relates to these claims, that motion is denied as moot.
The Court does have jurisdiction to determine whether Walker received adequate notice of the forfeiture proceedings, since that goes to the question of whether procedural deficiencies infected the forfeiture. See Boero, 111 F.3d at 305; Lopes, 862 F. Supp. at 1185. The DEA contends that Walker received adequate notice and has moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint. Because both parties have submitted materials outside the pleadings with respect to the notice issue, the Court will treat the motion as one for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991); Sulton v. Greiner, No. 00 Civ. 0727, 2000 WL 1809284, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2000). Since Walker is the non-moving party, the Court reads the parties' submissions in the light most favorable to him and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Allen v. Coughlin, 64 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1995).
Notice of the DEA's intent to forfeit property is sufficient if it is "`reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections,'" whether or not the interested parties receive actual notice. Dusenbery v. United States. 534 U.S. 161, 122 S.Ct. 694, 700 (2002) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
The DEA has submitted evidence that notice of the seizure was published in USA Today, on May 7, 14, and 21, 1997. (Hieronymus Decl. ¶ 4 (k); Ex. 19.) The DEA has also submitted written notice of the seizure addressed to Walker at Central Virginia Regional Jail, a signed certified mail receipt for the notice, and a page from the Central Virginia Regional Jail "Legal Log" indicating that Walker signed for an incoming mail item from the Department of Justice. (Hieronymus Decl. ¶ 4 (d); Exs. 5, 6; Porzeinski Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 1.) Finally, the DEA encloses written notices of seizure sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to eight other addresses. Two of these were addressed to Walker, one to him at his permanent address and another to him in care of his attorney. (Hieronymus Decl. ¶¶ 4(c), (e); Exs. 3, 7.) The notices were accepted at both addresses. (Hieronymus Decl. ¶¶ 4(c), (e); Exs. 4, 8.)
In his opposition papers, Walker has attached a copy of a Warrant of Seizure signed by Magistrate Judge Peck authorizing DEA agents to seize the BMW. The warrant is dated April 2, 1997. (Plt. Opp. Br. Exs. 2-3.) Walker also attaches copies of the DEA's submissions described above — specifically, a page from the declaration of Robert A. Porzeinski and the excerpt from the "Legal Log" relating to the delivery of the DEA's notice of seizure to Central Virginia Regional Jail. (Plt. Opp. Br. Exs. 3-4.) These submissions indicate that the DEA mailed the notice on April 28, 1997 and Walker signed for it on May 3, 1997. Walker contends that the DEA should have sent him the notice of seizure before it seized the BMW, not after.
Walker misunderstands his right to notice, which relates to the initiation of the forfeiture proceedings, not to the date property is seized. The DEA is not required to provide notice before it seizes property. Rather, the DEA must provide notice that the property has been seized and that the DEA intends to forfeit it, so that persons who claim an interest in the property have an opportunity to contest the proposed forfeiture. See 19 U.S.C. § 1607; 21 C.F.R. § 1316.75. The parties' submissions indicate that Walker clearly had such an opportunity. Accordingly, the DEA's motion is granted.
CONCLUSION
Because the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of the forfeiture and because Walker received adequate notice of the administrative forfeiture proceedings, the Court awards summary judgment in favor of the DEA. Walker's motion to compel the production of evidence is denied as moot.
SO ORDERED