Opinion
9:22-CV-1133 (GTS/ATB)
11-28-2022
GERALD WALKER, Plaintiff, v. SUPERINTENDENT UHLER, et al., Defendants.
GERALD WALKER Plaintiff, pro se
GERALD WALKER Plaintiff, pro se
DECISION AND ORDER
GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se plaintiff Gerald Walker ("plaintiff") commenced this action by filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ("Southern District") in September 2022, together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). Dkt. No. 1 ("Compl."); Dkt. No. 3 ("IFP" Application). In the complaint, plaintiff asserts claims for the violation of his constitutional rights arising out of his confinement in the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") at Sing Sing Correctional Facility ("Sing Sing C.F.") and Upstate Correctional Facility ("Upstate C.F."). See generally Compl. At the time he filed the complaint, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Upstate C.F. Id. at 1.
By Decision and Order filed on October 24, 2022 (the "October Order"), Chief District Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted plaintiff's IFP Application and severed and transferred plaintiff's claims regarding events that occurred at Upstate C.F. to the Northern District of New York. Dkt. No. 7. The Southern District retained jurisdiction over the claims that arose at Sing Sing C.F. and dismissed the claims, with leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the October Order. Id.
As of the date of this decision, plaintiff had not filed an amended pleading in the Southern District action. See Walker v Capra, et al., No 1:22-CV-7638 (S.D.N.Y.).
This action was transferred to this District on November 1, 2022. Dkt. No. 8. Presently before the Court for review is the portion of the complaint relating to claims that arose in the Northern District.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
A. Governing Legal Standard
Section 1915(e) of Title 28 of the United States Code directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that - . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should exercise "extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff) have had an opportunity to respond." Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, a pleading that only "tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement" will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
B. Summary of the Complaint
The following facts are set forth as alleged by plaintiff in his complaint.
The Court will not review the facts relating to claims that arose at Sing Sing C.F. for sufficiency pursuant to Section 1915(e).
On August 22, 2022, plaintiff was transferred from Sing Sing C.F. to Upstate C.F. Compl. at 5. At Upstate C.F., plaintiff has been denied "therapeutic treatment, programming, and services." Id. Plaintiff has also been subjected to unsanitary conditions, confined to a double bunk cell, and deprived of cleaning supplies. Id. Plaintiff also claims he has been deprived of his "property." Id.
Construed liberally, the complaint contains Eighth and Fourth Amendment claims against Superintendent Uhler ("Uhler"), DSS Bishop ("Bishop"), Commissioner Anthony Annucci ("Annucci"), Deputy Demers ("Demers"), and Captain John Doe ("Doe"). See generally, Compl. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. See id. at 6. For a complete statement of plaintiff's claims and the facts he relies on in support of those claims, reference is made to the complaint.
The Court is mindful of the Second Circuit's instruction that a pleading by a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests. See, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) ("On occasions too numerous to count, we have reminded district courts" that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings must be construed liberally); Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2005) ("We leave it for the district court to determine what other claims, if any, [plaintiff] has raised. In so doing, the court's imagination should be limited only by [plaintiff's] factual allegations, not by the legal claims set out in his pleadings.").
C. Nature of Action
Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), which establishes a cause of action for" 'the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Assn, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990)); see also Myers v. Wollowitz, No. 95-CV-0272, 1995 WL 236245, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1995) (McAvoy, C.J.) (finding that "[Section] 1983 is the vehicle by which individuals may seek redress for alleged violations of their constitutional rights"). "Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights, [but] . . . only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from "cruel and unusual punishment" at the hands of prison officials. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). This includes punishments that "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
To state an Eighth Amendment claim for medical indifference, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective component of an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference medical claim "requires that the alleged deprivation must be sufficiently serious, in the sense that a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain exists." Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the subjective element, medical mistreatment rises to the level of deliberate indifference only when it "involves culpable recklessness, i.e., an act or a failure to act . . . that evinces 'a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm.'" Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Hathaway, 99 F.3d at 553). "Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence but less than conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm." Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994). To assert a claim for deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege that (1) a prison medical care provider was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that the inmate had a serious medical need; and (2) the medical care provider actually drew that inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Chance, 143 F.3d at 702.
"To demonstrate that the conditions of his confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the plaintiff must satisfy both an objective test and a subjective test." Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 480 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). To satisfy the objective element, "the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conditions of his confinement result 'in unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs.'" Id. (citation omitted). "[The inmate must show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health." Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). With respect to the subjective element, plaintiff must "demonstrate that the defendants imposed those conditions with 'deliberate indifference.'" Jolly, 76 F.3d at 480 (citation omitted). "To constitute deliberate indifference, '[t]he prison official must know of, and disregard, an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.'" Walker, 717 F.3d at 125 (quoting Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2012)).
Here, plaintiff has failed to plead any viable Eighth Amendment claim. As to the objective prong, plaintiff alleges, in a conclusory manner, that he was denied "therapeutic treatment, programming, and services" without any facts related to the type of treatment, programs, or services, or when he was denied treatment or services. Moreover, plaintiff's claim that he was confined to a double bunk and denied cleaning supplies, without more, does not suggest that he was confined to conditions that posed an unreasonable risk to his health.
Furthermore, plaintiff has not plead facts suggesting that any named defendant was deliberately indifferent. "Personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under [Section] 1983." Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977)). As the Supreme Court has noted, a defendant may only be held accountable for his actions under Section 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683 ("[Petitioners cannot be held liable unless they themselves acted on account of a constitutionally protected characteristic.").
In order to prevail on a Section 1983 cause of action against an individual, a plaintiff must show "a tangible connection between the acts of a defendant and the injuries suffered." Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). This is true even for supervisory officials. See Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) ("There is no special rule for supervisor liability."). "[A] plaintiff must plead and prove 'that each Government-official defendant, [including supervisors,] through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.'" Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).
Upon review, the complaint fails to implicate in any of the Upstate C.F. defendants in any unconstitutional conduct. Plaintiff identified Uhler, Bishop, Annucci, Demers, and Doe as defendants in the caption of the complaint and in the list of parties. Compl. at 1, 2. However, plaintiff has not plead that these defendants were personally involved in any alleged constitutional violation. Indeed, these defendants are not referenced anywhere in the body of the complaint. In the absence of factual allegations sufficient to plausibly suggest that the defendants were personally involved in conduct that violated plaintiff's constitutional rights, the complaint fails to state a cognizable claim against them. See Cipriani v. Buffardi, No. 06-CV-0889 (GTS/DRH), 2007 WL 607341, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb.20, 2007) ("Dismissal is appropriate where a defendant is listed in the caption, but the body of the complaint fails to indicate what the defendant did to the plaintiff.") (citation omitted); see also Casino v. Rohl, No. 14-CV-2175, 2014 WL 5425501, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) (dismissing complaint since the plaintiff had not adequately pled the defendant's personal involvement in any of the constitutional deprivations alleged in the amended complaint).
For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. Claims Related to Property
The Supreme Court has held that the negligent or intentional deprivation of prisoner's property may not be the basis for constitutional claims if sufficient post deprivation remedies are available to address the claim. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531 (1984) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981)); Davis v. New York, 311 Fed. App'x. 397, 400 (2d Cir. 2009) (An alleged loss of property, "whether intentional or negligent - will not support a due process claim redressable under § 1983 if 'adequate state post-deprivation remedies are available.' ") (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. 533). "New York in fact affords an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the form of, inter alia, a Court of Claims action." Jackson v. Burke, 256 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2001). Because plaintiff has access to adequate state law remedies, he has not been deprived of property without due process of law and therefore cannot state a claim for relief pursuant to Section 1983. See Love v. Coughlin, 714 F.2d 207, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam); see also Shabazz v. Pico, 994 F.Supp. 460, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim that the defendants destroyed his property in violation of his due process rights). For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff's claims related to property loss are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Section 1983.
In the alternative, plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims are subject to dismissal for failure to plead personal involvement.
IV. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Clerk provide the Superintendent of the facility, designated by plaintiff as his current location, with a copy of plaintiff's inmate authorization form, and notify the official that this action has been filed and that plaintiff is required to pay the entire statutory filing fee of $350.00 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court provide a copy of plaintiff's inmate authorization form to the Financial Deputy of the Clerk's Office; and it is further
ORDERED that if plaintiff wishes to proceed with this action, he must file an amended complaint as set forth above within thirty (30) days from the date of the filing of this Decision and Order; and it is further
ORDERED that, if plaintiff timely files an amended complaint, this matter be returned to the Court for further review; and it is further
ORDERED that if plaintiff fails to timely file an amended complaint as directed above, the Clerk shall enter judgment indicating that the remainder of this action is DISMISSED without prejudice without further order of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for failure to comply with this Decision and Order. In that event, the Clerk is directed to close this case; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Decision and Order on plaintiff, together with a copy of the original complaint.