Opinion
24A-CR-739
12-12-2024
Javante Saqwan Walker, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT A. Robert Masters St. Joseph County Public Defender South Bend, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General J.T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court The Honorable Elizabeth C. Hurley, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 71D08-2306-MR-11
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT A. Robert Masters St. Joseph County Public Defender South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General J.T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Judges Weissmann and Foley concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Vaidik, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] Javante Saqwan Walker appeals his conviction for murder, arguing the trial court improperly instructed the jury. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] One night in September 2021, Walker was at a bar with friends when he saw Montell O'Neal. Walker and O'Neal argued, and other patrons separated them before it could become physical. After leaving the bar, Walker and O'Neal ended up at the same house party. Walker was armed with a semi-automatic handgun. When he walked into the kitchen, O'Neal was there. Walker drew his gun and fired six shots at O'Neal, hitting him five times in the back and neck and killing him.
[¶3] The State charged Walker with murder and a firearm enhancement. At trial, Walker argued that he acted in self-defense. After the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of murder, voluntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, and self-defense. The court also gave, over Walker's objection, Indiana Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 12.19: "Motive is what causes a person to act. The State is not required to prove a motive for the crime charged." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 79.
[¶4] The jury found Walker guilty of murder and that he used a firearm during the offense. The trial court sentenced Walker to a total term of sixty-five years.
[¶5] Walker now appeals. Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Walker argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the State was not required to prove motive. "The purpose of a jury instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict." Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 553 (Ind. 2019) (quotation omitted). The trial court has broad discretion as to how to instruct the jury, and we generally review for an abuse of that discretion. McCowan v. State, 27 N.E.3d 760, 763 (Ind. 2015). In doing so, we "consider the instructions as a whole and in reference to each other," and we will not reverse the trial court "unless the instructions as a whole mislead the jury as to the law in the case." Id. at 764 (quotation omitted).
[¶7] Here, the trial court gave Indiana Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 12.19, which states, "Motive is what causes a person to act. The State is not required to prove a motive for the crime charged." As Walker acknowledges, our courts have historically approved the use of this pattern instruction. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 544 N.E.2d 1359, 1364 (Ind. 1989); Mathews v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1172, 1178-79 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022), trans. denied. Yet, Walker contends that, in instructing the jury that the State wasn't required to prove motive, the trial court "effectively charg[ed] the jury to disregard the mens rea element of [his] crimes and defenses" and "effectively eliminated the State's burden of proving the state of mind element of each of crime or defense the jury was asked to consider." Appellant's Br. pp. 7, 14. In other words, even though the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of self-defense, murder, and the lesser-included offenses, Walker claims the motive instruction "undercut" these other instructions. Id. at 14. Looking at all the instructions together, we disagree.
[¶8] The trial court instructed the jury on the levels of culpability, the elements of murder and its lesser-included offenses, and that the State must prove each element-including the requisite culpability-beyond a reasonable doubt. And at the end of the self-defense instruction, the court told the jury, "The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did not act in self-defense." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 77. Contrary to Walker's argument, we see no reason why the jury would have given more weight to the single instruction on motive than to the rest of the instructions, or why the motive instruction would have caused the jury to disregard the rest. On the contrary, the court began the final instructions by directing the jury to "consider all the instructions as a whole" and to "not single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others." Id. at 69. And instructing the jury that the State didn't have to prove motive but did have to disprove Walker's self-defense claim is not inconsistent. Taking all these instructions together, the trial court's instruction on motive did not offset the State's burden of proof. See Young v. State, 696 N.E.2d 386, 391 (Ind. 1998) (rejecting appellant's argument that pattern instruction on motive "did not clarify the distinction between motive and intent, and thereby, diluted the state's burden of proof").
[¶9] Nor did the motive instruction preclude the jury from considering what caused Walker to act. In giving this instruction, it is not as if the trial court prevented the jury from giving any weight to the presence or absence of motive; the court merely clarified what the State was and was not required to prove. Walker testified that he shot O'Neal because he thought he "was gonna die," and the heart of his closing argument was that he acted out of fear. Tr. Vol. II p. 222. The trial court's motive instruction did not undermine this argument. See Mathews, 186 N.E.3d at 1179 ("[T]he jury received ample information about motive and could weigh the evidence accordingly."). The court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury.
[¶10] Affirmed.
Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.