Opinion
CR-2022-1377
11-03-2023
Chelsea Yvette Walker v. State of Alabama
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court (CC-17-3013 and CC-17-3014)
COOL, JUDGE
Chelsea Yvette Walker appeals her convictions for two counts of second-degree assault, a violation of § 13A-6-21, Ala. Code 1975. The trial court sentenced Walker to concurrent sentences of 10 years' imprisonment and split the sentences, ordering Walker to serve 3 years' imprisonment followed by 2 years of supervised probation.
A full recitation of the facts is not necessary in this appeal. Rather, it is sufficient to note that, on November 23, 2016, Walker was involved in a fight with Showanda Carter and that, during the fight, Walker pulled a knife and stabbed Carter in the leg. Carter's husband, Dexter Walker ("Dexter"), intervened and managed to grab the knife from Walker and subdue her, but he sustained a cut to his finger when he grabbed the knife. Walker was convicted of two counts of second-degree assault - one count for injuring Carter and one count for injuring Dexter.
On appeal, Walker argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for a judgment of acquittal because, she says, the State failed to prove a prima facie case of second-degree assault with respect to Dexter. Section 13A-6-21(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, provides that a person commits second-degree assault if, "[w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another person, he or she causes physical injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument." Walker's specific claim on appeal is that the State failed to prove that she intended to cause physical injury to Dexter.
Walker does not argue that the State failed to prove a prima facie case of second-degree assault with respect to Carter.
We agree, however, with the State's argument that Walker failed to preserve this specific claim for appellate review. In moving for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case, Walker argued that the State had "not met [its] burden [of proving] that [she] actually caused [Dexter's] injuries" (R. 89 (emphasis added)), not that the State had failed to prove that she had the intent to cause Dexter's injuries. It is well settled that "'a defendant who states specific grounds in his motion for a judgment for acquittal waives all grounds not stated.'" Thomas v. State, 302 So.3d 720, 729 (Ala.Crim.App.2019) (quoting Ex parte Hall, 843 So.2d 746, 748 (Ala. 2002)). In other words, when a defendant "'states specific grounds in a motion for a judgment of acquittal, the defendant is bound by those grounds and cannot raise new or different grounds on appeal.'" Thomas, 302 So.3d at 729 (quoting R.K.D. v. State, 712 So.2d 754, 757 (Ala.Crim.App.1997)). Thus, because Walker's motion for a judgment of acquittal specifically challenged only the causation element of the State's case, her sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim before this Court is limited to that argument, which she has not raised on appeal. Accordingly, we will not consider Walker's argument that the State failed to prove that she intended to cause Dexter's injury, and, because that is the only claim Walker has raised with respect to her convictions, her convictions are affirmed. See Keaton v. State, [Ms. CR-14-1570, Dec. 17, 2021] __So. 3d__,__ (Ala.Crim.App.2021) (holding that the appellant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim was not preserved for appellate review because she "did not raise at trial the specific sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim she raise[d] on appeal").
We acknowledge Walker's argument that she preserved her sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim by filing a motion for a new trial in which she argued that the jury's verdict "was contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence." (C. 410.) However, that argument challenged the weight of the evidence, which "is clearly a different matter from the sufficiency of the evidence." Thompson v. State, 97 So.3d 800, 810 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (citations omitted). See Jenkins v. State, 972 So.2d 165, 167 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) ("'Preponderance of the evidence' is defined as ... '[t]he greater weight of the evidence.'" (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1220 (8th ed. 2004))).
Walker also argues that her sentences are illegal, and the State agrees that a remand is necessary for the trial court to correct the sentences. Walker and the State are correct.
Second-degree assault is a Class C felony. See § 13A-6-21(b). At the time of Walker's offenses in November 2016, § 13A-5-6(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, provided that, unless a defendant was sentenced as a habitual felony offender, the sentence for a Class C felony could not exceed 10 years' imprisonment and had to comply with § 15-18-8(b), Ala. Code 1975. At the time of Walker's offenses, § 15-18-8(b) provided, in pertinent part:
Effective July 1, 2023, the Alabama Legislature amended § 13A-5-6(a)(3) to remove the requirement that a sentence for a Class C felony must comply with § 15-18-8(b). See Act No. 2023-461, Ala. Acts 2023. However, "'a criminal offender must be sentenced pursuant to the statute in effect at the time of the commission of the offense, at least in the absence of an expression of intent by the legislature to make the new statute applicable to previously committed crimes.'" Zimmerman v. State, 838 So.2d 404, 406 n.1 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (quoting 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1462 (1989)).
"Unless a defendant is sentenced to probation, drug court, or a pretrial diversion program, when a defendant is convicted of an offense that constitutes a Class C or D felony offense and receives a sentence of not more than 15 years, the judge presiding over the case shall order that the convicted defendant be confined in a prison, jail-type institution, treatment institution, or community corrections program for a Class C felony offense or in a consenting community corrections program for a Class D felony offense, except as provided in subsection (e), for a period not exceeding two years in cases where the imposed sentence is not more than 15 years, and that the execution of the remainder of the sentence be suspended notwithstanding any provision of the law to the contrary and that the defendant be placed on probation for a
period not exceeding three years and upon such terms as the court deems best."(Emphasis added.)
Act No. 2023-461 (see note 3, supra) also amended § 15-18-8. Under the amended statute, when a defendant is convicted of a Class C felony and receives a sentence of not more than 15 years' imprisonment, the trial court is not required to split the sentence and, if it does, may order the defendant to serve a split portion that does not exceed 3 years' imprisonment. See § 15-18-8(a)(1). However, because there is no indication that the legislature intended for the amended version of § 1518-8 to apply retroactively, the trial court was required to sentence Walker under the version of the statute that was in effect at the time of her offenses. Zimmerman, supra.
Walker, who is not a habitual felony offender, was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment for her Class C felonies. Thus, under the applicable sentencing statutes that were in effect at the time of Walker's offenses, the trial court was required to split Walker's sentences, as it did, but could not impose split portions that exceeded two years' imprisonment. However, the trial court ordered Walker to serve 3 years' imprisonment on each of her convictions, and, as a result, the split portions of her sentences are illegal. We therefore reverse Walker's sentences and remand the case for the trial court to hold a new sentencing hearing at which the court imposes split sentences that comply with the version of § 15-18-8(b) that was in effect at the time of Walker's offenses. "In so doing, however, we note that [Walker's] 10-year sentence[s] [are] valid; thus, the trial court cannot change the underlying sentence[s]." Born v. State, 331 So.3d 626, 638 (Ala.Crim.App.2020). The trial court shall take all necessary action to ensure that the circuit clerk makes due return to this Court within 42 days of the date of this opinion, and the return to remand shall include a transcript of the new sentencing hearing and the amended sentencing order.
AFFIRMED AS TO CONVICTIONS; REVERSED AS TO SENTENCES; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Windom, P.J., and Kellum, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.