Given the overwhelming evidence from numerous witnesses — including expert witnesses and Neuman's family, colleagues, and friends — that Neuman displayed no signs of mental illness and was malingering, we see no reasonable probability that the second trial's outcome would have differed had Dr. Flores's testimony been presented exactly as it was in the first trial. See Walker v. State , 306 Ga. 44, 47 (2), 829 S.E.2d 121 (2019) (any error in excluding evidence was harmless because such evidence was cumulative of other evidence presented as to appellant's defense at trial); see also Harris v. State , 256 Ga. 350, 377 (3), 349 S.E.2d 374 (1986) (court's assumed error in handling of expert testimony was harmless because of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt and against his defense of insanity). (iii) Neuman further claims that the trial court erred by excluding as irrelevant Dr. Flores's testimony about the housing protocol in correctional facilities for individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity, about whether Dr. Flores thought Andrea Sneiderman's actions in sending Neuman pictures were appropriate, about Neuman's statements to Dr. Flores about how Neuman felt about Andrea Sneiderman prior to the shooting, and about whether Dr. Flores had any concerns that Neuman could be malingering.

But a trial court "can negate the potentially harmful effect of improperly introduced evidence by prompt curative instructions rather than by granting a mistrial." Walker v. State , 306 Ga. 44, 49 (4), 829 S.E.2d 121 (2019). "Whether to grant a mistrial is within the trial court's discretion, which an appellate court will not disturb unless there is a showing that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial."

[17] In addition, this Court has determined that "the trial court can negate the potentially harmful effect of improperly introduced evidence by prompt curative instructions rather than by granting a mistrial." Walker v. State, 306 Ga. 44, 49 (4), 829 S.E.2d 121 (2019). See Allen v. State, 277 Ga. 502, 504 (3) (c), 591 S.E.2d 784 (2004) ("[Q]ualified jurors under oath are presumed to follow the instructions of the trial court").

"[T]he decision to grant a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial." Walker v. State , 306 Ga. 44, 49, 829 S.E.2d 121 (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). Pretermitting whether Perkins properly preserved this claim, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion to conclude that a mistrial was not necessary to preserve Perkins's right to a fair trial.

The evidence presented was more than sufficient for a rational jury to reject Morris's theory of self-defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See, e.g., Walker v. State , 306 Ga. 44 (2), 829 S.E.2d 121 (2019) (Overwhelming evidence authorized the jury to reject self-defense theory and find the defendant guilty of murder where the defendant shot the victim in the back while she was trying to get away from him and the defendant "continued to brutally stab her to death after she had fallen as a result of being shot."). Judgment affirmed.

Instead, "the overwhelming evidence against [Rodrigues], completely independent of the [other-acts] evidence offered by [the State], pointed directly to an intentional and malicious killing committed by [Rodrigues] in this case rather than one that was committed in self-defense." Walker v. State , 306 Ga. 44, 49 (3), 829 S.E.2d 121 (2019). See also Parks , 300 Ga. at 308 (2), 794 S.E.2d 623.

See Anglin, 302 Ga. at 339 (5) (explaining that victim's widow's testimony regarding a telephone conversation between victim and another person that victim intended to bring gun to meeting with defendant was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but to show why defendant believed he needed to respond with violence); Strickland v. State, 257 Ga. 230, 232 (3) (357 S.E.2d 85) (1987) (holding it was error to exclude on hearsay grounds testimony regarding death threat made against the defendant, as it was not offered to prove the truth of the substance of the threats but to show why defendant purchased a gun). See Walker v. State, 306 Ga. 44, 47 (2) (829 S.E.2d 121) (2019) (holding trial court error, if any, in precluding defendant's sister hearsay testimony that defendant told her after the shooting the victim tried to kill him, was harmless because the testimony was cumulative of defendant's own testimony that he acted in self-defense); Reaves v. State, 292 Ga. 545, 548 (2) (d) (739 S.E.2d 368) (2013) (explaining any error in exclusion of hearsay testimony of defendant's co-worker was harmless in trial for malice murder, first-degree cruelty to child, and aggravated battery, when it was cumulative of other admissible evidence); Nix v. State, 280 Ga. 144-45 (5) (625 S.E.2d 746) (2006) (finding trial court's error, if any, in excluding hearsay testimony of defendant's mother, was harmless given the excluded testimony was largely cumulative of other evidence introduced at trial).

Moreover, "[i]t is well established that a trial court ‘can negate the potentially harmful effect of improperly introduced evidence by prompt curative instructions rather than by granting a mistrial.’ " Id. at 897, 873 S.E.2d 185 (quoting Walker v. State , 306 Ga. 44, 49, 829 S.E.2d 121 (2019) ). In addition, "juries ‘are presumed to follow curative instructions in the absence of proof to the contrary.’

Sanchez’s statement that Venturino told Sanchez over the phone that Cruz was going to kill him was at least "somewhat cumulative" of Venturino’s own testimony on that point. Walker v. State , 306 Ga. 44, 829 S.E.2d 121 (2019). Moreover, the State never again mentioned to the jury Venturino’s request to meet with Sanchez alone, indicating that it was not a significant component of the proof against Venturino.