The complaints center around defects in the report of sale, whereas the cases cited by Appellants point out that it is vital that the record contain an "Order of Sale." See, e.g. T EX. P ROB. C ODE A NN. § 825 (Vernon Supp. 1996); Walker v. Sharpe, 807 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). The record before us plainly contains an Order of Sale, dated June 14, 1995, thus Appellants' authorities are not applicable to cause a reversal of the trial court's judgment.
In Walker, no order of sale was ever entered; thus the decree confirming the sale was invalid. Walker v. Sharpe, 807 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). In Vineyard, the question for the appellate court to answer was whether an order of sale was a final, appealable order.
See id. The second type is a case in which the party alleges that the trial court committed substantial error in performing a discretionary act (type two). See id.; compare Walker v. Sharpe, 807 S.W.2d 448, 450-51 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied) (involving an order confirming the sale of property when the property was sold before the order issued authorizing the sale, contrary to probate code sections 331, 341-46, 353, and 355), and McDonald, 783 S.W.2d at 287 (involving the disproportionate distribution of the estate of intestate decedent, contrary to probate code section 45), with Nadolney, 116 S.W.3d at 280 (involving the trial court's determination that the appointment of an appraiser was necessary, an act within the trial court's discretion). III.
To prevail under a statutory bill of review, one must specifically allege and prove substantial errors by the trial court that need not appear from the face of the record, but may be proved at trial. Walker v. Sharpe, 807 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). The probate code defines heirs as "those persons, including the surviving spouse, who are entitled under the statutes of descent and distribution to the estate of a decedent who dies intestate."
The present case is therefore unlike Probate Code section 31 cases in which the party seeking a bill of review alleges that the trial court has acted in direct derogation of a specific, non-discretionary, provision of the probate code. See, e.g., Walker v. Sharpe, 807 S.W.2d 448, 450-51 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied) (involving order confirming sale of property when property was sold before order issued authorizing sale, contrary to Probate Code sections 331, 341-46, 353, 355); McDonald, 783 S.W.2d at 287 (involving disproportionate distribution of estate of intestate decedent, contrary to Probate Code section 45). In contrast, the question before Judge Herman was whether Taub had proved substantial error in Judge Olsen's discretionary act.
Christensen v. Harkins, 740 S.W.2d 69, 74 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1987, no writ). Under the Probate Code provisions dealing with judicial sales, both the order of sale and an order confirming the sale are necessary for a valid transfer from the estate, and title will not pass without the order and confirmation. Andrews v. Koch, 702 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tex. 1986); Walker v. Sharpe, 807 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). However, the decision to allow a judicial sale and the manner of sale are conclusively decided by the order of sale. Although a subsequent order confirming the sale is necessary to transfer title to the property and is specifically made appealable under the terms of section 355, the confirmation hearing addresses merely the fairness of the price and the conformity of the sale to the law and the provisions of the prior order of sale; it does not reopen the questions decided in the order of sale or amount to further hearings on the issues decided by that order.