In determining whether the entry of a default judgment is appropriate, the Court also weighs “(1) prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied; (2) whether the defendant appears to have a litigable defense; and (3) whether defendant's delay is due to culpable conduct.” Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 Fed.Appx. 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). All three factors weigh in favor of North American.
It is axiomatic that public defenders and appointed criminal attorneys do not act under color of state law in providing legal services to criminal defendants, and as such they are not proper Defendants in a civil rights matter and are immune from suit under federal civil rights laws for actions taken in the capacity of appointed counsel. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); see also Carter v. Kane, 717 Fed.Appx. 105, 108 (3d Cir. 2017); Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 Fed.Appx. 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014). As all of the claims contained in Plaintiff's complaint allege that counsel and the Office violated his rights by providing ineffective assistance as criminal counsel in his ongoing criminal defense, Defendants are immune from suit in a federal civil rights matter and Plaintiff's claims against them must therefore be dismissed with prejudice.
reraise a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, argue that this ineffective assistance should excuse his late filing of the three time barred claims for false arrest, false imprisonment and illegal search contained in his original complaint, and finally to raise a conclusory claim for alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Turning first to Plaintiffs claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court has already explained to Plaintiff that public defenders and appointed criminal attorneys do not act under color of state law in providing legal services to criminal defendants, and as such they are not proper Defendants in a civil rights matter and are immune from suit under federal civil rights laws for actions taken in the capacity of appointed counsel. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); see also Carterv. Kane, 717 Fed.Appx. 105, 108 (3d Cir. 2017); Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 Fed.Appx. 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs ineffective assistance claims against Defendant Morris thus fail to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983 as Morris's failings as a criminal or private attorney do not amount to state action, and are once again dismissed.
They are, therefore, not proper Defendants in a civil rights matter and are immune from suit under federal civil rights laws for actions taken in the capacity of appointed counsel. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); see also Carter v. Kane, 717 Fed.Appx. 105,108 (3d Cir. 2017); Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 Fed.Appx. 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs claims against his appointed attorney, all of which appear to be aimed at that attorney's failings in representing Plaintiff in criminal proceedings, fail to state a claim for relief and must also be dismissed at this time.
The same is true of public defenders and, in many situations, prosecutors. Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 Fed.Appx. 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[P]ublic defenders and court-appointed counsel acting within the scope of their professional duties are absolutely immune from civil liability under § 1983.”)
. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); see also Carter v. Kane, 717 Fed.Appx. 105,108 (3d Cir. 2017); Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 Fed.Appx. 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014). Because Defendant Farrow is not a proper Defendant for Plaintiffs civil rights claims, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against Defendant Farrow must also be dismissed with prejudice.
and it appearing that after a court is satisfied that the prerequisites for entering default have been met, it must consider the following three factors: 1) “prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied”; 2) “whether the defendant appears to have a litigable defense”; and 3) “whether defendant's delay is due to culpable conduct,” Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 Fed.Appx. 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014);
and it appearing that while the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges the improper transfer of $1,129,845.50, it does not adequately describe how it calculated its prejudgment interest; and it appearing that after a court is satisfied that the prerequisites for entering default have been met, it must consider the following three factors: (1) “prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied”; (2) “whether the defendant appears to have a litigable defense”; and (3) “whether defendant's delay is due to culpable conduct,” Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 Fed.Appx. 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014); Plaintiff alleges that it is entitled to a pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at Pennsylvania's statutory rate of six percent accruing from the date the funds were fraudulently transferred.
Turning first to his assigned attorney, it has long been recognized that public defenders and criminal defense attorneys are absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 for actions taken when acting in the scope of their professional duties as defense counsel as they do “not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); see also Carter v. Kane, 717 Fed.Appx. 105, 108 (3d Cir. 2017); Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 Fed.Appx. 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014). Thus, as Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Paul Zager derive from alleged errors made in performing a lawyer's traditional functions, he is immune from suit under § 1983 for these claims.
It is well-settled that “public defenders and court-appointed counsel acting within the scope of their professional duties are absolutely immune from civil liability under § 1983.” Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 Fed.Appx. 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014)