Walker v. Mills

12 Citing cases

  1. Quicksilver Resources, Inc. v. Eagle Drilling, L.L.C.

    CIVIL ACTION H-08-868 (S.D. Tex. May. 8, 2009)   Cited 5 times
    Distinguishing from Penncro an agreement that contained language that "special, indirect, or consequential damages shall be deemed to include, without limitation, . . . loss of profit or revenue" and finding that the parties at issue had used their contracting power to redefine "consequential damages"

    Relatively recently, the Northern District of Oklahoma cited the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which recognized "the hornbook rule that delegation of performance of a contract does not discharge the liability of the delegating obligor."Oral Roberts Univ. v. Anderson, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1339 (N.D. Okla. 1997) (citing Walker v. Mills, 78 P.2d 697, 699 (Okla. 1938)). "It is stated as a general rule that `a party to a contract may not, unless authorized by the other party, either in the contract itself of otherwise, so assign the contract as to escape liability for the performance of the acts or duties imposed upon him by its terms,' but the assignor remains liable to the other party for the proper performance by his assignee."

  2. Carnegie Techs., LLC v. Triller, Inc.

    No. SA-20-CV-00271-FB (W.D. Tex. Jun. 7, 2021)   Cited 1 times

    See also Quicksilver Res., Inc. v. Eagle Drilling, L.L.C., No. CIV.A. H-08-868, 2009 WL 1312598, at *8 (S.D. Tex. May 9, 2009) (“It is stated as a general rule that ‘a party to a contract may not, unless authorized by the other party, either in the contract itself of otherwise, so assign the contract as to escape liability for the performance of the acts or duties imposed upon him by its terms,' but the assignor remains liable to the other party for the proper performance by his assignee.”) (quoting Walker v. Mills, 78 P.2d 697, 699 (Okla. 1938) (quoting American Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum)).

  3. Carnegie Techs. v. Triller, Inc.

    SA-20-CV-00271-FB (W.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2020)

    Grand Ave. Partners, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1068 (internal citation and quotation omitted). See also Quicksilver Res., Inc. v. Eagle Drilling, L.L.C., No. CIV.A. H-08-868, 2009 WL 1312598, at *8 (S.D. Tex. May 9, 2009) ("It is stated as a general rule that 'a party to a contract may not, unless authorized by the other party, either in the contract itself of otherwise, so assign the contract as to escape liability for the performance of the acts or duties imposed upon him by its terms,' but the assignor remains liable to the other party for the proper performance by his assignee.") (quoting Walker v. Mills, 78 P.2d 697, 699 (Okla. 1938) (quoting American Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum)). Carnegie argues that neither the Note Assignment nor the Purchase Agreement contains an express release of Triller's obligations under the original Promissory Note. Carnegie also argues that an intent to release Triller from liability on the Note cannot be inferred from these contracts.

  4. Oral Roberts University v. Anderson

    11 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (N.D. Okla. 1997)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that prevailing party was entitled to attorneys' fees under an option contract, which had expired prior to litigation, because the parties were litigating their performance under the terms of the contract

    As stated above, however, a mere assignment of the rights under the option agreement does not end the contractual relationship between ORU and Anderson. Defendant Anderson has made no specific claim of consent to delegate a duty, and the Court finds nothing in the record to relieve Anderson of the hornbook rule that the delegation of performance of a contract does not discharge the liability of the delegating obligor. See, e.g., Walker v. Mills, 182 Okla. 480, 78 P.2d 697, 699 (1938). Finally, Defendants make specific objections to the attorneys' fees claimed by ORU.

  5. Fink v. Sheridan Bank of Lawton, Oklahoma

    259 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Okla. 1966)   Cited 2 times

    This is to say that there can be no conspiracy where the acts complained of, and the means employed in doing the act are lawful. Hughes v. Bizzell, supra; Walker v. Mills (1938), 182 Okl. 480, 78 P.2d 697; Shaw v. Cross (1921), 83 Okl. 273, 201 P. 811.          The Judge of the divorce court testified that he allowed the Sprague liens in his oral decision in the case rendered on December 23, 1964; that he did not carefully read the divorce decree presented to him and signed on December 29, 1964, and did not notice that the Sprague liens were not included therein; that when the omission was brought to his attention he corrected the same nunc pro tunc by the amendment to the divorce decree entered the following day, December 30, 1964.

  6. Gaylord Entertainment v. Thompson

    1998 OK 30 (Okla. 1998)   Cited 164 times
    Recognizing that federal case law provides a logical framework for determining the scope of the protection guaranteed by Oklahoma constitutional law.

    See Stiles v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 624 N.E.2d 238, 244 (Ohio.App. 1993).Claiborne, supra note 25, 458 U.S. at 928, 102 S.Ct. at 3433 (the Court held that nonviolent elements of boycott activities intended to bring about political, social and economic change are entitled to First Amendment protection); Jurkowski, supra note 85 at 62; Walker v. Mills, 182 Okla. 480, 78 P.2d 697, 700 (1938); Shaw v. Cross, 83 Okla. 273, 201 P. 811, 812 (1921).Jurkowski, supra note 85 at 62; Hughes v. Bizzell, 189 Okla. 472, 117 P.2d 763, 764 (1941).

  7. Brock v. Thompson

    1997 OK 127 (Okla. 1997)   Cited 106 times
    In Brock v. Thompson, 948 P.2d 279, 293 n.58 (Okla. 1997), the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted "Oklahoma jurisprudence teaches that one has the right to prosecute a lawful business without unlawful molestation or unjustified interference from any person, and any malicious interference with that business is an unlawful act and an actionable wrong."

    See Stiles v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 624 N.E.2d 238, 244 (Ohio App. 1993).N.A.A.C.P., supra note 34, 458 U.S. at 928, 102 S.Ct. at 3433 (the Court held that nonviolent elements of boycott activities intended to bring about political, social and economic change are entitled to First Amendment protection); Jurkowski, supra note 66 at 62; Walker v. Mills, 182 Okla. 480, 78 P.2d 697, 700 (1938); Shaw v. Cross, 83 Okla. 273, 201 P. 811, 812 (1921).Jurkowski, supra note 66 at 62; Hughes v. Bizzell, 189 Okla. 472, 117 P.2d 763, 764 (1941).

  8. Jurkowski v. Crawley

    1981 OK 110 (Okla. 1981)   Cited 20 times

    Barsh v. Mullins, 338 P.2d 845 (Okla. 1959). Such a statement of the nature of a civil conspiracy presupposes that there can be no conspiracy where the act complained of and the means employed are lawful. Walker v. Mills, 182 Okla. 480, 78 P.2d 697 (1938); Shaw v. Cross, 83 Okla. 273, 201 P. 811 (1921). This Court has previously held that a privilege defeating a claim of defamation renders the statements not unlawful, thereby defeating a claim of conspiracy where the means employed to achieve that purpose are also lawful.

  9. Sweeney v. Bay State Oil Gas Co.

    192 Okla. 28 (Okla. 1943)   Cited 21 times

    This raised the sufficiency of the pleadings to support the judgment. Walker v. Mills, 182 Okla. 480, 78 P.2d 697. Evidence was heard but none of the evidence was brought up, the appeals being by transcript. Appellants make three contentions: (1) That the plaintiff has no such title as gives it the right to partition; (2) that the purpose for which the property was acquired would be defeated by partition; and (3) that the effect of the partition decree is to abrogate the contract and substitute for it a different contract made by the court.

  10. Hughes v. Bizzell

    189 Okla. 472 (Okla. 1941)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that statements made at a hearing before University Board of Regents to determine if discharge of employee should be upheld are immune

    Mangum Electric Co. v. Border, 101 Okla. 64, 222 P. 1002; 11 Am. Jur. 543; 15 C.J.S. 996; 5 R.C.L. 1061; 12 C. J. 540. It follows from this definition that there can be no conspiracy "where the acts complained of, and the means employed in doing the acts, are lawful." Walker v. Mills, 182 Okla. 480, 78 P.2d 697. Plaintiff admits that the defendants had the right to discharge her without assigning any reason for so doing, but contends that they used unlawful means to do a lawful act, and that the unlawful means consisted of the false charges set out in the petition, and that by making such false charges she was defamed by the defendants. The question then is whether the occasion for making the charges constituted an absolute or only a qualified privilege. If the privilege was absolute, the acts of the defendants are not unlawful.