The questions asked and excluded were perhaps too general, and were close to asking the witnesses the very questions the jury were to answer by their verdict. See United States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498, 55 S.Ct. 273, 79 L.Ed. 617; United States v. Sauls, 4 Cir., 65 F.2d 886; Miller v. United States, 5 Cir., 71 F.2d 361, 362; Hamilton v. U.S., 5 Cir., 73 F.2d 357; Walker v. McLoud, 204 U.S. 302, 27 S.Ct. 293, 51 L.Ed. 495. Counsel seemed to think that by rejecting these questions the court was denying him the right to cross examine both positively and negatively. Though we do not think that was the purpose or effect of the rulings, the misunderstanding, pursued by counsel with persistence, perhaps with contumacy, caused so serious and heated a disagreement with the Court and an atmosphere so tense as to hinder, if not entirely prevent, a fair trial. If it is replied to this that it was the untactful, contentious, disagreeable, and almost personally offensive manner in which appellant's counsel conducted his case which brought down upon him the very mildly disciplinary action of the court, the record plainly shows that appellant's counsel was, in good faith, if not with good judgment, tact and finesse, endeavoring to represent his client to the best of his ability.
Such a duty does not, however, rest upon the drawee with reference to the signature of the payee or the signatures of the indorsers, and the drawee, in general, who pays out money on a forged indorsement, may recover such money from the holder who has presented and received the proceeds of the paper. Figuers v. Fly, supra; People's Bank v. Franklin Bank, 12 S.W. 716, 88 Tenn. 299, 6 L.R.A., 724, 17 Am. St. Rep., 884; United States v. National Exchange Bank, 29 S.Ct., 665, 204 U.S. 302, 53 L. Ed, 1006, 16 Ann. Cas., 1184; and see cases collected in note, L.R.A., 1916E, 539. Up to this point, as we understand the briefs, there is no difference between the parties hereto as to the law.
By section 19, art. 2, c. 48, of the General Statutes of Kentucky, as amended March, 1884, courts of equity were limited in the investments which they might authorize guardians to make of the money of their wards, to real estate or stocks or interest-bearing bonds of the United States, state of Kentucky, or some county or town of the commonwealth; and it was held that the Harrison chancery court was without power to exchange the beneficial interest of the minor heirs in real estate for shares of stock in a corporation; that the question was not one of irregularity, but as the power given was clear and specific, limitations upon its exercise must be strictly followed or the proceedings were a nullity. In Walker, Ex'r, v. McLoud, Trustee, 204 U.S. 302, 27 Sup. Ct. 293, 51 L.Ed. 495, the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, involving an analogous question. (138 Fed. 394, 70 C. C. A. 534), was sustained.
See also Jordan v. Jordan, 145 Tenn. 378, 239 S.W. 423 and Magevny v. Karsch, 167 Tenn. 32, 65 S.W.2d 562, 92 A.L.R. 343. So in Walker v. McLoud, 204 U.S. 302, 27 S.Ct. 293, 51 L.Ed. 495, it was held that where a statute authorized the sale of property for cash, a sale on credit was absolutely void. In Gibson v. Lyon, 115 U.S. 439, 6 S.Ct. 129, 29 L.Ed. 440, it was determined that a judicial sale confirmed by the court upon terms not authorized by law, was void, and the purchaser was without title upon which to base an action of ejectment.