OCGA § 46-9-132. See also Walker v. MARTA, 226 Ga.App. 793, 795 (1) (487 S.E.2d 498) (1997). Extraordinary diligence is defined as "that extreme care and caution which very prudent and thoughtful persons exercise under the same or similar circumstances."

[I]n an ordinary negligence case, opinion evidence alone is insufficient to grant summary judgment, because the weight and credibility of opinion evidence are for the jury to determine. Harrison v. Tuggle, 225 Ga. 211, 213 (2) ( 167 SE2d 395) (1969); Ginn v. Morgan, 225 Ga. 192, hns. 2, 3 ( 167 SE2d 393) (1969); Galloway v. Banks County, 139 Ga. App. 649, 651 ( 229 SE2d 127) (1976); see also Home Ins. Co. v. Sunrise Carpet Indus., 229 Ga. App. 268, 272-273 (2) ( 493 SE2d 641) (1997); Walker v. MARTA, 226 Ga. App. 793, 797 (1) ( 487 SE2d 498) (1997); Johnson v. Autozone, 219 Ga. App. 390, 393 ( 465 SE2d 463) (1995).FPI Atlanta, L.P. v. Seaton, 240 Ga. App. 880, 888 (5) (c) ( 524 SE2d 524) (1999) (physical precedent only).

Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 200 ( 296 S.E.2d 693) (1982). The mere occurrence of an unfortunate event is not sufficient to authorize an inference of negligence. Amos v. City of Butler, 242 Ga. App. 505, 506 (1) ( 529 S.E.2d 420) (2000); Walker v. MARTA, 226 Ga. App. 793, 798 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 498) (1997). A plaintiff must come forward with specific facts establishing a breach of duty, as well as the other elements of negligence, and may not rest upon generalized allegations.

While Boone stated his opinion that the conduct did not appear suspicious to him, in an ordinary negligence case, opinion evidence alone is insufficient to grant summary judgment, because the weight and credibility of opinion evidence is for the jury to determine. Harrison v. Tuggle, 225 Ga. 211, 213 (2) ( 167 S.E.2d 395) (1969); Ginn v. Morgan, 225 Ga. 192 (2), (3) ( 167 S.E.2d 393) (1969); Galloway v. Banks County, 139 Ga. App. 649, 651 ( 229 S.E.2d 127) (1976); see also Home Ins. Co. v. Sunrise Carpet Indus.,, 229 Ga. App. 268, 272-273 (2) ( 493 S.E.2d 641) (1997); Walker v. MARTA, 226 Ga. App. 793, 797 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 498) (1997); Johnson v. Autozone, 219 Ga. App. 390, 393 ( 465 S.E.2d 463) (1995). Further, Boone made certain admissions against interest which create a jury question as to his exercise of ordinary care.

See Doe, 268 Ga. at 605. Because Rappenecker did not point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue on the matter of LSE's purported failure to provide adequate security, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to LSE. Walker v. MARTA, 226 Ga. App. 793, 798 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 498) (1997) (physical precedent only). Judgment affirmed. Johnson, C. J., and Smith, J., concur.

Peterson contends that the trial court erred in finding that noncompliance with OCGA § 8-2-106 (a) created an adverse inference or rebuttable presumption of spoliation of evidence. Although we offer no opinion concerning Peterson's alleged negligence in performing a duty required by state law, nevertheless, we conclude that even assuming that such a breach of duty occurred, it was not the proximate cause of Finch's injuries. Walker v. MARTA, 226 Ga. App. 793, 798 (2) ( 487 S.E.2d 498) (1997) (physical precedent only). See Sharpnack v. Hoffinger Indus., 231 Ga. App. 829, 830 ( 499 S.E.2d 363) (1998) (summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff cannot establish a meaningful link between underlying claims and alleged spoliation.)

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Walker v. MARTA, 226 Ga. App. 793, 798 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 498) (1997). See also Cromer, supra at 549.

Since Jimmy Johnson failed to point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue on the matter of providing adequate security and a sufficient number of trains, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to MARTA. See generally Walker v. MARTA, 226 Ga. App. 793, 796 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 498) (1997) (physical precedent only). 2.

Thus, nothing about the Lopez decision changes the conclusion about the lack of foreseeability in this case. See also Walker v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 487 S.E.2d 498 (Ga.Ct.App. 1997) (affirming summary judgment against patron of metropolitan transit authority who brought action to recover for injuries as result of criminal assault while he was waiting for train at station because patron failed to show that authority had knowledge that particular route had history of violent and assaultive conduct by passengers, such that violent incidents occur daily or weekly, as would give rise to duty on part of authority as common carrier to prevent assault); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A cmts. e & f (explaining that a common carrier is not required to take precautions against a “sudden attack from a third person which he has no reason to anticipate” nor “required to take any action until he knows or has reason to know that the plaintiff is endangered”). The New York case cited by Plaintiffs, Farash v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 574 F.Supp.2d 356 (S.D.N.Y.

Id., 304. In Walker v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 226 Ga.App. 793, 487 S.E.2d 498, 500 (1997), the court considered whether the defendant, a common carrier, was entitled to summary judgment where the criminal conduct of a third party was unforeseeable. In that case, the plaintiff was on the platform of the Georgia State MARTA station when, suddenly and without provocation, two unknown individuals grabbed him and threw him onto the tracks.