• 2 The fatal flaw in plaintiff's argument is its premise, i.e., that the loss of a liquor license constitutes the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. For more than 80 years, the courts of this State have rejected arguments similar to plaintiff's and have steadfastly held that a license to sell alcoholic beverages is not a right but, rather, a privilege, subject to regulation under the police powers of the State, and that, as such, it is not afforded due process protection. A reverse chronological review of Illinois case law so holding includes the following decisions: Black Knight Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Oak Forest (1987), 159 Ill. App.3d 1016, 513 N.E.2d 109; Two Kats, Inc. v. Village of Chicago Ridge (1986), 147 Ill. App.3d 440, 497 N.E.2d 1314; Duncan v. Marcin (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 963, 403 N.E.2d 653; Huguley v. Marcin (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 230, 349 N.E.2d 564; Walker v. Marcin (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 791, 321 N.E.2d 406; Malito v. Marcin (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 658, 303 N.E.2d 262; People v. Smith (1938), 368 Ill. 328, 14 N.E.2d 82; O'Connor v. Rathje (1938), 368 Ill. 83, 12 N.E.2d 878; Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co. v. Mayor Commissioners (1937), 367 Ill. 310, 11 N.E.2d 388; People v. McBride (1908), 234 Ill. 146, 84 N.E. 865. • 3 Moreover, several of these decisions have specifically addressed and upheld the constitutionality of the Act, including the provision now codified as section 9-5. (See People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N.E. 865; People v. Smith, 368 Ill. 328, 14 N.E.2d 82; O'Connor v. Rathje, 368 Ill. 83, 12 N.E.2d 878; Huguley v. Marcin, 39 Ill. App.3d 230, 349 N.E.2d 564; Malito v. Marcin, 14 Ill. App.3d 658, 303 N.E.2d 262.)

In Illinois, which has local-option laws similar to those of Ohio, it has expressly been held that a person licensed to sell intoxicating liquor has no constitutional right to notice of an impending local-option election. See Malito v. Marcin (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 658, 303 N.E.2d 262; Walker v. Marcin (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 791, 321 N.E.2d 406; Huguley v. Marcin (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 230, 349 N.E.2d 564; and Liquor Hut, Inc. v. Marcin (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 718, 406 N.E.2d 139. A similar conclusion was reached in Philly's v. Byrne (C.A. 7, 1984), 732 F.2d 87, also involving a local-option election, in which it stated at 92: "* * * [N]otice and opportunity for a hearing are not constitutionally required safeguards of legislative action. * * *"

As to the licensees or residents of the precinct, the only notice required is the notice expressly provided for in section 5 of article IX of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 43, par. 170). (See Liquor Hut, 84 Ill. App.3d 718, 720, 406 N.E.2d 139, 141; Cooper, 44 Ill. App.3d 918, 920, 358 N.E.2d 1218, 1219; Walker v. Marcin (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 791, 321 N.E.2d 406 (abstract).) Moreover, this section provides that failure of the clerk to cause notice to be given or the failure to make publication of the submission of the proposition shall not affect the validity or binding force of the vote upon the proposition.

The published notice given here was in compliance with the Liquor Control Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 43, par. 170) and the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 46, pars. 12-1, 12-3). Notice identical to that given in the present case was approved in Walker v. Marcin (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 791, 321 N.E.2d 406, leave to appeal denied (1975), 58 Ill.2d 595. It has been consistently held that the Liquor Control Act's local option referendum provisions are constitutional, and that the only notice necessary is that provided for by the Act. See Huguley v. Marcin (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 230, 349 N.E.2d 564, and cases cited therein.

• 1 A license to sell alcoholic beverages at retail is not a right but a privilege, and as such it is not subject to the protection of due process under the Constitution. Malito v. Marcin (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 658, 303 N.E.2d 262, leave to appeal denied, 55 Ill.2d 602, dismissed for want of a substantial Federal question, 417 U.S. 963. • 2 In Walker v. Marcin (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 791, 321 N.E.2d 406, leave to appeal denied, 58 Ill.2d 595, complaints contesting the validity of two local option elections had been dismissed by the trial court. Plaintiffs had alleged that article IX, Local Referendum, of the Liquor Control Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 43, pars. 166 et seq.) was unconstitutional because it failed to provide for actual notice to resident voters and retail liquor licensees of the circulating and filing of local option petitions in violation of article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution and of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The court said: